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ABSTRACT
Ethnic and Racial Out-Group Attitudes and Interactions in Times of Increasing
Diversity
by
Annette Jacoby

Advisor: Richard Alba
Much attention has been devoted to the presumed negative effect of diversity
growth on various dimensions of attitudes and interaction between different racial
and ethnic groups. However, whether the claims hold true is unclear- there is a
considerable controversy over the impact of changing diversity on societal
behavior. With ongoing migration, the United States are becoming more and more
ethnically diverse but a sound debate on racial and ethnic composition and its
consequences for inter-group interactions and attitudes towards others has not yet
been possible due to a lack of causally-oriented panel studies.
In this study, two important features are tested: on the one hand, friendships to
racial or ethnic out-group members (Chapter IV), and on the other, attitudes
towards these people (Chapter V). To my knowledge, this study deploys one of
the first U.S. panel designs measuring diversity effect using two waves of panel
data from the Portraits of American Life Survey (2006-2012). Using different
measures of inter-group socializing and attitudes towards out-group members, this
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study explores whether changes in community diversity lead to changes in outgroup attitudes and contact across racial lines.
This study distinguishes whether the contextual effects take place on the tract or
city level, and whether individuals experiencing increases in diversity initially
lived in low, medium or high heterogeneity. Furthermore, separate results are
presented for non-Hispanic white and non-white respondents. The analysis on
attitudes differentiates whether the treatment (the change rate in diversity) is due
to changes in neighborhood composition for stayers and or to neighborhood
changes for movers.
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CHAPTER I

DIVERSITY GROWTH AS A CONTESTED TOPIC

Much controversy has surrounded the diversification of the U.S. population. Whether
diversification poses a social, economic, cultural and political threat to the U.S. continues
to be a contested topic. The election of Donald Trump, which is partially built on his
blatantly depreciative attitudes towards immigrants and racial and ethnic outsiders, has
facilitated negative out-group attitudes on the conservative right. Arguable studies such
as the famous analysis of social capital and diversity by Robert Putnam (2007) add fuel to
the flames by demonstrating that ethnically heterogeneous cities and regions show lower
levels of commitment to voluntary activities and other forms of solidarity behavior.
Residents of ethnically heterogeneous regions, according to Putnam, retreat into their
private life, offering an example of the conflicts that are inherent to immigration.
Nevertheless, it is assumed that the positive inter-group relations and attitudes are of
central importance for a successful coexistence under the conditions of increasing
cultural, religious and ethnic variety. Reducing negative stereotypes is just as crucial as
increasing empathetic ties and contact to racial and ethnic out-group members in diverse
neighborhoods and cities.
Huge demographic changes are taking place in the U.S. as a consequence of immigration
and the resulting racial and ethnic composition of the population. In demographic
analyses of the present and near future of U.S. race and ethnicity, it is often assumed that
children and adolescents are growing up surrounded by more diversity than were older
1

cohorts, pointing towards a postracial society (Perez & Hirschman, 2009). It has been
widely reported that half of the children born in the U.S. have at least one minority
parent, more and more global neighborhoods are developing (Logan & Zhang, 2010), and
destination areas with little history of immigration now face increasing influx by migrants
(Johnson & Lichter, 2010; Lichter, 2013a). But what do these changes mean? What effect
will the third demographic transition (Alba, 2012; Coleman, 2006) have besides
representational demographics?
While there are tendencies of growing tolerance towards individuals with a different
ethnic or racial background and of increasing interethnic engagement (Marsden, 2012)
there is a substantial part of academia arguing that diversity growth has detrimental
effects for community. As a distinguished voice in this debate, Robert Putnam (2007)
claims to have shown that ethnically diverse neighborhoods’ residents have lower trust,
community cooperation and fewer friendships, both within and between different racial
and ethnic groups. He argues that large immigrant groups or rapid immigration growth
rates tend to incite a feeling of threat and competition between ethnic groups – an
observation that traces back to Blalock (1967) and has been supported by current authors
like De Souza (2007), Greif (2009) and Alesina and LaFerrara (2000), amongst others.
These observations also have support from outside the US, for instance by the
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), that has conducted an "Ethnic
Diversity and Collective Action Survey" (Schaeffer, Koopmans, Veit, Wagner, &
Wiedner, 2011) and confirms the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and
communities' collective efficacy, social cohesion and interethnic trust.
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While the general tone of research has been rather negative about diversity’s communal
effects, there is much research that has demonstrated a positive association among
community, city-level ethnic diversity, and features of interethnic attitudes and
interaction. This research shows that increasing numbers of children will be exposed to
more diverse schools and neighborhoods, have a more diverse set of friends, will eat
more diverse food and watch more diverse TV programming. In line with the contact
hypothesis (Allport, 1979a; Sigelman & Welch, 1993), these heightened levels of
interethnic contact are associated with more harmonious inter-group relations, at least if
particular conditions are fulfilled. Additionally, intermarriages are on the rise and higher
rates of multiracial and multiethnic self-identification suggest that there is some degree of
blending of races and a “blurring of the color line” (Alba, 2012).
The report is divided into six major parts. Mainly relying on insights from the inter-group
contact and group threat theory, Chapter I discusses the theoretical framework underlying
the analytical approach discussed in Chapter II. The analytical description of this study
focuses on the benefits of panel data including two time points, the decision to evaluate
diversity effects by initial level of diversity and the two different levels of geography
employed in the evaluation. In Chapter III contextual diversity will be analyzed through a
demographic lens, adding to our spatial understanding of diversification for movers and
stayers and whites and non-whites. Building on the theoretical framework and this
demographic discussion, the following chapters deal with the question of how ethnic and
racial diversity affects contact across racial lines (Chapter IV) and the attitudes towards
others (Chapter V). In Chapter V, the analysis was divided into diversity effects on
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movers and stayers. Finally, the results are summarized and policy recommendations for
action are formulated in Chapter VI.

THEORY AND EVIDENCE: DIVERSITY, OUT-GROUP ATTITUDES AND
INTER-GROUP INTERACTION

In the following, the research is briefly explained from a theoretical perspective, after
which the data used and methodological approach are presented (Chapter II). Theories
that explain why diversity evokes certain kind of reactions are multiple and divergent.
There are two distinctive broad literatures that describe diverging effects of diversity on
immigration attitudes.
On the one hand, threat theories such as “inter-group competition,” “defended
neighborhoods,” and “disorganization” predict that increased diversity and out-group
presence decrease inter-group trust, give rise to racial and ethnic stereotypes and lead to
detrimental attitudes towards out-groups, including immigrants. On the other hand, the
contact hypothesis is the basis for arguments that diversity growth leads to higher
chances of contact across racial lines in schools, at work or in the neighborhood, which
reduces out-group hostility.
According to a meta-analysis, about half of the U.S.-based studies are mainly in line with
the threat-hypothesis, 20 percent are not and 30 percent show mixed evidence (Meer &
Tolsma, 2014). Theories range from the individual- to the macro-level, and encompass
both psychological and sociological viewpoints. In the following, light is shed on the
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macro-level out-group threat and inter-group contact theory, followed by three additional
theories that explain individual xenophobia.

Out-Group Threat Perspective
Much of the literature presents a pessimistic image of how shifting diversity impacts
communities. In general, studies based on a threat-perspective show that higher levels of
diversity have detrimental effects on out-group perception and attitudes towards
immigrants. One of the main reasons is that people do not “like” racial and ethnic
outsiders. Instead, people prefer their “own kind” and “flock together” on that basis. This
preference is visible with regards to intimate relationships, like dating, marriage and
friendship choice (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). But even on less intimate
levels, people tend to prefer being around the likes of themselves. For instance, studies
have found that individuals participated more and felt more comfortable in church when
they belonged to the majority group (Martinez & Dougherty, 2013). Similarly, they also
have a better impression of customer service administered by someone of their own race
(Montoya & Briggs, 2013).
Scholars offer numerous explanations for the stimulation of exclusionary and xenophobic
attitudes in the face of increasing diversity. The most widely used theories are “intergroup competition” and “defended neighborhoods,” which focus on out-group
proportions, out-group in-migration, or ethno-racial polarization. Furthermore, theories of
community erosion and disorganization in ethnically heterogeneous settings have been
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widely used to explain changes in neighborhood relations and a general deterioration of
interaction.
Proponents of inter-group competition theories have long argued that higher percentages
of racial and ethnic outsiders stir conflict and social tensions. They state that long-term
inhabitants feel threatened by the presence of out-group members due to real or perceived
competition between ethno-racial groups for scarce resources (Krysan, 2000; Quillian,
1995). The argument refers to competition over economic interests such as jobs or access
to housing or non-material issues such as political representation or the prevailing way of
life (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).
In a similar vein, the “defended neighborhoods” theory states that fears of out-group inmigration from adjacent areas triggers defensive behavior among members of the
dominant group to preserve a neighborhood’s way of life, which they feel is threatened
by the newcomers (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; B. J. Newman, 2013). This
argument is borne out in ethnographic studies of white urban neighborhoods, which
report that their residents share a sense of community identity that is based on closure to
other ethno-racial groups and the protection of acquired privileges. This has been
tellingly demonstrated in research conducted in Canarsie, New York (Rieder, 1987),
where inhabitants viewed their neighborhood as a "closed place" and a “safe haven” for
its inhabitants while keeping African-Americans out during the 1960’s and 1970’s.
A second classical line of research focuses on general community erosion and
disorganization as resulting from declines in social control (R. J. Sampson & Groves,
1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942) rather than threat and competition across groups. This
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approach argues that ethno-racial heterogeneity results in reduced social interactions
among neighbors, which again lowers overall levels of social control, efficacy and
capacities to solve community problems collectively. Typical work in this area focuses
on neighborhood disorder (R. J. Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999), whereby authors
emphasize that community erosion and disorganization boost overall rates of crime
(Hipp, Tita, & Boggess, 2009).
A frequent starting point for this line of research is Putnam’s (2001) widely used
distinction between "bridging" and "bonding" social capital. Bridging is the act of
transferring trust across group boundaries, whereas "bonding" fosters social cohesion as
well as identity and trust within the group, but not towards outsiders. Putnam’s research
encompasses some of the places in the U.S. with the highest overall trust scores, such as
New Hampshire and Montana, rural areas in West Virginia and East Tennessee, and
cities such as Bismarck, North Dakota and Fremont, Michigan, which tend to be
homogenously white. It also includes some of the least trusting places, such as Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and Houston, which are highly diverse cities. Even after
controlling for other variables such as civic participation, age, education, crime rates,
etc., a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital persisted. This
led Putnam to the conclusion that diversity actually causes certain community problems.
He notes that whilst the observed withdrawal from society is universal, it is particularly
evident in disadvantaged, high crime, ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods. In
Putnam‘s view, ethnic diversity itself seems to encourage withdrawal from communal
life (2007) and it is this “hunkering down” that he considers the most proximate
mechanism associated with low social cohesion and trust in diverse environments.
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In a random experiment, Enos (2014) tests what happens to out-group attitudes when
individuals of different ethnic backgrounds meet in urban contexts. For a short period,
he exposed members of homogenous white communities in Boston to a simulated
demographic change at their train station by assigning groups of Spanish-speaking
individuals to mingle on the platform. Astonishingly, he finds heightened levels of
exclusionary attitudes as a reaction to this minimal change in daily exposure to what
people perceive as “others,” broadly confirming the statements of the inter-group threat
perspective.

Inter-Group Contact Perspective
Inter-group contact theory posits that exposure to racial and ethnic out-group members
can decrease conflict, stereotyping and prejudice (Allport, 1979a). Allport also points
out that such contact only leads to a reduction of prejudices when four conditions are
met:
1. The contact should be between individuals with the same status.
2. Individuals should have common goals.
3. Individuals should cooperate to reach these goals.
4. The inter-group contact should be supported by authorities.

This idea has ancestry in the sociological founders, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and
Georg Simmel, who stressed early on that modern societies did not necessarily need to
be homogenous. These early sociologists argued that heterogeneity, brought upon
society through urbanization and industrialization, might weaken traditional forms of
8

social cohesion, but introduce opportunities for new kinds of networks and cooperation.
For both Ferdinand Tönnies and Émile Durkheim, the city is seen as the main center of
modernization processes. They agree that the traditional form of social integration was
bound to local space: the family, the neighborhood and the village. Both focus on
contrasting urban and rural life in order to illustrate the change in the nature and quality
of human relations in the transition to modernity. What sets them apart, is that for
Tönnies the spread of modern cities is a sign that the modern age of society
(Gesellschaft) has replaced the age of the community (Gemeinschaft) and will inevitably
lead to an artificial and self-centered coexistance in anonymity. While Tönnies
represents this culturally pessimistic position, Durkheim represents a positive, hopeful
assessment of the integrative potential of modern societies. For Durkheim, it is precisely
the modern Gesellschaft based on the division of labor, which he compares with a
functioning organism, while the Gemeinschaft is an close-knit community bound
together by mechanical solidarity. Durkheim celebrates the loosening traditional bonds
as a liberation from oppressive narrowness. Very much in line with Durkheim, Georg
Simmel demonstrated how changes in group composition can lead to altered group
processes that are not inherently inferior to traditional forms of social cohesion in premodern times.
Research shows that individuals with low levels of inter-ethnic and inter-racial ties are
more likely to develop an in-group bias. This preference goes hand in hand with hesitant
contact across racial lines or hostility propelled by stereotypes and prejudices. Intergroup contact theorists argue that much of the observed worsening of out-group attitudes
and perceptions can be attributed to the lack of inter-racial and inter-ethnic
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communication rather than the level of heterogeneity per se (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston,
2008). Laurence (2014) finds that the negative effects of diversity on inter-ethnic
attitudes only hold true for those individuals that do not have previous ties to members
of the out-group. Relying on the European Social Survey, researchers from the Berlin
Social Science Center (WZB) demonstrate that ethnic diversity has negative effects on
out-group perception when there is no actual inter-ethnic contact, supporting both group
threat and contact theory (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010).
Inter-group contact theory suggests that when such contact takes place in form of
communication and interaction xenophobic attitudes towards racial and ethnic outsiders
decrease. However, diversity and actual exposure/interaction should not be treated
equally. In fact, prior research has shown, that diversity growth can in some cases lead
to higher segregation (Wright, Ellis, Holloway, & Wong, 2014), especially for nonHispanic whites, Hispanics and Asians, while it has only beneficially decreased
segregation for blacks (Iceland, 2004a).
Apart from contact as a mediator, ethnic and racial diversity can also decrease out-group
hostility and stereotypes. Logan and Zhang’s “Global Neighborhood” (2010) concept
posits that increasing number of individuals, including whites, live in highly diverse
neighborhoods. In the most diverse of these neighborhoods, Asians and Hispanics create
buffers that allow for growth in the black population. Accordingly, blacks and whites
come into increasing exposure to one another, possibly decreasing racial animosity.
Further, a group of authors from Marburg, Hagen, Göttingen (Germany), Oxford
(England), Saint Andrews (Scotland), Stellenbosch (South Africa), Montreal (Canada)
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and Singapore investigated how contact between members of different ethnic and racial
groups affects mutual attitudes by means of surveys from Germany, various European
countries, the USA, Great Britain and South Africa (Christ et al., 2014). They show that
residential communities with a high proportion of migrants exhibit lower levels of
prejudices than residential districts where few people with migration background live.
Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that this effect is not only triggered by personal
contact. Prejudices are also demonstrably reduced if contacts between ethnic groups are
maintained in the environment in which respondents live, regardless of whether the
respondents themselves have contact.
Other research in this area focuses on diversity and friendship in schools and
universities. Chang’s (1996) multi-institutional study of inter-racial interaction proposes
that greater racial diversity in the student population leads to greater frequency of
socialization across race. Furthermore, students with few out-group friends are more
likely to make friendship decisions based on people’s skin color (Martin, Trego, &
Nakayama, 2010). Closely related, Fischer (2011) states that the contact hypothesis
applies to college students, especially with regard to white attitudes towards black
students.
In general, studies in school settings and work places differ from diversity effects in
more unstructured settings such as neighborhoods or cities. A potential explanation is
that the effect of diversity on out-group attitudes and contact across ethnoracial lines
mainly is a positive one when the interaction between the different racial and ethnic
groups takes place in a formal setting that relies on mutual recognition and cooperation
(Allport 1979a). Allport posits that individuals can develop better attitudes towards
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unknown races and ethnicities under certain circumstances among which institutional
support, equal social standing and exposure stand out the most. Thus, it is equally
important to look at diversity effects in social units where individuals can avoid intergroup contacts (neighborhoods) and in social units where inter-group contacts cannot be
avoided such as classrooms or workplaces (Marschall & Stolle, 2004; Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2006).

Moderators
In the debate over how diversity impacts xenophobic attitudes towards racial and ethnic
outsiders and minorities, several authors have found perceptions to be impacted by the
underlying socioeconomic context (Eric Oliver & Wong, 2003; Portes & Vickstrom,
2011, 2011; Tam Cho & Baer, 2011). While some scholars find negative effects of
increasing levels of diversity, they oftentimes conclude that the lower social interaction
and trust associated with rising ethnic diversity are due to the social disadvantage tied to
the neighborhood itself. This resource-driven approach stands in contrast to the “Putnam
camp,” because diversity as such is not seen as the actual driver of attitudes. Research
reveals that residents living in disadvantaged communities are significantly more likely
to distrust their community than those living in middle-class neighborhoods (Uslaner &
Brown, 2005). Living in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods creates fear, which
often translates into fear of racial and ethnic outsiders. Individuals living in
disadvantaged neighborhoods experience powerlessness and a lack of social support and
therefore start mistrusting others, withdraw from society, and develop fearful
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xenophobic attitudes towards outsiders. Furthermore, residents might be exposed to
higher levels of urban decay and violence and perceive threat and competition more
severely if they live in an area marked by low economic resources.

Individual-Level Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigrants
In addition to macro-level threat and inter-group contact theories, individual-level
explanations of immigration-related attitudes focus on levels of education (human
capital theory), interpersonal trust (societal integration theory) and feeling of threat
(individual threat theory).
Human capital theory proposes that individuals benefitting from higher education tend
to have more positive attitudes towards out-groups or minorities. In general, the
perception of racial and ethnic others is often based on whether they are perceived as
competitive or complementary workers. When low-skilled immigrants migrate to the
United States, low-skilled native workers will likely have more negative attitudes due to
the threat of job displacement and unemployment, which higher-educated natives fear at
a lesser extent. More highly educated workers often actually gain from the immigration
of low-skilled workers because various services, like landscaping and childcare, become
less expensive. Furthermore, education has been shown to positively influence tolerance
towards out-groups, either through an internalization of immigrant-friendly values or
through learning processes that dismantle racial and ethnic stereotypes (Jenssen &
Engesbak, 1994).
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While human capital theory certainly is an important explanatory determinant shaping
individual attitudes towards immigration, other crucial features influence individual
perception. With growing interest in the socio-psychological nature of xenophobia and
racial and ethnic stereotypes, perceived cultural threats are incorporated into this study
to explain the formation of immigrant-friendly and immigrant-rejecting attitudes.
Research has shown that some people feel that immigrants and local inter-group contact
are undermining their country’s culture and thus their own identity, and therefore hold
negative attitudes towards immigration. If you define yourself through national identity
and pride, you easily feel threatened by others. If the only aspect of life you identify
with is your racial or ethnic group, minorities or out-group members are more likely to
be perceived as a danger. Whether this is a negative attitude towards the unknown or
even the participation in a right-wing extremist group - anything that promises to bolster
one’s own identity looks tempting. A study by Sniderman et al. (2004) shows that it is
not only economic threats that form individuals’ attitudes towards immigration, but
rather “culturally threatening cues,” such as people speaking a different language, that
form negative out-group perception.
Interpersonal trust theory proposes that individuals with higher network trust, higher
trust in friends, neighbors and their family members tend to be more open-minded
towards those who are different from them. Interpersonal trust is crucial in facilitating
the cooperation and social coordination between individuals and is established through
regular face-to-face-interaction.
The following research plan delineates how both out-group threat and inter-group
contact theory will be incorporated into the models in Chapter IV and V while taking
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into account both macro-level moderators (tract- or city-level socio-economic status)
and micro-level determinants like individual-level human capital theory, interpersonal
trust and individual threat.
As I will point out below, this study focuses on whether diversity growth in
neighborhoods and cities triggers feelings of threat in individuals, which will be
measured through the willingness to interact with racial out-group members (Chapter
IV) and attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Chapter V). It is difficult to discern if
attitudes towards others influence out-group interaction, or if the interaction actually
shapes attitudes. On the one hand, inter-group contact theory asserts that an individual’s
out-group attitude is influenced by the interaction and contacts with racial and ethnic
others. In fact, scholars have found that friendship and interethnic contact are important
prerequisites for positive outward perception and attitudes (Martin et al., 2010). On the
other hand, attitudes towards racial and ethnic out-group members might impact the
likelihood of having out-group contact in the first place. Scholars have also provided
evidence that racial and ethnic socialization and the way a person has learned to perceive
racial and ethnic others influence interracial and interethnic interaction and friendship.
This school of thought applies well to school settings, where students’ choice of friends
is often reflected in the attitudes towards others inflicted by their families’ attitudes.
Researchers find that children of parents with negative racial attitudes tend to adopt this
perception, which then detrimentally affects cross-group friendships (Edmonds &
Killen, 2009).
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Geographical Level of Analysis
An issue to be addressed in the analysis concerns geographical level. Research on the
interaction between an area’s level of diversity and out-group attitudes and interaction
has been conducted on different levels of analysis, ranging from census tract (Eric
Oliver & Wong, 2003; Stolle et al., 2008) to county-level analysis (Branton & Jones,
2005). Rather than relying on one level of analysis, this study extends the research by
analyzing diversity effects for both tract and CBSA-level, which allows us to draw
potentially different conclusions.
Diversity has different effects on individuals when measured at different geographies (J.
E. Oliver, 2010). In a recently published paper using accurate measures of the ethnic
diversity in the 80 meters surrounding each individual’s residence, Dinesen and
Sønderskov (2015) find that ethnic diversity on the micro-level affects trust
detrimentally, while the effect levels off at higher geographic units. In contrast, other
papers show that city-wide or higher-level analysis reveals a detrimental effect of
heterogeneity growth, while at the neighborhood level an increased propensity of
individuals to engage with others and out-group members and higher rates of social
cohesion in general occur (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015). In a meta-analysis of previous
research Kaufmann and Harris find that 75 percent of relevant papers relate
neighborhood diversity to improving perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants and
minorities, while diversity growth at the metropolitan level is linked to higher feelings of
threat and animosity. There has been no sound explanation as to why these differences
might be, but they show the need to be careful about hypothesis formulation and
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analysis level. Since I have both tract- and city-level data, I will analyze both to see if
Kaufmann and Harris’ observations are supported.
Tract-level analysis pertains to fine-grained contexts that individuals live in and gets
closer to what we perceive as a “neighborhoods” and might depict what the racial and
ethnic makeup of living contexts looks like. Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA),
which consist of both metro- and micropolitan areas, on the contrary, reflect higher-level
political and social processes and might be affected in social policies. Even though
metropolitan areas typically include multiple political units, issues like housing and
employment are often administered and overseen at the metropolitan level, and
resources are (re)distributed by the city government (Wong, 1990).
Summing up, the present study investigates whether individuals’ reactions to
increases in diversity are in line with macro-level threat or inter-group contact
theories, controlling for individual-level human capital, interpersonal trust and threat
theory. However, the crux of the matter is that the analysis will be conducted for
both micro-level neighborhoods and more macro-level city-level analysis.
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CHAPTER II

DATA

The analysis relies on the Portraits of American Life Study (PALS),1 which is an
extensive, nationally representative panel study (see Map 1 below for the location of
counties included in the sample2) originally focused on religion in the U.S. Given the
relationship of race and ethnicity to religion in the U.S., the survey also collected data on
ethnic and racial diversity and inter-group relationships. In addition, the dataset includes
a range of variables describing moral and social attitudes and racial and ethnic selfassessment. Geographic identifiers (tract-level information for both 2006 and 2012) in
the confidential version of the data set were accessed through restricted-use files.
At present, the PALS comprises of two waves, which were collected in 2006 and 2012
and include 1,314 respondents who were interviewed in both years. Non-response
weights were also included for Wave 2. The dataset includes a sample of the U.S.
population above the age of 17 living in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who
are not members of the U.S. Armed Forces or inmates in institutional facilities, such
mental facilities, elderly homes or the U.S. prison system.
RTI International (Research Triangle Institute), a not-for-profit research organization,
helped the PALS researchers at Rice University to conduct five-stage sampling ensuring
1

Emerson, Michael O., David Sikkink, and Adele D. James. 2010. "The Panel Study on
American Religion and Ethnicity: Background, Methods, and Selected Results." Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 49(1): 162-171.
2
Due to confidentiality requirements, the map does not include tract locations, but
aggregated county locations.
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a randomized probability sample while also allowing for a racially diverse sample. The
dataset differs from truly random sampling (where individuals constitute the primary
sampling unit) in that researchers purchased residential addresses within 60
predetermined primary sampling units (PSUs) (based on 3-digit US zip codes).
Subsequently, approximately 120 5-digit zip codes were chosen from the initial 60
PSU’s, from which 248 postal carrier routes were extracted. Ultimately, roughly 10,000
addresses were selected through this multistage sampling procedure3.
The Portraits of American Life Survey includes sampling weights, which were taken
into account throughout the study. The weights are applied to align the sample with
overall census demographics4.
Based on the sampled addresses, interviewers visited households to conduct initial
screening interviews selecting one respondent from each household. On average, the
interviews took 75 minutes, were completed by 50 percent of those reached, who were
rewarded with an incentive of 50 Dollars. In 2006, 2610 interviews were completed with
population oversamples for Asians, Hispanics, and African Americans.
To provide contextual data for the respondents, community characteristics are taken
from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Censuses. Neither wave 1 nor wave 2 are concurrent to the
Census data, but were conducted 6 and 2 years after the respective census. A delayed
measure of individual-level attitudes could be an advantage, as some time has passed for
community changes in diversity to take effect.
3

Representativeness of the data will be established in Chapter III.
Stata’s “svy” command was used to identify the sample as complex survey data. All
regressions take into account the complex survey design and use weights to generalize to
make the data representative.
4
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Map 1. Counties in which random sample of respondents live, 2006
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KEY DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

As I have explained, the Portraits of American Life Survey offers the possibility to look
at key dimensions of out-group attitudes and inter-group bridging over two time points.
In the following, key variables derived from above-described theories will be presented.

Key Dependent Variables
This study proposes a two-step analysis to develop insights into how changing diversity
levels impact interethnic and interracial relations:
a) Diversity Effects on Changes in Out-Group Friendships
b) Diversity Effects on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants
Studying both inter-group friendships and out-group attitudes offers the possibility to
understand diversity effects from different angles. Diversity growth might have a
different effect on attitudes than on actual inter-group bridging and might shed light on
the disaccord between the threat and contact theory. As pointed out in Chapter I, it is
difficult to discern whether racial and ethnic attitudes shape interethnic contact or
whether there is a reverse causality. In fact, there is little etiologic discussion on this
topic and researchers often assume one causal direction or another. Authors such as
Powers and Ellison (Powers & Ellison, 1995) point out that while they find the contact
hypothesis to remain true empirically it also makes sense to switch the causal direction
to reveal the contingent nature of the contact hypothesis. While the goal of this study is
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not to answer whether attitudes influence contact or contact influences attitudes – it is
likely that causality operates in both directions – the above key variables are both
included in this analysis in Chapter IV and V.
While these two dependent variables should not be treated interchangeably, feelings
towards racial outsiders and immigrants might be similar in light of increasing
heterogeneity. One might even argue that diversity growth can trigger fear in
individuals, who then lump attitudes towards immigrants and racial out-group members
together. It has been shown that a feeling of threat towards “others” was conveyed
through both restrictive attitudes towards immigrants and negative stances on racial outgroup members - through a portrayal of criminal blacks and Hispanics, for instance
(Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005). Alternatively, diversity growth might lead to
improved attitudes towards immigrants and other races, or reactions could be different
for both groups. In terms of geography, immigration and diversity are linked: Much of
the increase in diversity stems from inflows of immigrants, which points to a coherence
between attitudes towards immigrants and other races. In Chapter III, the link between
ethno-racial diversity and immigration is explored at both the neighborhood and
metropolitan level.
a) Interaction with Racial Out-Group Members: Visiting or Inviting an Outgroup friend
Instead of focusing solely on attitudes and perceptions, which are sentiments not
necessarily leading to further action but rather connected to a perception of the
surrounding world, this analysis focuses on bridging towards people who are racially
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“different” by analyzing how diversity influences interracial home visits. The first part
of this study (Chapter IV) addresses contact across racial boundaries. The outcome of
interest is based on this PALS question: “In the past 12 months, about how many times
have you been in the home of a friend of different race or had them in your home?”
Numerous studies have relied on respondents’ reports on the racial and ethnic
composition of their circle of friends (De Souza Briggs, 2007; Fischer, 2011; Levin, van
Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; Martin et al., 2010). Though these reports might misrepresent
or exaggerate, it is important to call to mind that friendship is a measure that is not easily
understood and captured, because it is subjective and thus difficult to interpret. Instead,
this study focuses on the number of times interracial home visits take place. An
invitation into the home of a racial or ethnic other represents the most intense form of
bridging ties across ethno-racial divides. In other words, contact across racial lines at
home is included in the model since this measure operationalizes an intimate experience
of diversity in everyday life. Friendship ties are deliberate actions, compared to neighbor
trust or even co-worker ties (that are involuntary), and they often involve regular or
frequent face-to-face contact and communication. Friendship ties are important sources
of emotional aid, companionship and assistance (Wellman & Wortley, 1990), and they
are ranked high among the things that matter most in life (Klinger, 1978).
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b) Attitudes towards racial and ethnic out-group members: Perceptions of
immigrants in the U.S. job market
After having analyzed diversity effects on changes in out-group bridging, I study
changes in attitudes towards immigrants and the way this is affected by changing
patterns of diversity (Chapter V).
The attitudinal measures will tell us little about the actual contact and interaction
between members of different racial and ethnic groups. Instead, they inform us about
how respondents feel, how they perceive the world around them and find their own
social and political position in changing environments. While the quality and frequency
of contact across racial lines certainly influence attitudes towards racial and ethnic
others, attitudes towards and perceptions of individuals with an immigrant background
are an important prerequisite before they can talk to and potentially even befriend each
other.
This part of the analysis relies on a key dimension of out-group attitudes: the belief that
immigrants take away “native jobs.” The question asked to capture individuals’ attitudes
towards immigrants is worded: “Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too many
jobs away from other American citizens” offering interviewees a 1-5 response scale. My
choice in outcome was limited by the over-time design of the study and the limited
availability of variables measuring out-group attitudes over time. As I will demonstrate
in the following, however, I am confident that the above outcome adequately represents
individuals’ overall perception of immigrants in the U.S..
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Key Independent Variables
Below, light will be shed on the independent variables that will be used as controls in
the analysis of attitudes towards immigration and contact across racial lines. The main
independent variables are diversity and diversity growth rates respectively. Furthermore,
I adjust for education (human capital theory), interpersonal trust (societal integration
theory) and feeling of threat (individual threat theory). There are additional independent
variables that I will take into account. In the following, key potential confounders will
be discussed that must be taken into account even though they might not be shown into
the final models.

I) Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Diversity Growth
It is important to bear in mind that racial and ethnic diversity can be captured through
various kinds of diversity measures in the literature. As I demonstrate in Chapter III,
diversity can be assessed by focusing, merely, on the share of people belonging to a
particular (majority or minority) ethnoracial group in a given area. With regards to race
and ethnicity in the U.S., it can make sense to study the proportion of an area’s
population that is foreign-born. In Chapter V, dealing with attitudes towards immigrants,
such an approach is undertaken. While this might be sufficient in some regions that are
mainly marked by the presence of two major groups, actual diversity cannot be
measured this way. Instead, this study relies on measures of multi-group diversity.
What is common to most of the measures of diversity is that a single value describes
both the complex evenness (how evenly distributed the abundances of the ethnoracial
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groups are) and richness (simple count of ethnoracial groups) of a neighborhood or city.
While an increase in the relative or absolute size of each racial or ethnic group results in
higher diversity score, different kinds of measures vary in their sensitivity to richness
and evenness. In line with established scholars, this study relies on the Simpson
diversity index, which is also referred to as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) or
Blau Index in economics (Laurence, 2011; Schaeffer, 2013). This measure has been
shown to be more susceptible to racial and ethnic evenness, but takes into account both
the quantity of different races and ethnicities present and the number of individuals with
each race or ethnicity5. The Simpson Diversity Index is a highly popular measure of
fractionalization and concentration used by ecologists, biologists, ecologists,
geographers, psychologists, economists, demographers and sociologists. Part of the
popularity derives from it’s clear interpretation (the probability of two individuals
belonging to different groups ranging from 0 to 1), while other indices are harder to
grasp. Due to it’s intuitive interpretation, the Simpson Diversity index has been widely
used in order to measure diversity, both in terms of evenness and richness. Within the
field of sociology, the Simpson Diversity index has been heavily relied on to describe
the effect of diversity on trust (Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015; Fisher Williamson,
Abigail, 2013; Putnam, 2007), on ethnoracial conflict (Legewie & Schaeffer, 2016),
social cohesion (Meer & Tolsma, 2014; Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Kuha, & Jackson,
2014). Furthermore, Simpson diversity has been shown to be better for small sample
sizes, because the relative standard variation is kept low when compared to other
diversity measures (Magurran, 2003).
5

For a discussion of weaknesses and disadvantages associated with the Simpson
Diversity measure, please read the section on study limitations in Chapter VI.
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Based on 2000 and 2010 Census data for both the CBSA and tract level five mutually
exclusive racial and ethnic groups (non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, Asian, other)
were used to calculate the Simpson's Diversity Index, which measures the probability of
two randomly selected individuals belonging to a different race or ethnicity (Simpson,
1949):
!

! =1−
!!!

!! (!! − 1)
!(! − 1)

where
!! = the total number of people of a particular race or ethnicity
! = the total number of people of all groups

There will be a score of 0 if all individuals in a tract belong to the same group, whereas
1 means absolute heterogeneity. In the PALS sample, the diversity scores of all the tracts
range from 0.0039 to 0.79, with the sample mean being 0.37.
However, solely relying on the Simpson diversity index might result in a biased and
oversimplified analysis. It might be useful to compare how different measures of
heterogeneity relate to each other (Schaeffer, 2013). The Entropy score is another widely
used diversity measure, and will be used as a cross-reference and sensitivity analysis in
this study (Iceland, 2004b).
As Iceland points out it is important to distinguish between the Entropy index and the
Entropy score, two very different measures that are often used interchangeably. The
entropy index measures diversity as the distribution of ethnoracial groups across
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neighborhoods with regard to the overall region’s entropy (and as such is a measure of
segregation), while the score pertains to the overall entropy of a given region. It is
calculated as

, where p describes a particular group’s share of the total population in a given area.
The entropy score ranges from 0 (when all individuals in an area belong to the same
ethnoracial group) to infinite (relies on the number of groups included into the
calculation). In this study, the maximum entropy is 1.609, as all five groups taken into
consideration in this study would hypothetically make up an equal share of 20 percent.
In fact, such a high level of diversity is not reached. U.S.-wide, the average Entropy
score is .662, while the sample mean is similar at 0.621. The maximum level of entropy
recorded is 1.53 for the whole nation and 1.48 for the PALS sample. In order to get a
better understanding of how low-, medium- and high-diversity areas are composed and
how the Simpson diversity and Entropy score relate to each other, three hypothetical
examples were chosen.
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Table 1. Hirschman/Herfindahl Index/Simpson Diversity and Entropy Score in
three exemplary CBSAs

Spirit Lake, IA
Micro Area
SeattleTacomaBellevue, WA
Metro Area
San FranciscoOaklandFremont, CA
Metro Area

NonHispanic
White
16255

Black

Asian

Other

Hispanic

HHI/S*

E**

29

72

22

178

0.04

0.11

98.18%
2340577

0.18%
185061

0.43%
389309

0.13%
65123

1.08%
309476

0.47

0.96

71.15%
1810300

5.63%
349895

11.83%
994616

1.98%
53968

9.41%
938794

0.69

1.30

43.65%
8.44%
23.98% 1.30%
22.63%
* HHI/S: Hirschman/Herfindahl Index/Simpson Diversity
** Entropy Score
Highlighted fields constitute majority groups (larger than 10 percent of the total
population)

Table 1 shows three examples from CBSA-level dataset that depict low-, medium- and
high-level diversity as it is used in this study. As we can see, low diversity CBSAs (both
in terms of Simpson diversity and Entropy score) are dominated by one particular
ethnoracial group, while other groups are marginalized. Medium-level CBSAs, such as
Seattle, most commonly have one dominant group, but the other groups are less
marginalized and have stronger presence.
What is noticeable from Table 1 is that Simpson diversity and the Entropy score seem to
relate to each other, indicating collinear behavior. To test this assumption, a pairwise
correlation between Simpson/Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the Entropy score was
conducted, which confirms that the measures are highly correlated.
29

Figure 1. Scatterplot Entropy Score 2000 and Simpson Diversity Score 2000

Figure 1 shows that the Simpson Diversity index and the Entropy index are associated at
.989 (Adjusted R-squared = 0.979) at the tract-level. Due to the strong correlation and in
order to avoid redundancy, the focus of this study lies on Simpson diversity, but some of
the maps and analysis were conducted using the Entropy score.
Based on the Simpson diversity scores for 2000 and 2010, diversity increase rates were
calculated for the change-models. I decided to use diversity increase rates (growth rates),
rather than differences between 2000 and 2012. It is important to remember that increase
rates should always be seen relative to the size of the base diversity. The main reason for
this decision was that diversity growth rates allow for better comparison across different
parts of the country, both on the CBSA and tract-level. For instance, some tracts in
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Queens in New York have among the highest diversity scores in the nation, which
makes it hard to compare diversity growth in such diverse places with diversity growth
in low-diversity areas. Imagine two different tracts (Tract 1 and 2) experiencing
diversity growth of 0.2 on the Simpson scales ranging from 0 to 1. If Tract 1 has an
initial diversity score of 0.1 (rising to 0.3) and Tract 2 lies at 0.4 (rising to 0.6), then
diversity would have grown 200 percent for the lower-diversity tract and 50 percent for
the higher-diversity tract. In other words, low-diversity tracts and CBSAs oftentimes
have smaller diversity gains, but diversification might be rising at a steeper rate the same
absolute increase in high-diversity tracts in Queens, for instance. In that sense, growth
rates are more sensitive to lower-diversity neighborhoods and cities, and level the
playing field across the nation. I argue that increase rates do a better job of capturing the
“felt” growth of diversity, especially for individuals in low-diversity neighborhoods and
cities, for whom heterogenization might feel more intense and overwhelming than for
individuals accustomed to these kinds of changes. The reliance on growth rates will be
particularly beneficial when comparing reactions to diversification across low, medium
and high initial diversity in Chapter IV and V.
As I have pointed out before it is not sufficient to analyze diversity effects at one
particular geographical level. In fact, prior research seems to indicate that some of the
inconsistencies we find in the literature might be due to the use of different geographies.
Therefore, I will construct contextual diversity measures for both the city and
neighborhood level. Census tracts were used to approximate neighborhoods. These are
relatively small geographic units with 4,000 inhabitants on average. The PALS sample
includes 1,314 respondents spread across 273 census tracts. It is common in the urban
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literature to equate neighborhoods with census tracts, as they are the best available
administrative geography at this scale. The larger urban context is approximated through
Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), which cover both Metropolitan and Micropolitan
Statistical Areas. There are 54 such areas in the sample.
It is important to keep in mind that this analysis relies on administratively drawn tracts
and Core Based Statistical Areas whose delimitations of area are therefore subject to
boundary changes between censuses. The study uses 2010 Census tract and city
boundaries filled with 2010 data and adjusted values for 2000 in order to make sure that
neighborhood and city boundaries are comparable across time. NHGIS6 standardizes the
2000 data in these time series tables to 2010 census geography in two steps, first
allocating census counts from 2000 census blocks to 2010 census blocks and then
summing the reallocated 2000 counts for all 2010 blocks that lie within each target 2010
unit. Where a 2000 block intersects multiple 2010 blocks, NHGIS applies areal
interpolation to estimate how the 2000 block characteristics are distributed among the
intersecting 2010 blocks.
II) Trust
This analysis includes individual-level social trust, which is highly important for
building cohesion and peaceful cooperation among different members of society
(Morrone, Tontoranelli, & Ranuzzi, 2009). Newton and Zmerli (2011) distinguished
between particular social trust – trust in known others (friends, family, neighbors) – and
general social trust – trust in unknown others. Similarly to Newton and Zmerli’s work,
6

Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0
[Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0.
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the present paper includes two condensed variables that will be referred to as “Trust
towards Family and Relatives” (mainly family) and “General Trust towards others”
(neighbors, friends and strangers) in the following. These measures were obtained
through factor analysis (see varimax rotated outcomes below, Table 2) based on the
PALS statements: R has completely trusted family/friends/neighbors/strangers in past 12
months.
Table 2. Types of trust created through Factor Analysis and Scoring Coefficients
(based on Varimax Rotated Factors)
Variable
Complete Trust in Family
Complete Trust Neighbors
Complete Trust in Friends
Complete Trust in Strangers

General Trust
towards Others
0.007
0.526
0.444
0.460

Trust towards Family
and Relatives
0.854
0.129
0.138
-0.455

Since these two constructed scales tap the same underlying factors (family and
general trust towards others), it is important to verify how good the scale is using
Stata’s alpha command, which calculates scale reliability coefficient Cronbach’s
Alpha. For trust in neighbors, friends and strangers, Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.71
indicating that the correlation is fairly high.

III) Human Capital
As described in the theory section, less well-educated individuals tend to show more
prejudices and xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants and racial and ethnic others; that
is, minorities with whom these educational groups generally compete in the less well33

qualified labor market segments. Educational advances and cognitive abilities, by
contrast, weaken attitudes of this kind. In this study, four levels of education were taken
into account: (a) less than or no High School Degree (reference category), (b) graduated
from High School, (c) some College, (d) College degree and more.
IV) Individual Threat Theory
As explained before, threat is expected to be an important factor in shaping people’s
attitudes towards and interaction with racial or ethnic outsiders. In this dissertation,
individual-level threat is measured through both the
(a) Feeling of safety in neighborhood measured through the question:
How Often Has R Felt Unsafe In Current Neighborhood? (Recoded into never
and once or more) and
(b) Feeling that one’s own racial group is in- or decreasing in neighborhood
(measured through the statement):
Will Percent of R’s Race In This Neighborhood Increase Or Decrease In Future?
(recoded into yes and no)

The reason that these two variables were included is that it can be expected that
individuals who feel their social being is threatened, either through unsafe neighborhoods
or a relative decrease in the numbers of people like themselves will often blame outsiders
for their loss of identity and orientation. While it is important to differentiate between
actual neighborhood safety and perceived safety, racial and ethnic others are often
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accused of increasing real or perceived crime rates and violence, which detrimentally
affects attitudes.

V) Movers and Stayers
As I will show in more detail in Chapter III, the diversity experiences of movers and
stayers are inherently different. The origins of diversity changes are quite different for
movers and stayers, which might reflect in differential reactions to changes in diversity.
While changes in neighborhoods for stayers might disrupt familiar processes and
introduce unknown dynamics, residential mobility is different in the sense that
individuals leave their habitual living situations and networks and choose a new context.
As research has shown (Oishi, 2010), individual residential mobility is closely related to
decreases in social capital (the density of social networks marked by trust and
cooperation) and collective efficacy (the ability to control neighborhood behavior through
shared values and goals). In addition, living in the same neighborhood over extended
periods of time has been shown to encourage prosocial behavior (Oishi et al., 2007).
Furthermore, movers and stayers might initially be different in their likelihood to move
based on their preferences for diversity. Stayers are expected to show either no significant
reaction as those that do not approve of neighborhoods with increasing diversity could
potentially move away, or negative reactions, as those that cannot move experience
changes in their neighborhood. Reactions by movers are expected to be different: if
individuals have different preferences for neighborhoods and decide to move based on
these, it can be expected that they show negative reactions to rising diversity, because the
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new neighborhood might not fit their expectations. On the other hand, the assumption
that movers take informed choices and relocate to neighborhoods that are in accordance
with their racial and ethnic preferences could also imply that they react well to changes in
neighborhood diversity.
The analysis of out-group friendships in Chapter IV focuses on stayers only. People who
move to new neighborhoods oftentimes lose trust in their friends, lose friends they trust,
spend less time with people close to them (Oishi, 2010) and think of friendships as
disposable (Gillath & Keefer, 2016). Hence, including movers could produce misleading
results. While Chapter IV focuses only on stayers, Chapter V includes a careful
distinction between movers (those individuals that moved to a new neighborhood
between 2006 and 2012) and stayers (those that individuals that remained in their
neighborhood between 2006 and 2012).

VI) Socio-demographic controls
I include data on the age and gender of a person. I also include ethno-racial background
in the overall models. Despite the imprecision of the basic measure, separate models will
be implemented that look at a broader White/non-White distinction as well.
I expect different results for each racial and ethnic group, as different groups might feel
more or less threatened and might experience different levels of diversity beforehand.
Various scholars have demonstrated that diversity growth mainly effects whites’ attitudes
detrimentally (Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2016; Stolle et al., 2008), triggers
demographic anxiety (Trawalter & Richeson, 2008), and fosters preferences to interact
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and converse only with other whites. Furthermore, diversity growth results in white
respondents believing that the increased presence of minority residents (in particular
black residents) leads to an anti-white bias (Rae, Newheiser, & Olson, 2015).
Interestingly, scholars have drawn a distinction between those whites that are actually
exposed to more diversity versus those white respondents who merely perceive the threat
of an increasing minority population. While the feeling of threat through a seemingly
expanding minority population is related to actual diversity, a discrepancy in “real” and
“perceived” population composition might actually drive prejudice and fear of ethnic and
racial minorities (Alba et al., 2005). Supporting this line of thinking, researchers have
demonstrated in experiments that whites who read fake news paper articles titled “In a
Generation, Ethnic Minorities May Be the U.S. Majority” reacted with higher racial bias
than those respondents that read a more neutral article on U.S. demographics (Craig &
Richeson, 2014). While these results are very insightful, it is important to evaluate also
how people react to actual changes in the neighborhood and cities rather than focusing on
the idea of increasing power of the minority population.

While the bulk of research has been conducted on non-Hispanic white attitudes towards
minorities and immigrants, there are a few papers that analyze black attitudes towards
immigrants (Diamond, 1998), showing that the threat-perspective also holds true for this
group but is less pronounced than for whites. However, it seems oversimplified to
conclude that racial and ethnic xenophobia is a problem of mainly whites; in situations of
increased competition for scarce resources like jobs and housing, out-group hostility and
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in-group interaction could occur for any well-defined group (McClain, 2006; McClain &
Tauber, 1998).
VII) Length of residence
Individuals who have lived in a given neighborhood for a long time are more likely to
have more friends in general. Robert Sampson (1988) found that length of residence was
positively linked to number of social ties and frequency of participation in social leisure
activities at both the individual and neighborhood level. Furthermore, residential stability
is related to more pro-social community and helping behavior (Oishi et al., 2007).
Nevertheless it is reasonable to hypothesize that individuals who have lived in their
neighborhood for a very long time are less comfortable with any changes and might react
negatively to increases of diversity in their surroundings.
VIII) Homeownership
Homeownership could be of importance to the generation of interethnic bridges and
might influence the perception towards and interaction with racial or ethnic others.
Owners are more likely to live in one location for a long period of time and are more
likely to have a sense of concern for the neighborhood due to their financial investment in
their own home. Home ownership positively impacts residents’ life satisfaction, which is
the same for quality of neighborhood, and has been shown to be an important individual
characteristic contributing to the formation of social cohesion in several studies (R.
Sampson, 1988).
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X) Additional Macro-Control
Alongside the analysis of racial and ethnic diversity, a neighborhood’s or CBSAs average
socioeconomic status will be incorporated. In line with prior research this study measures
socioeconomic status as the percentage of individuals above the age of 25 with a college
degree (Branton & Jones, 2005).

METHODOLOGY

There is no need to verify if diversity and individual attitudes towards and interaction
with racial and ethnic outsiders are related. The existing positive association between
racial and ethnic diversity and perception of and interaction with racial and ethnic others
has been confirmed in countless research projects (Laurence, 2014; Martin et al., 2010;
Stolle et al., 2008) and also holds true in the cross-sectional section of this project.
While two time points are by no means sufficient for making a causal argument, the study
takes an important step towards understanding the directionality of diversity effects.
Rather than focusing on one type of social integration, this paper examines two different
aspects: changes in friendships (Chapter IV) and changes in attitudes (Chapter V).
As pointed out before, analyzing repeated cross-sections of data offers interesting insights
into associations, but impedes causal statements. One of the major problems with the
existing literature on neighborhood effects is that the apparent impacts identified in crosssectional research may not be causal but instead driven by selection bias. Selection bias is
a common difficulty researchers need to address when an individual’s location in a
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particular neighborhood is dependent on the outcome variable and therefore violates the
assumption that an independent variable is uncorrelated with the error term in a
regression equation. For instance, the effect of healthy food stores in the neighborhood
might mistakenly be identified as a contextual effect on individual’s higher health
outcomes when in fact individuals who attach more value to health decide to live in
vicinities that offer them the food they seek. While scholars are aware of this problem
and try to account for the bias through econometric modeling techniques, it is also
important to focus on patterns of residential mobility and sorting into and out of
neighborhoods. In our case this means: How do we know that those studies showing that
increasing diversity is positively related to attitudes towards immigration and contact
across racial boundaries are not biased by the fact that individuals with a preference and
higher propensity to live in heterogeneous neighborhoods relocate to more diverse
neighborhoods?
Although it is known that selection bias can overstate neighborhood effects, few U.S.based papers have tested the causal assumptions that both contact theorists and groupthreat advocates have made with regard to out-group attitudes and interethnic bridging.
Several studies from Germany, the Netherlands and Britain pose intriguing exceptions
that address this causal inference problem. In the paper “Moving to Diversity: Residential
Mobility, Changes in Ethnic Diversity, and Concerns About Immigration” Merlin
Schaeffer and Bram Lancee (2015a) use longitudinal data from Germany and show that
respondents who move to more diverse settings show worsening attitudes towards
immigration over time, while those who stayed and those who moved to equally diverse
neighborhoods did not show any reaction. In the British context, Kaufmann and Harris
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(2015) use 20 years of longitudinal data to address the selection bias of those moving out
of diverse neighborhoods, leaving behind a seemingly more tolerant population. Studying
affective attachment to the community, Laurence and Bentley (2015) use 18 years of
panel data – and very similarly to Schaeffer and Lancee – and use subgroups to determine
whether the change rate in diversity stems from a community increasing in diversity
around individuals who do not move (stayers) or individuals moving into more or less
diverse communities (movers).
To my knowledge, the only two causal U.S.-based papers were written by Enos (2014),
testing effects of real-life diversity growth on train commuters in Boston, and Fischer
Williamson (2013), who uses a natural experiment to demonstrate diversity effects on
social capital. The place of investigation was Lewiston, Maine, which was a
homogenously white city before the influx of Somalis in 2001. Partially supporting Enos’
observations, Fischer Williamson’s analysis shows that detrimental effects of
concentrated Somali populations on trust and friendship was only measurable at the
neighborhood-level, but not at the city-level. While scholars outside the U.S. support both
the threat and contact theory, these two longitudinal papers convey a relatively dismal
validation for the threat hypothesis.
Multinomial logistic change-models will be implemented to examine following
hypotheses:
H1a: Increasing levels of diversity produce higher levels of interethnic bridging
and improved attitudes towards “others” at the neighborhood level, but not at the
city level.
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H1b: Initial level of diversity is expected to play an important role in determining
‘movers’ attitudes and propensities to interact with ethnic or racial out-group
members. Residents who move from heterogeneous communities to more diverse
settings are expected to report an increase in interethnic bridging and improved
attitudes towards “others” over time, while those people with low levels of prior
experience with diversity might show less favorable attitudes.
H1c: At the neighborhood level, increasing levels of diversity produce lower
levels of interethnic bridging and worsening attitudes towards “others” for
movers, but not for stayers.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH
In the following description of the analytical approach, seven consecutive steps will
contribute to an overarching understanding of diversity effects. Thereby, models will be
dissected by movers and stayers, level of geography (CBSA and Census tract), Whiteand Non-White dichotomy and level of initial diversity.
A) First Step- Cross-Sectional Models
In the first step, cross-sectional association between racial and ethnic diversity and outgroup perceptions and inter-group bridging for both 2006 and 2012 are tested. In line
with the theoretical discussion, contextual effects for both tracts and metropolitan areas
are measured. Hierarchical modeling was not used in the analysis, because 30 percent of
the sample consisted of individuals that did not share their tract with another individual in
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the sample. In other words, the variance within many tracts is 0. Regular multinomial
logistic regression models are estimated to predict the independent effects of ethnic and
racial diversity on out-group perception and interaction.
B) Second Step- Using Panel Data
The analysis must still confront the problem that communities are dynamic environments
and a cross-sectional approach to this analysis will tell us more about geographical
covariation of social cohesion and diversity rather than about effects of changes in
diversity on changes in attitudes or interaction. Therefore, examining relationships
through two-time point panel data is a critical step towards establishing causality.
To examine whether diversity has a positive or negative effect on changes in attitudes and
contact across ethnoracial frontiers, I regress changes in out-group perception and outgroup interaction on changes in diversity. This study posits that if diversity does have an
effect on individuals’ outward perception and interaction with “others,” owing to threat,
anomie, contact etc., then a change in the level of diversity should elicit a change in an
individual’s behavior and attitude.
C) Third Step- Preliminary Analysis of Movers and Stayers
As pointed out before, the analysis of out-group friendships in Chapter IV will only deal
with stayers, because movers relocating to new neighborhoods might differ in the
perception of friendship and often change their friendship behavior due to the move itself,
which would distort the results.
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In Chapter V, the mover/stayer distinction is included for the tract-level analysis, because
attitudes can be taken to a new neighborhood and do not necessarily change due to the
move. A CBSA-level distinction between movers and stayers will not be implemented, as
only eight percent of the sample relocated from one CBSA to another between 2006 and
2012; instead, 34 percent of the respondents moved to a new census tract, usually within
the CBSAs boundaries. In order to state which consequences a change in diversity will
have on changes in individual attitudes in Chapter V, an interaction of change in diversity
with the mover/stayer dichotomy will be included.
By including interaction effects for movers and stayers, this study distinguishes between
different sources of diversity growth. This step is crucial because people who remain in
their (changing) neighborhoods between 2006 and 2012 are expected to be inherently
different from people who decide to move.
D) Fourth Step- Subgroup Analysis by Level of Geography
Finally, the same models will be constructed for CBSA-level diversity. As studies have
revealed differences in diversity effects between various levels of geography,
geographical units should be varied to see if the results observed at the census tract level
also hold true for the CBSA level. However, this is not done in most studies and instead
the geographic level of the context units is mainly determined by data availability. By
implementing separate models by geographic level, I hope to discuss the postulated
mechanism of diversity growth for different geographies.
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E) Fifth Step- Subgroup Analysis by White and Non-White Dichotomy
Just as important as separate analysis by geographical level is the distinction between
non-Hispanic white and non-white respondents who are anticipated to experience
diversity growth very differently (see theoretical discussion). Whites have been shown to
react negatively to increases in diversity in their social contexts, as discussed previously.
While the virulence and extent of white xenophobia and racism have declined, the feeling
of out-group threat and a preference for in-group socialization has been shown to be
present among many whites (Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015).
Furthermore, non-Hispanic whites generally live in less diverse neighborhoods and are
therefore less familiar with diversity. As shown in Table 3, on average, whites live in
neighborhoods with a 33 percent chance of randomly encountering two tract inhabitants
that are different from each other either ethnically or racially. These chances are higher
for black individuals (42 percent), Hispanic individuals (47 percent) and Asian
individuals (51 percent). In other words, Asians have a 20-percentage-point higher
likelihood of randomly coming across two different people when compared to white
respondents. This difference in initial level of diversity might translate into different
reactions to changes in diversity for movers and stayers.
Table 3. Diversity by Individuals' Race and Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian

Mean Level of Tract-Level Diversity, 2006
0.331
0.420
0.469
0.510
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F) Sixth Step- Subgroup Analysis by Initial Level of Diversity
Besides the prior discussed benefits of two time points, panel data are also useful for
addressing individual transitions into different kinds of neighborhoods, which makes it
possible to dissect different initial levels of diversity. Based on the theoretical discussion,
it is likely that the effect of a change in diversity depends on previous experiences with
diversity. Larger shares of the immigrant population have been found to be both
positively (via inter-group contact) and negatively (via group threat) correlated with antiimmigrant attitudes simultaneously. A person’s background and original place of
residence (origin category) could explain such opposing results. Increasing diversity
might be threatening for those who previously lived in homogeneity, because little
contact across racial lines is made in homogenous areas. Individuals moving from
moderate or high levels of diversity in their neighborhood to a higher-diversity
neighborhood may be more accustomed to diversity and might see growing diversity as
an opportunity for further inter-group contact.
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CHAPTER III
CHANGES IN DIVERSITY

The following demographic analysis centers on changing diversity patterns in the U.S.,
diversity growth by initial level of diversity and the role of immigration in generating
changes in diversity.
Chapter IV and V deal with the effect of changes in diversity on two dependent variables:
attitudes towards immigrants and interracial bridging. While these two measures might at
first deal with seemingly different topics, the following section connects the two different
objects of my dependent variables, one in terms of immigration and the other in terms of
race and ethnicity. I argue that feelings about immigration and race are directly
connected, both socially (Chapter II) and geographically and, in combination, offer a
broader insight into the effect of diversity growth. In the following, I establish that
diversity and immigration are linked through a strong connection at the neighborhood and
metropolitan levels between growing ethno-racial diversity and a growing immigrant
presence.
Furthermore, this chapter explores particularities regarding the diversity in the PALS
dataset and includes an analysis of changes in diversity for movers and stayers, and
diversity change patterns for whites and non-whites.
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Changes in the Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Population
Over the past 50 years the U.S. have witnessed an immense growth of the non-white
population leading to an overall growth in diversity (Frey, 2014). In addition,
demographic analyses of the present and near future have shown that the non-white
population has diversified both in terms of racial and ethnic composition as well as
geography – while immigration and diversity used to be characteristic traits of traditional
gateway cities and port of entries (Singer, 2004), they have spread to many more cities
and neighborhoods. Research on diversity shows that since 1970 there has been a steep
increase both in the size of the foreign-born population (10 million resident immigrants to
roughly 43 million in 2015) and its relative percentage (4.7 percent in 1970 to 13.5
percent in 2015)7 and an associated diversification in the population of racial and ethnic
backgrounds, particularly in areas that are not traditional immigrant gateways (Massey,
2010) and in rural parts of the country (Lichter, 2012).
With the 1965 immigration law, the national-origins quota system and the racist limits on
Asian immigration were finally abolished, paving the way—unintentionally--for a more
extensive immigration from Asia, Latin America and other non-European regions. Rather
then immigration stemming from Southern and Eastern European countries, as the
legislators devising the 1965 law anticipated, immigrants from Asia and Latin America
are the new front-runners among immigrants (Massey, 2010). As Frank D. Bean, Jennifer
Lee, Jeanne Batalova, and Mark Leach (2004) point out there are several states that can
either be categorized as Hispanic-white-states or states with significant shares of the
7

Migration Policy Institute (MPI) tabulation of data from U.S. Census Bureau, 20102015 American Community Surveys (ACS), and 1970, 1990, and 2000 Decennial Census
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population that are non-white (which includes southern states that are divided between
whites and blacks). Individuals in this fourth wave of immigration were more educated
and more likely to belong to the middle class, and due to better technology and
transportation within the U.S. people were no longer bound to urban cores and were able
to migrate out. In line with spatial assimilation theory, a high income, the use of English
language and the embedment in an Anglo-American social context makes the move into
an English-speaking neighborhood more likely. American citizenship and the duration of
living in the U.S. has been shown to correlate positively with geographic mobility to
English-speaking neighborhoods, while the contact with their own ethical group was
negatively correlated with this form of mobility. Pushed out of the city by gentrification
and high housing prices, immigrants and minorities in general increasingly venture out in
search for better living contexts and schools. Richard Alba and Nancy Denton (Foner &
Fredrickson, 2005) point out that immigrants tend to move to ethnic enclaves with their
family once they arrive in the United States. In line with general assimilation theory
minorities in general want to translate their gain social and economic capital into
improved residential locations after having lived in the U.S. for several years (Massey,
1985), thus leading to a spread of migration out of gateways of immigration into lowdiversity residential suburbs and rural areas (Lichter, 2012).
Using entropy measures to record changes in ethnoracial diversity, Lee, Farrell and
Iceland demonstrate that entropy (a measure of whether all ethnoracial groups have equal
representation in a specific geographic area) has continuously climbed between 1980 and
2010 (2014). While non-Hispanic Whites still constitute the biggest part of the U.S.
population, this group grows at the slowest rate when compared with the other races and
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ethnicities and is marked by an aging population. Hispanic and Asian population
proportions have been fueled by an influx of young immigrants, coupled with higher birth
rates of these in-migrants (Johnson & Lichter, 2010). What has been labeled the third
demographic transition refers to the natural decline in the native majority population and
its rising average age leading to a need for migration, which goes far beyond the current
figures because of the shortage of labor (Coleman 2006). At the same time,
diversification has been identified as an important strategic area for action, so that cities
and regions remain competitive in the global "space of the flows" (Castells, 1996).

A) Diversity on the Tract-Level
In the following, the empirical material will be organized into separate sections on
diversity at different geographic scales (Census tract and Core-Based Statistical area). I
am using the Simpson index to trace the growth and spread of diversity. In order to make
sure that the Simpson diversity index constitutes an appropriate measure of diversity, the
following maps were also replicated using the Entropy score. As shown in the Appendix,
the cross-sectional and change-score maps (Map A and B) are almost identical.
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Map 2. Simpson Diversity in 2010, Tract-Level (see Appendix (Map A) for the same
map using Entropy Score)

Overall, the 2010 Simpson diversity score is 34.07 and has increased by almost four
percentage points in just a decade, since 2000. In other words, in 2010 there is a 34
percent chance that two individuals who were chosen at random from an average tract’s
population would belong to different races or ethnicities. A look at Map 2 reveals that
there are a wide variety of diversity levels in 2010. On the one hand, wide swaths
throughout the Midwest, Northeast and the northern part of the West are still highly
homogeneous at the tract level. States like Missouri or Maine are extreme examples of
areas that are almost entirely white. On the other hand, cities throughout the U.S. are an
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exception and consistently show high levels of diversity. In addition, the south and
coastal regions are highly heterogeneous as well.
While varying levels of diversity undoubtedly bring out different inter-group behavior in
people, it is more meaningful to study changes in diversity that individuals are exposed
to over time. It is known that diversity is rapidly increasing (Johnson & Lichter, 2010;
Lichter, 2013b; Parisi, Lichter, & Taquino, 2015), massively changing the way people
live, work and interact together and also influencing people’s perceptions of each other.
As the scatterplot in Figure 2 shows, there is a strong trend towards racial and ethnic
diversity growth at the tract level (most of the tracts lie above the red line, indicating
diversity growth). The Simpson Diversity Index (the chance that two individuals chosen
at random belong to a different racial or ethnic group) has risen for 71 percent of the
Census tracts between 2000 and 2010. Map 3 gives us a better idea of where increases
and decreases are located.
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Figure 2. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity in 2000 and 2010, Tract

Map 3. Change Rate Simpson Diversity, Tract-Level (see Appendix (Map B) for the
same map using Entropy Score)
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While the overall growth in diversity is substantial, it may be more momentous that
ethnic and racial heterogeneity is sprawling far beyond the coasts, diversifying areas that
have long been unexplored by immigrant and minority populations. Map 3 confirms
prior research showing that diversity is gradually spreading into smaller communities,
like suburbs and villages (Frey, 2014). The dark orange tracts experience the greatest
rate of change between 2000 and 2010. While much of the growth in diversity takes
place in traditional areas of immigration and multiracial population makeup, some of
these areas are traditionally white areas with little to no diversity in the first place. This
is particularly true for some Midwestern states like Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin.
Zooming in to the map reveals that much of the diversity growth stems from
diversifying suburbs and outlying areas surrounding Metro- and Micropolitan cities.
Since it is complicated to really define which tracts are ‘rural’ versus ‘urban’, I applied
rural-urban commuting area (RUCA) codes to the tracts which offers a multidimensional
measurement of urban/rural status that take into account what percentage of people
commute into the urban core. Using RUCA codes8 to group Census tracts into a ruralurban scheme ranging from 1 to 10, we can see that diversity change rates between 2000
and 2010 are similarly high across all categories in Table 4. Thus, tract-level
diversification is not an intrinsically urban phenomenon. However, it is interesting to
note that areas with a low percentage of people that commute to an urban core (both in
small cities and metropolitan areas) also have lower diversity growths. I conclude that
minorities and immigrants are increasingly present in rural neighborhoods and suburbs
but still rely on jobs and social connections in urban areas.
8

https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-classifications/datafor-rural-analysis/#ruralstatus
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Table 4. Diversity growth rate by Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) codes
RUCA
Code
(2010)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Classification

Metropolitan area core
Metropolitan area high commuting
Metropolitan area low commuting
Micropolitan area core
Micropolitan high commuting
Micropolitan low commuting
Small town core
Small town high commuting
Small town low commuting
Rural areas

Mean Change Rate
Diversity (Tract) in %
27.3
24.6
16.4
24.6
21.2
15.1
26.0
21.6
16.1
24.6

Despite the general upward trend in diversity, dramatic contrasts are still apparent on the
local level: clusters of tracts in Wyoming, West Virginia, Montana, Vermont, Kentucky
and Missouri, for instance, remained heavily white between 2000 and 2010.
Map 3 evidences that diversity has increased between 2000 and 2010 and shows that
diversity growth is taking place in a variety of settings. More importantly for this study,
diversity growth occurs in low-, medium- and high diversity settings. Relying on the
Simpson diversity scores for each tract in 2000 a new categorical variable was
constructed that captures initial high, medium and low diversity. As is to be seen on
Map 4, low diversity scores range from 0 - 24.3, medium-diversity ranges from 24.4 49.04 and high diversity ranges from 49.05 – 74.5. These three groups lay the ground for
the subgroup models in Chapter IV and V, offering three different scenarios of how
people react to changes in heterogeneity.
Based on the maps above that show clusters of heterogenization outside of immigrant
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gateways and urban cores, the following map focuses on whether low-, medium- and
high-diversity tracts experience increases or decreases in diversity. While this is a fairly
crude breakdown, it gives us the opportunity to quantify and map diversity growth and
declines by initial level of diversity.
The blue tracts were scarcely diverse in 2000, but darker blue ones are experiencing
increases in diversity while light blue tracts became even more homogenous between
2000 and 2010. Increases in low-diversity areas constitute more than a third of all tracts
in the U.S. (see Table 5 below Map 4) and are evident in northern New England through
vast parts of the Midwest. These are mainly areas that were almost entirely white but
now have begun to show greater heterogeneity. However, it is also evident that parts of
the Mid-Atlantic show clusters of decreasing diversity in already low-diversity tracts.
Consulting the earlier map, this is a part of the country that remains nearly completely
white. Furthermore, clusters of tracts in Montana, Oregon and Wyoming did not see
diversity growth as well. Low-diversity-low-increase tracts take up only 8.7 percent of
the whole nation.
The red and purple parts of Map 4 below are made of tracts that are already very diverse
(red) and somewhat diverse (purple). Darker red indicates diversity growth in highdiversity tracts, and orange tracts represent decreasing diversity in high-diversity tracts.
24 percent of all tracts have high diversity, while 30 percent have medium diversity.
Since the Simpson Diversity Index ranges from 0 to 1, it has an inherent cap, so very
diverse places like parts of New York City or San Francisco do not necessarily diversify
even more. However, measuring diversification still makes sense, as there is no
neighborhood that reaches maximum diversity (Census Tract 96 in Queens County, New
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York has a 79.4 percent chance of randomly selecting two individuals of different race
and ethnicity).
A part of the medium- and high-diversity belt includes big cities, which are highly
attractive for immigrants and minority populations. The Southeast comprises tracts with
white and black neighborhoods, but also tracts in states like North and South Carolina,
and Georgia, where Hispanics have risen in number. Quite differently from the
Southeast, the Southwest is mainly Hispanic and white. The Pacific Coast also has a
mixed population, including Hispanics, whites and an increasing presence of Asians.
What is most remarkable is that high-diversity neighborhoods show a nearly equal share
of increase (12.42 percent) and decrease (11.5 percent) between 2000 and 2010. In fact,
many of the high-diversity tracts that experience decreases in heterogeneity (orange) are
located in states like Texas, and have a majority Hispanic population leading to less
diverse population composition. In contrast, the majority of medium- and low-diversity
tracts experience heterogenization: between 2000 and 2010, only 24 percent of all
medium-diversity neighborhoods and 18 percent of all high-diversity neighborhoods
showed declining diversity scores.
Thus, we can state that U.S. tracts are diversifying across the whole country, with a
particular emphasis on those tracts with low initial diversity.
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Map 4. Increase or Decrease in Diversity by Initial Level of Diversity, Tract

Table 5. Diversity increase and decrease (2000-2010) by initial level of diversity in
2000
Freq.
High Initial
Diversity
Medium Initial
Diversity
Low Initial
Diversity

Increase
Decrease
Increase
Decrease
Increase
Decrease

5,983
5,540
10,956
3,436
18,178
4,062
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Percent
12.42
11.5
22.75
7.14
37.75
8.44

Within-Group
Percent
52.0
48.0
76.2
23.8
81.7
18.3

B) Diversity on the CBSA-Level (Core Based Statistical Area)
At the CBSA-level, the increase in diversity between 2000 and 2010 is even more
pronounced than for the tract-level, with only a small share of cities showing diversity
declines (Figure 3). In fact, compared to 71 percent of all tracts, 90 percent of all CBSA’s
underwent diversity growth.
Figure 3. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity in 2000 and 2010, CBSA
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Map 5. Simpson Diversity, City-Level

Map 5 replicates Map 4, but diversity is measured for Core Based Statistical Areas
(CBSA). As a reminder, a CBSA is a designated geographic boundary, which usually
consists of several counties conjoined by an urban center of not less than 10,000
residents.
As the Map 5 demonstrates, high levels of diversity on the micro- and metropolitan level
are mainly concentrated at the southern border and in coastal regions, with many of the
CBSAs in these regions having a higher than 50 percent chance of two randomly drawn
individuals being different in terms of race or ethnicity. Furthermore, diversity is high in
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CBSAs around traditional gateway cities of high-immigration. Among the 100 biggest
metropolitan areas, San Jose had the highest diversity rates, followed by New York City.
As I have pointed out before, cross-sectional snapshots of diversity across the country are
helpful in understanding racial and ethnic out-group perceptions and behavior; however,
similar to the above tract-level demographic analysis, CBSA-level diversity growth rates
are the focus of this study. Overall, diversity in micropolitan areas (containing between
10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants) increased by 21.47 percent, while that in metropolitan
areas (containing more than 50,000 inhabitants) increased by 26.31 percent. This
indicates that it is not just large metropolitan areas that are subject to diversification, but
also smaller ones.
While CBSA and tract-level maps look similar, we see interesting discrepancies between
the maps depicting diversity change rates between 2000 and 2010. Tract-level changes in
diversity were spread across the Unites States in both non-traditional areas of migration
like Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin (many of which have change rates of 70-250 percent),
and traditional areas of migration like vast areas in New York and California (Map 3).
However, the map clearly shows that there are many tracts that experienced decreases or
no changes in diversity, too, and they were mainly centered in the Mountain, Southwest
and Mid-Atlantic region of the U.S.. In terms of CBSAs (Map 6), however, decreases in
diversity or no change in diversity are mostly visible for the Southern states (excluding
Florida), while increases in diversity were more pronounced for the East and West Great
Lakes, North and Central Appalachia, Florida, Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Similar to
Map 4, diversity increase tends to be highest in traditional gateway CBSAs, but there is
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also a substantial share of CBSAs with diversity growth the Midwest, Northeast and the
northern part of the West (Maine, in particular).
Map 6. Change Rate Simpson Diversity, CBSA-Level

In correspondence with the demographic analysis of tracts (a), the Map 7 illustrates three
initial levels for all of the CBSAs broken down by whether there was an increase in
diversity or a decrease (or rather no change). Bear in mind that red CBSAs mark high
initial diversity, purple CBSAs medium initial diversity and blue CBSAs low initial
diversity. Within each category, lighter shades indicate decreases, while darker shades
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denote increases. While the map is evocative of the tract-level map, it is noticeable that
there was almost no diversity reduction in CBSAs between 2000 and 2010—just 10
percent overall (Table 6). In fact, the highest diversity decrease was observed for highdiversity cities (3.66 percent of all tracts). In other terms, just 22.9 percent of highdiversity CBSAs became more homogenous. Of all CBSAs only 1.05 percent
experienced homogeneity decreases in medium-level diversity and 0.84 percent in lowdiversity contexts.
Map 7. Increase and Decrease in Diversity by Level of Initial Diversity (2000), by
CBSA
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Table 6. Diversity increase and decrease (2000-2010) by initial level of diversity in
2000, CBSA

High Initial
Diversity
Medium Initial
Diversity
Low Initial
Diversity

Increase
Decrease
Increase
Decrease
Increase
Decrease

Freq.

Percent

236
35
282
10
384
8

24.71
3.66
29.53
1.05
40.21
0.84

WithinGroup
Percent
87.1
22.9
96.6
3.4
98
2

Summing up, there are two main insights we can derive from this part of the demographic
analysis of diversity:
a) The map and tables underline that nearly three quarters of all tracts and almost 96
percent of the CBSAs in the U.S. experience diversity growths. Increases in diversity
do not just pertain to traditional cities of in-migration and diversity, but were actually
most pronounced in low-diversity cities and tracts. This result stresses that much of
the current increase in diversity is happening in America’s rural areas, suburbs and
low-diversity communities, which is why subsequent analysis of individual reactions
to heterogenization need to be broken down by initial level of diversity.
b) It is equally important to study diversity at the CBSA and tract-level. CBSA and
tract-level changes in diversity do not necessarily overlap. Diversity reduction was
generally more prevailing for tracts than for CBSAs. Overall, only 5.5 percent of all
CBSAs homogenized between 2000 and 2010, while almost a quarter of all tracts in
the U.S. did.

64

Although attention will be paid to both CBSAs and tracts, the analysis in the
following two chapters will focus more on the tract-level as a proxy for people’s
neighborhoods. The level of heterogeneity that individuals experience on a day-today basis depends on how heterogeneous their immediate living context is. As the
maps illustrate, diverse micro- and metropolitan areas might be marked by
microsegregation that is not captured through such highly aggregated boundaries
(Lichter, Parisi, & Taquino, 2015).

Diversity and Immigrant Dispersion in the U.S.

In this section, I examine the geographic relationship between the rising share of
immigrants in the population and changing ethno-racial diversity.
In the past 50 years, migrants have become an important part of the American social
structure. In 1960, roughly 9.7 immigrants lived in the U.S.. This group accounted for
only about 5.4 percent of the population. According to the last census, in 2010, the U.S.
has about 40 million immigrants (12.9 percent). The immigrant segment of American
social structure has thus increased almost fourfold since 1960. The U.S. is becoming
increasingly more mixed, as nearly a quarter of the population either is a first- or secondgeneration immigrant. It is foreseeable that the migrant population will continue to grow
in the decades to come even in the light of reduced immigration.
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Map 8. Immigrant Share by Tract, 2010

Map 9. Immigrant Share by CBSA, 2010
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Similar to diversity, migrants are not evenly spread across the country, but are concentrated
in large cities and industrial agglomeration centers (Map 8 and 9). In particular, areas like
the Boston-New York-Washington Corridor, southern Florida, Seattle, Chicago, Miami, San
Francisco and Los Angeles have high immigrant concentrations. However, immigrants have
increasingly moved to rural and suburban areas in the United States (Lichter, 2012). For
instance, there are high concentrations of immigrants in rural areas of Idaho, Texas and
Kansas.
Doubtlessly, immigration increases diversity. The increased presence of immigrants and
their children has diversified the racial makeup of the country, especially with regards to
Hispanic and Asian population shares. According to Census data for 2010, approximately a
quarter of the immigrant population is Asian, while more than half is Hispanic. A scatterplot
(Figure 4) and simple correlation manifest this relationship as highly significant for the
tract-level: diversity and migrant share are positively associated. Roughly 25 percent of the
variability in Simpson diversity scores can be attributed to the percentage of immigrants in
2000, while the adjusted R-Square for 2010 is 0.23. For both 2000 and 2010, a one percent
higher immigration share is associated with a 0.6 higher score on the Simpson Diversity
Index. For CBSAs, this relationship is similar (Figure 5): Explaining 22 percent of the
variability, a one-unit increase in immigrant percentage is significantly associated with 0.42
higher diversity score.
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Figure 4. Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, Tract

Figure 5. Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, CBSA

With regard to the change score scatterplot (Figure 6), we can state that changes in diversity
between 2000 and 2010 is substantially associated with the logged change scores in
immigration percentage between the two time points. Explaining 5 percent of the total
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variance at the tract-level, a one-percent increase in logged immigration percentage is
associated with an increase of 0.19 on the Simpson Diversity Index between the two time
points. For the CBSA-level scatterplot (Figure 7), a one-unit increase in logged immigration
percentage is associated with an increase of 0.45.

Figure 6. Change-Score Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, Tract

Figure 7. Change-Score Scatterplot Diversity and Immigration, 2000 and 2010, CBSA
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Nevertheless, immigration and diversity should not be treated as identical (Wright et al.,
2014). Since the association between diversity and immigration explains roughly a quarter
of the overall variability, there remains a substantial divide between the two factors. The
following maps (Maps 10 and 11) are bivariate choropleth maps, which display both the
immigrant share and diversity score in 2010 on one map. Map 10 measures these variables
at the tract-level, and Map 11 at the CBSA-level. To distinguish between the two variables
different sets of color were used to show the different levels of relationships. The red shades
represent the percentage of immigrants and the blue colors represent the Simpson diversity
score. Both maps show that there is considerable overlap in diversity and immigration, for
instance along the California coast, parts of Texas and Florida. The coincidence is most
obvious for the CBSA-map.
However, not all high-immigration tracts have high levels of diversity, too. This becomes
particularly clear when looking at the tract-level map. Zooming into New York City, for
instance, we can see that the city itself is dark purple/brown, pointing to both high diversity
and high concentrations of immigrants. Interestingly, tracts surrounding New York City, in
New Jersey for example, are not very diverse, but display high levels of immigrants living
there (percentages between 5-20 percent). In the tracts surrounding Morris Town, NJ, for
instance, the relatively high levels of immigration result mostly from its large Hispanic
population. In this case, the low diversity score stems from the low presence of blacks and
Asians. In Spokane, WA, 82 percent of the population is white, but 38 percent of its
inhabitants were born in Europe and 35 percent in Asia. Another more explicit example of
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such discrepancy is the southern tip of Texas: Many tracts here show very high immigrant
shares; however, diversity is quite low as most of these tracts are majority-Hispanic. In Rio
Grande city, for instance, the likelihood of randomly selecting a person with a different race
or ethnicity is only 8 percent (94.3 percent of the population identify as Hispanic), while the
overall city has an immigrant percentage of 30 percent in 2010.
Having said that, high-diversity tracts and CBSAs do not necessarily imply high
immigration, either. In fact, many tracts are only blue (high diversity only), especially from
the coastal area of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, along the Mississippi and into
Louisiana. Cities like Baton Rouge (3.5 percent immigrants, but 50 percent of randomly
selecting a person outside of own race or ethnicity) have a less than 10 percent Hispanic
population and very low immigration, but states like Georgia, North and South Carolina
have seen a rise in Hispanic population share. Many areas in the U.S. historically have an
ethnically and racially mixed population, with large shares of African-Americans and
Asians, who have lived here for many generations.

71

Map 10/11. Relationship Diversity and Immigration (Tract and CBSA)
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In conclusion, diversity and immigration are highly correlated, but do not always go hand in
hand.
Although the underlying hypothesis is that increasing shares of immigrants are connected
with increasing diversity and immigrants spread out geographically in the 2000-2010 period,
diversity growth does not only take place in areas of high immigration. While the U.S. as a
whole has gotten more diverse, high increases in diversity are found particularly in many
neighborhoods with low percentages of foreign-born population in 2000 (see Figure 8
below). While diversity and immigrant percentage are correlated, diversity growth is most
pronounced in low-level immigration tracts.
Figure 8. Scatterplot of Simpson Diversity in 2000 and 2010, color-coded by immigrant
percentage in 2000 (Tract) *

* The red line indicates no change in tract diversity between 2000 and 2010
* Tracts were colored differently based on the initial level of immigrant percentage
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Another way to show this is:

Figure 9. Diversity increase rates (2000-2010) by immigrant percentage (2000)

Summing up the link between immigration and diversity, there are two main results:
1. While diversity has increased and the foreign-born population has undoubtedly
contributed to that growth, diversity and immigration percentage should not be
conflated. On the one hand, there is high diversity in low-immigration areas, because
some minorities, such as African Americans and American Indians, do not have
immigrant origins.

Furthermore, there are minorities including Asians and

Hispanics, some of whose families have been in the U.S. for three or more
generation and are therefore not counted towards recent immigrants. On the other
hand, there are areas of high immigration with low diversity. As I pointed out, this
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concerns tracts with a disproportionately high immigrant share that have reached
their “tipping point” and turned into a majority-minority tract.
2. Furthermore, diversity mainly increases in areas of low-immigration percentages (in
2000).
3. Still, immigration and diversity are closely intertwined. Simpson diversity scores are
highly correlated with the percentage of immigrants, and much of the diversification
stems from immigration increases between 2000 and 2010. In line with trends we
find for diversity, immigrants have also moved outside of traditional immigrant
gateways further bolstering rural and suburban heterogenization.

Changes in the Racial and Ethnic Composition in the PALS Dataset

The study has several limitations that will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI of this
dissertation. However, the relatively small sample size of only 1,314 respondents that were
followed across wave 1 and wave 2 and the use of predetermined primary sampling units
(PSUs) as the basis for random sampling need to be discussed here in order to establish
national representativeness of the data. As explained earlier, the sample selection process is
based on 60 PSUs, which might also cause the sample to not represent U.S. demographics.
Furthermore, the study oversampled ethnoracial minorities. Using complex survey weights
provided by the PALS researchers (accounting for nonresponse, clustered sampling and
selection probability bias), the following weighted table was constructed comparing PALS
and national averages to establish representativeness.
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Table 7. Comparison of PALS and national averages, unweighted and weighted (Total
number of tracts and CBSA's in brackets)
Portraits of
American Life
Survey
TractCBSA
Level
-Level
Mean
Mean
Simpson
Diversity
Score, 2010
(0-1)
Immigration
Percentage,
2010
Change
Diversity
Score
(Growth
Rates),
2000-2010

Unweighted
Weighted

Unweighted
Weighted
Unweighted
Weighted

National

TractLevel
Mean
0.34
(48257)

CBSA
-Level
Mean

0.37
(432)
0.32

0.29
(52)
0.29

0.31
(955)

16.93
(431)
12.84

10.61
(52)
5.5

12.79
(48242)

5.65
(955)

24.21
(428)
23.42

22.93
(49)
23.12

23.02
(48238)

24.43
(942)

The eye-catching difference between national and unweighted PALS-means is due to the
selectivity bias in the survey design: On average, PALS overrepresents ethnoracial
minorities, who tend to live in more diverse neighborhoods, to achieve an adequate quantity
of respondents in those groups. While there were 63.7 percent non-Hispanic whites in 2010,
the sample contains only 48.4 percent non-Hispanic whites.
After the survey weights were applied, the main demographic variables in the PALS sample
can be said to be representative of national CBSA- and tract-level diversity, immigration
percentages in 2010 and changes in diversity scores for both CBSAs and tracts between
2000 and 2012.
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Changes in Diversity by Mover-Stayer-Status
Much of the following tract-level analysis will separate outcomes by movers (34 percent of
the sample) and stayers (66 percent) as these two groups might experience changes in
diversity differently. As pointed out before, the CBSA-level analysis does not contain a
distinction between movers and stayers, because movers who relocated from one CBSA to
another made up only 8 percent of the sample. Put differently, most movers changed
residences within CBSA-boundaries. For the tract-level, there are many explanations why
we might expect different effects of diversity for movers and stayers, four of which I will
focus on below.
1. First of all, movers might be moving away from diversity. In general, most studies have
demonstrated that diverse areas are less coveted than areas with low diversity, especially by
whites (Krysan, Couper, Farley, & Forman, 2009). In particular, families with children try
to avoid heterogeneous neighborhoods, as contextual diversity is often equated with lower
school quality (Owens, 2017). Furthermore, diverse neighborhoods are often associated with
negative characteristics, such as higher perceived crime rates and lower socioeconomic
status (Quillian & Pager, 2001). However, concluding that movers always move to less
diverse and “better” neighborhoods is oversimplified, as the table shows. I hypothesize that
while some individual movers try to make moves to better neighborhoods or housing, others
might be forced to move due to eviction, foreclosures or other involuntary push factors
(Desmond, 2017; R. J. Sampson & Sharkey, 2008).
While we can assume that increases in diversity are perceived more positively by movers
who “voluntarily” select into a new neighborhood, the decision to move or not to move is
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not necessarily a choice based on preference. While research has demonstrated that the main
intention behind individuals’ relocations is to improve their living situation by moving into
less disadvantaged, less dense and better-educated neighborhoods9, individuals might face
constraints that make such an “upward” move unattainable. Similarly, people that
experience diversity growth in their neighborhoods might find themselves unable to move
due to financial constraints. These hypotheses will be tested towards the end of Chapter V
through income-subgroups arguing that individuals with higher incomes might be less likely
to relocate involuntarily when compared to low-income movers.
2. Secondly, movers and stayers might experience a different quality of diversity. Increases
in diversity for stayers might feel more gradual than for movers, who move to an entirely
new neighborhood. As a reminder, the Simpson diversity index, by construction, does not
capture the presence of all five racial and ethnic groups included in this study (white, black,
Asian, Hispanic, other), but the likelihood of two randomly chosen individuals to be
different from each other. Thus, moving from a 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian
neighborhood to a 50 percent Hispanic and 50 percent black neighborhood might feel very
different for movers, but will not differ in terms of diversity level.
Moreover, the quantity of change is not comparable for movers and stayers. In fact, Figure
10 and Table 8 show that diversity experiences differ strongly for movers and stayers.
Overall, stayers experience a 15.2 percent increase in diversity between 2000 and 2010,
while movers increase rates are at 28.3 percent.
9

https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-574.pdf
David Ihrke, Reason for Moving: 2012 to 2013 (Population Characteristics), U.S.
Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 2014
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Scatterplot of Simpson Diversity Index (Tract) in 2000 and 2010
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Figure 10. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity by Mover/Stayer
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No Change in Diversity

The mover-stayer difference varies by in low, medium and high initial diversity settings as
well. Movers have a higher percentage of people initially living in high-diversity
neighborhoods (36 percent). Those movers who initially lived in highly heterogeneous
contexts moved to neighborhoods that were 18 percent less diverse, pointing to an outmigration into more homogeneity. In comparison, stayers living in high-diversity
neighborhoods experienced a -5.6% drop in diversity between 2006 and 2012. As I have
pointed out before, the biggest gains in diversity can be observed for movers and stayers in
low-diversity tracts: On average, movers from low-diversity neighborhoods move to
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neighborhoods with more than double the initial diversity rate. Stayers experienced a 58
percent gain in diversity in low-diversity neighborhoods.

Table 8. Movers and Stayers: Where do they go? (Tract-level), Percentage Rate
Increase in Diversity by Mover/Stayer and Initial Level of Diversity
STAYER
OVERALL

Frequency
796

Percent
100

Diversity Change Rate
15.23%

Low Initial Diversity
Medium Initial Diversity
High Initial Diversity

273
259
249

34.96
33.16
31.88

58.89%
12.29%
-5.56%

MOVER
OVERALL

Frequency
422

Percent
100

Diversity Change Rate
28.31 %

Low Initial Diversity
Medium Initial Diversity
High Initial Diversity

127
142
151

30.24
33.81
35.95

75.06%
14.31%
-18.02%

3. Movers might be different from stayers in terms of their social capital. Studies point out
that people with high levels of social capital show better attitudes towards immigrants, even
if models control for income and education (Gordon & Maharaj, 2015; Herreros & Criado,
2009). On the one hand, individuals with higher levels of social capital might be less likely
to move in the first place, while movers might have fewer social ties and community
involvement hindering them from relocating. Movers might be less “successful” at
establishing ties than those individuals that remained in the neighborhood (Pettit &
McLanahan, 2003). On the other hand, moving can also have a disruptive element to it
(Briggs, 1997), as relocations to a new neighborhood decrease social capital even if movers
and stayers were coequal in terms of social capital before the move.
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4. Scholars have pointed out that people who move to diversity for whatever reasons might
experience anticipation effects (Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015a). While most people move to
find a living situation where they feel their needs and preferences are better met, movers to
growing diversity might know that they are moving to a more heterogeneous neighborhood
and anticipate threats to their social status. In general parlance, the change in attitudes does
not necessarily happen after the relocation to the new neighborhood, but before: “People
plan to move and thus know where they will live in the future. […] In other words, once
people know that they are going to move to a more diverse neighborhood, the outlook of
heightened competition over resources and conflicting ways of life might start to threaten
them, resulting in increasing concerns prior to the event of moving itself” (ibid, p. 4).
All in all, these four factors (nature of diversity, involuntary relocation, social capital
differences for movers, and anticipation effects) reinforce the hypothesis that movers might
show less minority-friendly attitudes and confirm the need for separate subgroup models.
In order to establish beforehand if different reactions towards diversity growth might stem
from differences in movers and stayers characteristics, it is crucial to look at the summary
statistics for both groups first (Table 9).
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics (Overall, Stayers, Movers), 2006 *
OVERALL

STAYER

MOVER

0.38
0.36

0.37
0.35

0.40
0.38

0.23
0.17
0.15
0.25

0.15
0.18
0.16
0.27

0.28
0.15
0.13
0.24

0.27

0.32

0.25

0.29

0.33

0.34

43.31
0.38
0.71

46.95
0.40
0.70

36.44
0.35
0.72

0.12
0.25
0.23
0.24
0.15

0.11
0.28
0.21
0.24
0.14

0.13
0.21
0.25
0.23
0.16

0.82
0.17
0.53
0.02

0.82
0.19
0.54
0.02

0.82
0.11
0.52
0.03

0.37

0.39

0.33

0.37

0.39

0.32

0.22

0.23

0.20

Neighborhood Level Indicators
Simpson Diversity 2010
Simpson Diversity 2000
Change Rate Simpson Diversity
Rate
% Immigrants 2010
% Immigrants 2000
Change Rate % Immigrants
Socioeconomic Status of
Neighborhood (% College Degree,
2006)
Socioeconomic Status of
Neighborhood (2012)
Basic Demographics
Age
Male
Parents Born in U.S.
Education
No High School
High School
College
Bachelor
More than a Master
Complete Trust in
Family
Neighbors
Friends
Strangers
Threat
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood
(2012)
Decrease of Own Race in
Neighborhood
*Unless otherwise specified
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As shown in the preliminary statistics in Table 9, movers and stayers have similar levels of
initial diversity. As pointed out before, diversity seems to have risen across both groups
during that time span, although diversity increase rates are higher for movers than for
stayers.
On average, movers are 10 years younger and have a five-percentage point higher share of
women than stayers. Furthermore, they seem to live in neighborhoods with a lower
socioeconomic status (measured as the percentage of above-25-year-olds who finished at
least college). The difference in socio-economic status between movers and stayers is still
evident after the move: While stayers lived in neighborhoods with an average 58 percent of
college-educated adults, movers relocated to neighborhoods with a 12 percentage points
lower socioeconomic status in 2012. This observation partially confirms that movers might
not end up relocating to “better” neighborhoods, but might find themselves unable to move
to more affluent contexts.
Seventy-one percent of all parents were born in the U.S., which does not differ substantially
across subgroups. Human capital, which is measured through education, does not show any
peculiarities, either. Trust did not differ much for movers and stayers, except for movers’
lower trust in neighbors, which points to lower social capital. Interestingly, 39 percent of
stayers felt unsafe in their neighborhood, which was only true for 33 percent of the movers.
After the relocation, these percentages had not changed substantially. The fear of the own
race declining in the neighborhood was equally present in both groups. On average, movers
visited racial out-group friends 19 times a year, while stayers paid 17 visits.
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In order to find out whether the stayers are significantly different from the movers, a logit
model for the probability of a person remaining or leaving his or her neighborhood as a
function of the following explanatory variables was implemented:
Table 10. Logistic Regression Mover/Stayer (0,1) 2012, predicted by 2006 controls
Predicting the Likelihood that an Individual moved between 2006 and 2012
Odds Ratio
(z)
Age
0.949***
-10.56
Non-Hispanic White (0,1)
0.988
-0.01
Male
0.851
-0.18
(No High School Diploma)
High School
0.538**
-1.81
College
0.998
0.39
More than College
0.815
0.58
Income
0.924***
-4.48
General Trust towards Others
0.825*
-0.34
Trust towards Family and Relatives
0.900*
-1.12
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood
0.626***
-4.00
Decrease of Own Race in
1.048
0.69
Neighborhood
Parents born in U.S.
1.440**
1.51
Constant

5.522***

1.775

Table 10 shows that higher ages make an individual less likely to move, broadly confirming
the summary statistics above. In other words, movers tend to be significantly younger.
Whether someone was white or non-white was not significantly associated with a higher
propensity to move or remain in the same neighborhood. Furthermore, general trust towards
others and trust towards family and relatives is associated with a lower likelihood of moving
out of the current neighborhood, which adds to the earlier observation that movers have
lower trust in family and neighbors, both before and after the move. Educational status did
not yield significant results, except for high school graduates: In general, they are less likely
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to move than people without high school diplomas and individuals with college education.
Income was negatively associated with an individual’s likelihood to move, meaning that
movers tend to have lower incomes. Stayers feel less safe in their neighborhood when
compared to movers, even after income is controlled. Individuals with parents born in the
U.S. are more likely to move when compared to individuals with foreign-born parents.
In the following, the same analysis is conducted amended by Simpson diversity scores
(interacted with non-Hispanic white/non-white status) for 2000 to test whether movers are
fleeing diversity in 2000. As shown in Table 11, there was also no significant relationship
between the propensity to move for whites and non-whites in relation to local diversity
rates. However, this does not mean that whites do not avoid high-diversity neighborhoods.
Similar to the selection bias in and out of diverse areas discussed earlier, those whites and
non-whites living in high-diversity might have chosen to move here based on a preference
for diversity.
Table 12, on the other hand, shows that whites tend to move as diversity increases between
2000 and 2010. This confirms the findings of countless studies showing that whites are
more reluctant to live in racially and ethnically mixed neighborhoods and still prefer to live
in traditionally white residential contexts (Crowder & South, 2008; Lichter et al., 2015;
South & Crowder, 1997).
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Table 11. Logistic Regression Mover/Stayer (0,1), predicted by 2006 controls, including
Simpson Diversity (ranging from 0 to 1)
Predicting the Likelihood that an Individual moved between 2006 and 2012
Odds Ratio
(z)
0.85
Interaction (Diversity 2000 * White)
1.88
0.56
Interaction (Diversity 2000 * Non-White)
0.78
Age
0.949***
-10.43
Male
0.97
-0.18
(No High School Diploma)
High School
0.631*
-1.82
College
1.104
0.38
More than College
1.145
0.53
Income
0.924***
-4.48
General Trust in Others
0.975
-0.33
Trust towards Family and Relatives
0.913
-1.24
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood
0.546***
-4.06
Decrease of Own Race in Neighborhood
1.077
0.41
Parents born in U.S.
1.313
1.51
Constant
11.944***
5.91

Table 12. Logistic Regression Mover/Stayer (0,1) 2012, predicted by 2006 controls,
including Growth Rate Simpson Diversity (2000-2010)
Predicting the Likelihood that an Individual moved between 2006 and 2012
Odds Ratio
Interaction (Diversity INCREASE 2000-2010 * White)
1.002**
Interaction (Diversity INCREASE 2000-2010 * Non-White) 0.955
Age
0.944***
Male
0.981
(No High School Diploma)
High School
0.628*
College
1.067
More than College
1.145
Income
0.926***
General Trust in Others
0.971
Trust towards Family and Relatives
0.903
Felt unsafe in Neighborhood
0.556***
Decrease of Own Race in Neighborhood
1.155
Parents born in U.S.
1.263
Constant
11.565***

86

(z)
2.17
-0.27
-10.63
-0.13
-1.82
0.25
0.53
-4.24
-0.38
-1.39
-3.87
0.82
1.34
6.89

Summing up, we can expect different reactions for movers and stayers, because the quality
and quantity of diversity change differs dramatically on all levels of initial diversity. Since
diversity change rates are typically lower for stayers and the overall change is subtler, I
hypothesize that stayers react more positively to diversity growth.
Furthermore, there are significant differences between movers and stayers that deserve
closer attention. Most importantly, movers live in neighborhoods with lower socioeconomic
statuses and seem to have lower incomes (which might be due to their younger ages). These
factors might lead to less minority-friendly attitudes as diversity increases. To rule out that
differences in movers and stayers stem from unequal socioeconomic backgrounds, separate
income models (high, medium and low income) will be implemented. These models will
help us understand if movers’ and stayers’ out-group attitudes are influenced by their
resources and by their ability to move to neighborhoods that meet their needs and
ethnoracial preferences.

Changes in Diversity by White and Non-White

While diversity and diversity increase rates need to be analyzed separately for movers and
stayers, it is important to incorporate a distinction by non-Hispanic white and non-white
respondents as well. As we have seen in the model above whites show a higher propensity
of relocating in the face of diversity growth.
As shown in Figure 11, diversity has risen for both whites and non-whites. However, non-
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whites generally cluster on the higher end of the spectrum (high diversity living contexts in
both 2006 and 2012), while whites concentrate in low-diversity settings.

Figure 11. Scatterplot Simpson Diversity by White/Non-White Dichotomy

While there is an overall increase in diversity, the change is much higher for movers than
for stayers. In addition, diversity change also differs substantially for white and non-white
movers and stayers. As shown in Table 13, there is considerable variation in white and nonwhite increase rates: On average, stayers experience diversity growth of roughly 15 percent.
White stayers’ neighborhoods undergo an increase of 26 percent, while non-whites’
neighborhoods change only by 9 percent, which seems to be due to differences in initial
diversity. As a reminder, initial diversity scores for non-whites are 0.47 and for whites 0.29.
In fact, when we take a closer look at the table, we see that percentages across the three
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levels of initial diversity do not differ much, but since there is a higher percentage of nonwhite stayers the overall increase rate is suppressed.
For movers, the overall picture is similar but more drastic. Overall, movers relocated to
neighborhoods that were almost 1.6 times as diverse as their previous neighborhood.
Growth rates were 83 percent for white movers and 33 percent for non-white movers. This
overall discrepancy mainly stems from higher percentages of non-whites in high-diversity
tracts.
Overall, we can conclude that the dynamics behind diversity increases are similar for whites
and non-whites. However, overall whites see more dramatic increases in diversity between
2000 and 2010, because they start off in more homogeneous neighborhoods when compared
to non-whites.

Table 13. Percentage Rate Increase in Diversity by Mover/Stayer and initial level of
diversity
STAYER
OVERALL
Low Initial Diversity
Medium Initial Diversity
High Initial Diversity
MOVER
OVERALL
Low Initial Diversity
Medium Initial Diversity
High Initial Diversity

WHITE
26.16%
60.48%
12.32%
-4.74%

NONWHITE
OVERALL
9.04%
15.21%
54.02%
58.89%
12.25%
12.29%
-6.02%
-5.56%

WHITE
83.62%
208.47%
15.85%
-23.59%

NONWHITE
OVERALL
33.56%
28.34%
174.41%
75.06%
12.45%
14.31%
-15.80%
-18.02%
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Based on the insights from Chapter III, there are several conclusions that need to be drawn
for the operationalization of the analysis in Chapter IV and V:
1. Diversity increase rates at various levels of measurement show similar geographic
patterns across the U.S., but should not be conflated. Instead, the analysis should be
carefully dissected by CBSA- and tract-level. Overall, diversity increase is much more
pronounced at the micro- and metropolitan level when compared to tracts.
2. Diversity growth rates are highest in low-diversity contexts. Therefore, the analysis
needs to be broken down into separate levels of initial diversity.
3. Diversity increase rates and their effects should be studied separately for movers and
stayers. Movers and stayers differ on a range of characteristics, including the quality and
quantity of diversity increase experienced.
4. Diversity growth should be subdivided into diversity growth for whites and nonwhites.
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CHAPTER IV

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND OUT-GROUP FRIENDSHIP

Abstract
Relying on the contact and group threat narratives, the first analytic part of the dissertation
examines the link between changing diversity levels in both tracts and CBSAs, on the one
hand, and changes in friendship across racial boundaries, on the other.
Out-group interaction frequency can be seen as an indicator of the presence and intensity of
interethnic and interracial interactions. Lacking contact to racial and ethnic out-group
members and out-group friends might be an indicator of limited interaction across racial
lines and possibly also attitudinal impediments to contact. While diversity undoubtedly
offers a bigger heterogeneous pool from which to chose someone to talk to or spend time
with, the circumstances under which people who experience increasing heterogeneity in
their day-to-day environment actually end up with more heterogeneous circles of friends
remain unclear.
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Introduction
For a long time researchers assumed that contact and friendships across racial boundaries
were rare because the social separation between members of different ethnic and racial
groups was too great. The segregation between members of different ethnoracial groups was
seen as the major cause of low levels of interracial and interethnic bridging. The similarity
of racial and/or ethnic origins in segregated communities was seen as the most important
obstacle for building cross-ethnic relationships.
Segregation in the U.S. is still high, but it has declined (Iceland, 2004a; Lichter, 2013b)
giving way to higher levels of neighborhood diversity across the country. As diversity rises
in neighborhoods, a major challenge lies in moving from numerical diversity (the presence
of different races and ethnicities in one place) to interactional diversity (contact and
friendship across group boundaries). As the U.S. is steadily diversifying, it is necessary to
know if, and under which conditions, heightened levels of heterogeneity in communities and
cities lead to more social contact. While attitudes towards racial and ethnic others and the
willingness to form out-group bonds are undoubtedly related, scholars have focused on
diversity causally impacting prejudice, while the analysis of contact as an outcome has been
neglected and treated as a mediator rather than a dependent variable.
As I have pointed out before, there is still no firm conclusion as to whether diversity
increases or decreases racial and ethnic out-group interactions. Based on the idea that
limited ethnoracial out-group exposure impedes the formation of inter-group bridges, higher
levels of diversity should impact these ties positively. Today's younger generation
theoretically has a significantly higher probability of having an out-group friend when
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compared to older generations (Lichter, 2013), which would support the hypothesis that
growing diversity promotes cross-group contacts. Also, rising levels of intermarriage are
consistent with this idea (Livingston & Brown, 2017).
More generally, however, the relevant findings are rather controversial and suffer from the
primary reliance of cross-sectional data, which prohibits the analysis of changes across
different time periods and introduces a lack of directionality and selection bias. On the one
hand, scholars have demonstrated that increases in contextual heterogeneity can lead to
more positive contact, which then in turn increasing exposure will lead to more out-group
empathy (Laurence, Schmid, & Hewstone, 2017). The term positive contact refers to
interactions that serve a common goal or interest, while negative interactions mainly refer to
instances of harassment and insult. Positive contact has mainly been observed in the school
and college-context: Friendship segregation in schools is largely driven by residential
segregation (Hallinan & Smith, 1985; Mouw & Entwisle, 2006) and seems to decrease if
courses and extracurricular activities are inclusive to different races and ethnicities (Moody,
2001). In colleges and schools, interracial and interethnic dorms and learning settings have
been shown to encourage adolescent friendships between members of different racial and
ethnic groups (De Souza Briggs, 2007; Fischer, 2008; Gaither & Sommers, 2013; Moody,
2001; Quillian, 2002; Stearns, Buchmann, & Bonneau, 2009). Outside of the school context,
research shows that meaningful bridging across racial lines is more common for people in
neighborhoods marked by high levels of heterogeneity (Vervoort, Flap, & Dagevos, 2011).
On the other hand, diversity growth can also lead to a hunkering down of social networks in
general, which might affect interethnic and interracial ties. This perspective has been
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extensively covered in the theory section in Chapter I. Contradicting the literature above,
scholars have demonstrated that there are fewer diverse friendships in classes with a high
proportion of different cultural groups (Chan & Birman, 2009). It is a characteristic of peer
relationships that they are within the same race and ethnicity, the same sex and also similar
age (Hartup, 1996; Shrum, Cheek, & Hunter, 1988). Especially when it comes to best
friends and intimate relationships, the diversification of friendships is overshadowed by the
persisting color lines of in-group bridging. Recent research in the Netherlands has shown
that social networks, such as Facebook, are segregated along lines of ethnicity (Hofstra,
Corten, van Tubergen, & Ellison, 2017). In an analysis of a random selection of wedding
pictures found online researchers found that most of the guests invited to weddings
belonged to the same racial or ethnic group as the inviting couple, demonstrating that
intimate interracial friendships still seem to be rare especially with regards to White-Black
friendships (Berry, 2006).
As stated in the theory section in Chapter I, many scholars present a negative image of how
diversity impacts social networks. Previous research offers numerous explanations for the
deterioration of communities and lower levels of interethnic racial and ethnic interaction,
some of which focus on ethno-racial compositions such as ethnic polarization and
heterogeneity. As a brief summary of the in-depth theoretical discussion in Chapter I, the
most widely cited approaches are inter-group competition and defended neighborhoods
theories, which focus on out-group proportions, out-group in-migration, or ethno-racial
polarization. Furthermore, theories about general community erosion and disorganization in
ethnically heterogeneous settings have been widely used to explain changes in
neighborhood relations and a general deterioration of interaction (Green et al., 1998).
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As discussed above, there are several issues with prior research on diversity and out-group
bridging. While there is a lot of research that describes the negative effect of increases in
diversity on social cohesion, out-group trust, neighborhood attachment, xenophobia and
prejudice, there is no research specifically analyzing if patterns of interaction change due to
neighborhood or city changes in heterogeneity. While the effects of inter-group contact on
outward perception and attitudes have been studied extensively (Christ et al., 2014;
Edmonds & Killen, 2009; Powers & Ellison, 1995), the causal contextual diversity effects
on contact have been largely disregarded in the U.S. One reason is the unavailability of
panel data that can measure the changes in individuals’ interaction across ethnoracial lines.
The second difficulty with the current state of research is the threat to external validity of
conclusions from statistical analysis. Most of the research in this field has been conducted
on the development of friendships in schools and colleges (Fischer, 2011; Levin et al., 2003;
Martin et al., 2010) giving us an incomplete picture of the formation of out-group
friendships and contacts in every-day life. While youth research is being increasingly
discovered as an object of investigation and offers valuable insights into the characteristics
and formation of interracial and interethnic peer relations, diverse friendships between
adults have rarely been in the center of the interest. For this reason, little is still known about
how interracial and interethnic friendships arise in neighborhoods and other noninstitutional contexts and which factors contribute to them.
But why is the study of friendly contact across racial lines so important? First of all,
friendships arise on a voluntary basis, bring a higher degree of closeness compared to
acquaintanceships or random contacts, and tend to be motivated by common interests. While
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Pettigrew (1998) has demonstrated that not every form of contact establishes bridges
between different races and ethnicities, friendships are the most important for this purpose
and therefore crucial to the understanding of the effects of shifting population makeups.
Friendships between people of different races can also be seen as a mix between bonding
and bridging social capital (Putnam 2001). Bonding describes close relationships within
homogenous groups marked by high levels of emotionality and trust, while bridging refers
to contacts that span boundaries such as racial and ethnic disparities and are oftentimes
comparatively weaker.
Secondly, the investigation of friendship is closely aligned with the theories explaining
changing attitudes and patterns of interethnic and interracial interaction in light of increasing
heterogeneity: following the contact hypothesis of Allport (Allport, 1979b), numerous
analyses have been conducted on how interethnic and interracial interaction and friendship
affect prejudices and xenophobia. Research has demonstrated that people who are exposed
to cross-group friendships subsequently make more easily friends outside of their own racial
and ethnic group and feel less anxious about ethnoracial others (Page-Gould, MendozaDenton, & Tropp, 2008). Thus, increases in diversity might influence friendship patterns,
and diverse friendships, in turn, have been shown to spur even more development of
multiracial and multiethnic networks. As explained earlier, interethnic and interracial
conversations and interactions are crucial for resulting attitudes, social capital and collective
efficacy ( Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997) in neighborhoods. Psychologists Pettigrew
and Tropp found a very robust relationship between contact and prejudices in their extensive
meta-analysis on the basis of more than 500 studies with 250,000 participants (2006). The
more contact across ethnoracial lines, the lower the prejudice.
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While the above studies demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between contact
and prejudice, it remains unclear how out-group bridging positively reduces prejudice.
Pettigrew and Tropp followed up on this question in 2008 in a meta-analysis, in which they
investigated the mediating processes in which contact is transferred to more positive
attitudes. The meta-analysis shows that it is primarily empathy towards the minority group
that accelerates these processes. The reduction of anxiety towards the other group also plays
a role, but it has a weaker effect than empathy. The increasing knowledge about the other
group is of much lesser, but significant importance.
Finally it is important to point out that interethnic and interracial friendships are associated
with numerous positive characteristics. Adolescents who have diverse circles of friends have
been shown to be more socially competent (Lease & Blake, 2005), and perform better
academically (Wells, Fox, & Cordova-Cobo, 2016) when compared to people without such
friendships. Above all, young people who are new to a country and who are part of the first
generation of immigrants benefit from friendships to young people without an immigration
background by learning the new culture and learning the language of the immigration
country, and often show fewer social behavior problems and better school outcomes than
young people without such friendships (Titzmann & Silbereisen, 2009).
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Analytical Approach

While previous research has analyzed peer group composition and absolute or proportional
number of best friends with a different racial or ethnic background (Doyle & Kao, 2007;
Martin et al., 2010; Moody, 2001), this study focuses on the number of times a person
visited an out-group friend’s home or invited them to their home. The question asked in the
survey is: “About how many times in the past 12 months have you been in the home of a
friend of a different race or had them in your home?”
While we have no information on the intensity of the friendships, visiting someone at home
or inviting someone home implies a higher level of commitment than talking to or spending
time with an acquaintance. Home-based interaction suggests higher levels of trust and
shows dedication in terms of time and effort. In fact, merely asking respondents if they have
out-group friends and if so, how many, leaves too much room to interpretation and
overstatement.
Similar to research regarding outward perceptions and attitudes, there has been too little
consistent attempt to assess the effect that diversity has on individual’s propensity to form
out-group ties and relationships. By drawing on theoretical frameworks from inter-group
contact and group threat perspectives, the first part of the present study relies on information
of changes based on two time points of data (2006-2012) from the Portraits of American
Life Survey. I analyze the effect of changing levels of ethnic and racial heterogeneity on
changing levels and patterns of racial and ethnic out-group friendship in the U.S. Put
differently, the analysis evaluates the impact that tract- and CBSA-level diversity in 2000
and its change scores between 2000 and 2010 have on variations in out-group friendship and
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interactional behavior between 2006 and 2012 panels. Bear in mind that an increase in the
frequency of inviting or visiting an out-group friend at home might stem from a) overall
growth in the number of out-group friends between 2006 and 2012 and/or b) an increase in
the time spent inviting or visiting the same out-group friends. Or to put it this way: higher
levels of out-group bridging must not necessarily stem from having gained more out-group
friends, but might reflect spending more time together. Nonetheless, it is a strong measure
of friendship intensity and bespeaks the willingness to interact and bond with ethnoracial
out-group members.
The major problem with cross-sectional studies of diversity effects is selection bias. A
positive relationship between diversity and home-based interaction does not mean that
diversity leads to more out-group bridging. Instead, it could be that people with interethnic
friendships select into social spaces in which they are more likely to meet more out-group
peers. This study attempts to overcome the limitations of previous cross-sectional studies,
which generally overlook residential mobility and neighborhood sorting. By using panel
data, this study attempts to limit selection bias. Measures of human capital, threat and trust
were included into all of the models as key indicators of immigrant-related attitudes.
There is no distinction into movers and stayers in Chapter III (but Chapter IV), because
friendship patterns are not comparable for people who moved and those that remained in the
same tract between 2006 and 2012. The decision to focus on stayers is also based on the
observation that individuals have lower trust in friends and social relationships after
relocation (Chapter III). Therefore, measuring a change in the number of racial and ethnic
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out-group friends across time only makes sense for those people that remain in the same
neighborhood between these two time points.
The aim of the present chapter is to answer the following research questions:
1. How are racial and ethnic diversity and the propensity to visit or invite an out-group
friend associated?
2. How are changes in racial and ethnic diversity and changes in the propensity to visit
or invite an out-group friend associated across time?
a. How do these results differ by geographical level of analysis?
b. How do they differ by non-white and non-Hispanic white respondents?
c. How do they differ by initial level of diversity?
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Findings
a) Preliminary Analysis of Dependent Variables
Figure 12. Percentages: "About how many times have you been in the home of a friend
of a different race or had them in your home in the past 12 months?", 2006
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In the first step, the percentage distribution of different frequencies of diverse friendships
was calculated. Figure 12 shows that roughly 23 percent of the respondents in 2006 did not
visit or invite any racial out-group friend during the whole year. Almost eight percent
invited or visited an out-group friend’s home once, 20.4 percent twice and 16.4 percent five
to nine times. Roughly a third of the respondents are “regular” visitors/inviters and spend
time with an out-group friend between once a month and once a week.
The same question was asked in 2012, but the results were coded continuously, ranging
from 0-500 (Figure 13). However, the overall pattern is similar with results shifted even
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more towards no visits per year. 31.5 percent of all respondents claimed to not have
interacted with an out-group friend at home in the year prior to the interview in 2012
compared to 23 percent in 2006. This decline in close friendship interactions could be due
to a general decline in friendships over time (Brashears & Brashears, 2015). Furthermore,
the sample interviewed in 2006 was 6 years older – research has demonstrated that age is
negatively correlated with friendship (Bhattacharya, Ghosh, Monsivais, Dunbar, & Kaski,
2016).
Figure 13. Absolute numbers "Times visited or invited friend of other race", 2012
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For comparative purposes, I recoded the variables into the same categories. The results can
be seen in Table 14. Between 2006 and 2012, the percentage of people that never visited or
invited an out-group friend rose by almost 11 percentage points. All the other categories
declined between the two time points.
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Table 14. Number of times visited or invited friend of other race in past 12 months

Never
Once
2-4 times
5-9 times
>=10 Times

2006
Number
253
86
226
182
360

Percent
22.8

2012
Number
375

Percent
31.5

7.7
20.4
16.4
32.5

70
108
155
377

5.8
17.9
13.0
31.6

b) Cross-sectional Model
Figure 14. Mean number of times visited or invited out-group friend by increasing
level of diversity, 2012

The data in Figure 14 indicates that, there is a positive relationship between Simpson
diversity in 2010 and the mean numbers of times a person interacted with an out-group
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friend at home in 201210. On average, people living in more diverse neighborhoods have a
higher frequency of interacting with out-group friends.
Figure 15. Number of times visited or invited out-group friend by race and ethnicity,
2012

Although this study would have benefitted from sub-group analysis by all of the four racial
and ethnic groups, small sample sizes compel me to treat race and ethnicity as a dichotomy:
white and Non-white. While such a binary approach was necessary for statistical reasons, it
is also defensible because the white majority and non-white minority show widely divergent
reactions towards changes in diversity, as we will see in the following.

10

This serves as an example for the relationship between diversity and out-group home
visits. Due to the categorical nature of the home-visit variable in 2006, the plot was only
possible for 2012.
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On average, non-Hispanic whites have 18 home visits a year with ethno-racial others, while
non-whites have 24. Figure 15 illustrates that whites and non-whites do not differ much in
the frequency of out-group association until diversity becomes high and whites propensity to
conduct bridging contacts increases dramatically with neighborhood diversity. While the
overall relationship between diversity and overall frequency of out-group home visits is a
positive one, the positive link is strong for whites, while there seems to be no visible
relationship for non-whites. The figure shows that whites’ social contacts are very sensitive
to context. It appears that whites’ contacts are less diverse at lower levels of diversity but
more diverse at higher levels, while there was no apparent relationship between diversity
and out-group friends for non-whites.
In the following cross-sectional analysis, a multinomial logistic regression measures the
association between diversity and out-group visits adjusting for human capital, feelings of
threat and trust as major drivers of willingness to interact with racial others. In line with the
discussion above, the 2012 frequency of out-group home visits (never, once, 2-4 times, 5-9
times, more than 10 times) is the outcome. “Never” was set as the reference group.
Table 15 contains a multinomial logistic regression of how often an individual visited outgroup friend’s home in the past year. In line with the figures above, we see that higher
diversity is significantly associated with higher rates of visiting or inviting racial out-group
friends at least 2-4 times a year. Relative to no out-group home visits, a one-unit increase in
the Simpson diversity score (ranging from lowest diversity (0) to highest diversity (1))
raises the odds of visiting an out-group friend 2-4 times (versus not visiting an out-group
friend) by a factor of 2.97. With every one-unit increase in diversity, individuals have 3.88
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times the odds of having 5-9 friends and 7.54 the odds of having more than 10 friends when
compared to the base outcome.
Following Table 15, the predicted probabilities for diversity scores ranging from 0 to 0.9
were calculated in increments of 0.1 by using Stata’s margin command. The values in
Figure 16 are average predicted probabilities, which were calculated using the sample values
of the other predictor variables. For instance, the mean predicted probability of visiting
racial and ethnic out-group friends at home more than 10 times is 0.22 if one’s diversity
score lies between 0.1 and 0.2 and rises to 0.45 if one’s diversity score is between 0.7 and
0.8 (averaging across the mean sample values of the controls).
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Table 15. Relative risk ratios (cross-sectional), Multinomial Logistic Regression of how
often visited or invited out-group friend in past year, 2012 (z-scores in brackets)
REFERENCE GROUP: NEVER VISITED OR INVITED OUTGROUP FRIEND IN PAST 12 MONTHS
Simpson Diversity,
2010
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
(0,1)
High School
College
More than College
General Trust towards
others
Trust towards Family
and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race
is decreasing
Constant

Once

2-4 Times

5-9 Times

>= 10 Times

0.363
(-1.340)
0.978*
(-2.480)
0.812
(-0.710)

2.907*
(2.170)
0.976***
(-4.080)
0.903
(-0.540)

3.888**
(2.460)
0.975***
(-3.780)
1.232
(1.010)

7.542***
(4.600)
0.960***
(-7.490)
1.454*
(2.290)

0.870
(-0.460)
0.752
(-0.680)
0.470
(-1.560)
0.840
(-0.430)

1.200
(0.890)
1.743*
(1.610)
2.271**
(2.360)
1.950*
(1.970)

0.855
(-0.720)
1.208
(0.550)
0.958
(-0.120)
1.125
(0.350)

1.170
(0.880)
0.903
(-0.360)
1.361
(1.090)
1.304
(0.980)

1.223
(1.520)

1.185*
(1.820)

1.195*
(1.710)

1.296**
(3.120)

1.030
(0.230)
1.043
(0.150)

1.050
(0.550)
0.826
(-1.010)

1.101
(0.950)
0.941
(-0.290)

1.180*
(2.010)
0.953
(-0.290)

1.250
(0.680)
1.044
(0.070)

1.139
(0.610)
0.625
(-0.950)

0.759
(-1.070)
0.809
(-0.410)

0.910
(-0.480)
1.934
(1.590)

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001. Summary statistics: PseudoR2 = .053, N = 1146
* The model only shows major results of interest. In addition, the following characteristics

were controlled in all of the models: Length of residence, homeownership, tract-level
socio-economic status.
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APr(Visi(ng Out-group Friend Rela(ve to
"No visits"

Figure 16. Predictive Probability of out-group visits or invites
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While the main focus of the cross-sectional analysis lies on the association between
diversity and predicting out-group interaction and friendship, it is interesting to look at the
other control variables as well. Most strikingly, older respondents are less likely to visit outgroup friends’ homes when compared to younger respondents. General trust in others is
associated with increased odds of visiting out-group friends. Trust towards closer family or
friend was only significantly related with more than 10 visits or invites per year. While
individual trust and human capital theory seem to hold true for this cross-sectional model,
individual threat theory did not apply.
As we see in the following model, there is considerable value in introducing an interaction
term for whites and non-whites. As shown in Table 16 the positive association between
diversity and frequency of out-group visits only holds true for whites, which confirms the
initial association observed in Figure 15. In reference to no out-group home visits, whites
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show 5.8 times the odds of 5-9 out-group interactions and 13.7 times the odds of more than
10 interactions for every step increase in diversity. It is remarkable how strong the
association is for more than 10 out-group visits, proving the initial assumption that whites
maintain less diverse friendships when living in low-diversity neighborhoods, while whites
in high-diversity neighborhoods have more diverse friendships. Controlling for all the
covariates below, the mean predicted probability of visiting racial and ethnic out-group
friends more than 10 times is 0.18 for low diversity scores between 0.1 and 0.2, while
whites in high-diversity (0.8-0.9) have almost three times the likelihood of being in this
category (0.51) when compared to individuals in low-diversity neighborhoods (Figure 17).
In contrast, the non-white interaction does not exhibit a significant relationship between
diversity and out-group bridging. This is due to the fact that non-white initial friendships are
less affected by varying levels of diversity. Plotting the predictive margins in Figure 18
reveals that overall the likelihoods to spend time with out-group friends is high and there is
little variation across the x-axis. In other words, whites have lower friendship diversity, but
once they live in and self-select into diversity, the contextual composition is reflected in
their friendship choices, while non-whites are less sensitive. Instead, non-whites have
friendships that are more diverse in the first place and also live in more diverse places
(Chapter III).
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Table 16. Relative risk ratios (cross-sectional), including interaction White/Non-White,
Multinomial Logistic Regression of out-group visits and invites in past year, 2012 *
REFERENCE GROUP: NEVER VISITED OR INVITED OUTGROUP FRIEND IN PAST 12 MONTHS
Once
2-4 Times
5-9 Times
>= 10 Times
Simpson Diversity,
2010

0.241
(-1.220)

1.872
(0.880)

5.798*
(2.150)

13.70***
(4.090)

Simpson Diversity,
2010 * NON-WHITE
Age

0.274
(-1.170)
0.980
(-1.650)
1.270
(0.150)
0.857
(-0.390)
1.341
(0.510)
0.735
(-0.350)
0.615
(-0.520)
1.481
(0.480)

2.610
(1.220)
0.973**
(-3.410)
0.456
(-0.630)
1.321
(1.110)
1.756
(1.430)
1.611
(0.690)
2.929
(1.560)
2.232
(1.200)

1.452
(0.450)
0.975**
(-2.680)
0.425
(-1.770)
0.878
(-0.430)
1.763
(1.190)
0.606
(-0.920)
0.395
(-1.540)
0.603
(-0.960)

2.022
(1.050)
0.953***
(-6.360)
0.267
(-3.310)
1.442
(1.600)
1.356
(0.910)
0.659
(-0.830)
1.070
(0.130)
0.940
(-0.130)

1.318*
(1.730)

1.092
(0.750)

1.185
(1.290)

1.252***
(2.130)

1.193
(0.850)
1.456
(0.960)

1.151
(1.040)
1.019
(0.070)

1.138
(0.840)
0.924
(-0.260)

1.372**
(2.470)
1.079
(0.320)

1.469
(0.930)
0.355
(-0.870)

1.188
(0.630)
0.368
(-1.110)

0.613
(-1.400)
0.727
(-0.350)

0.994
(-0.020)
1.997
(0.970)

White (0,1)
Male
Parents born in US
High School
College
More than College
General Trust
towards others
Trust towards Family
and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race
is decreasing
Constant

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001, Summary statistics:
Pseudo R2 = .078 , N = 595
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but not included in this table: years in the
neighborhood, homeownership, family status.
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Pr(Visi(ng Out-group Friend Rela(ve to
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Figure 17. Predictive probability of out-group visits or invites, for Whites
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Figure 18. Predictive probability of out-group visits or invites, for Non-Whites
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While increasing age influences out-group visits negatively, education does not play a role
in predicting out-group bridging. Instead, neighborhood diversity, age and general trust were
the most important factors affecting individual bridging behavior. Overall, trust (in
particular towards strangers and neighbors) was highly predictive of having more than 5
out-group home visits, while trust in family and close friends was strongly associated.
In order to establish whether the Simpson diversity index is an adequate measure of
heterogeneity for this study, the same analysis as above was conducted using the Entropy
score in Table 17. The data in Table 17 indicates that the overall results are quite similar to
Table 16, which leads me to the conclusion that the Simpson Diversity measure is an
adequate measure of diversity for this study. Relative to no out-group home visits, whites
have 3.583 times the odds of 5-9 out-group interactions and 7.379 times the odds of more
than 10 interactions for every increase in Entropy.
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Table 17. Relative risk ratios (cross-sectional), ENTROPY SCORE, Multinomial
logistic regression of out-group visits and invites in past year, 2012 *

Entropy Score 2010
Entropy Score 2010 *NON-WHITE
White (0,1)
Age
Male
Parents born in US
High School
College
More than College
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is decreasing
Constant

REFERENCE GROUP: NEVER VISITED OR
INVITED OUT-GROUP FRIEND IN PAST 12
MONTHS
Once
2-4 Times 5-9 Times >= 10 Times
1.234
1.320
3.583**
7.379***
(0.84)
(1.68)
(2.34)
(3.89)
0.835
1.329
0.962
1.153
(-0.85) (0.72)
(-0.25)
(0.98)
0.199
1.348
0.637
0.732
(0.220) (-0.650)
(-1.69)
(-3.743)
0.956* 0.946**
0.989***
0.937***
(-1.98) (-2.97)
(-2.70)
(-2.99)
0.622
1.726
0.766
1.635
(-0.42) (0.63)
(-0.87)
(1.23)
1.526
1.059
1.836
1.764
(0.76)
(0.89)
(1.25)
(0.63)
0.625
1.846
0.836
0.822
(-0.83) (0.52)
(-0.54)
(-0.51)
0.947
1.735
1.156
1.544
(-0.19) (0.95)
(0.84)
(0.67)
1.177
1.420
1.110
1.272
(1.57)
(0.73)
(0.75)
(0.64)
1.126* 1.048
1.171*
1.143**
(1.84)
(1.11)
(1.89)
(-1.98)
0.934
0.947
1.155*
1.265**
(-0.33) (-0.83)
(1.98)
(2.33)
1.626
1.159
0.935
0.982
(0.52)
(0.99)
(-0.721)
(-0.54)
0.947
1.063
0.957
1.043
(-0.77) (0.83)
(-1.03)
(0.35)
0.321
0.625
0.999
1.324
(-0.75) (-0.81)
(-0.223)
(0.27)

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001, Summary statistics:
Pseudo R2 = .072 , N = 595
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but not included in this table: years in the
neighborhood, homeownership, family status.
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Summarizing the findings from this cross-sectional analysis leaves us with important
insights for the ensuing panel models. In order to examine the associations between
diversity and out-group bridging, multinomial logistic regression models were constructed
predicting no, 2-4, 5-9 and more than 10 visits in the past 12 months with “no visits or
invites” as the comparison group. The results should not be understood causally: more
heterogeneity does not necessarily cause heterogeneous circles of friends for whites, but can
be understood in terms of self-selection. Those whites with a preference for multiethnic and
multiracial settings and diverse acquaintances might decide to move or stay consistent with
this proclivity, while those people who are not content living in high-diversity contexts,
might have out-migrated. Conversely, whites have been shown to have a general preference
for in-group members and choose their neighborhood contexts based on this composition
preference, which affects their mobility in and out of a particular neighborhood (Adelman,
2005; Krysan et al., 2009). Thus, whites in low-diversity areas with homogenous friendship
circles might be product of self-selective behavior out of diversity.
Consequently, further analysis needs to account for the preference bias that could shape outgroup bridging. The following analysis attempts to look under the surface of these crosssectional results in order to understand how changes in diversity affect people’s propensity
to bond outside of their own race. It is assumed that non-whites react better to higher
diversity as they have a higher likelihood of living in diverse neighborhoods and feel more
at ease with “other” minority members and whites. While some whites in high-diversity
seem to be comfortable with their multiracial and multiethnic surrounding, most whites live
in less diverse neighborhoods and are therefore more unfamiliar with diversity. While this
hypothesis seems to contradict the above finding, I believe that a panel analysis will offer
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more evidence of a causal relationship from contextual diversity to bridging behavior than
cross-sectional analysis can.

c) Panel Data Model
As pointed out before, cross-sectional analyses have the disadvantage that causal processes
are not identifiable. The positive relationship between ethnic and racial diversity and outgroup friendship that we observe above could in fact be due to selective mobility of
respondents. Thus, the positive correlation between diversity and out-group bridging does
not mean that higher of levels heterogeneity in neighborhoods bolster out-group bridging.
Instead, people who value diverse friendships might in fact stay in neighborhoods where the
residents are becoming more dissimilar. Therefore, two time points of data will be used to
assess whether an increase in tract- or city-level diversity is linked to changes in individuals’
out-group interactions for stayers. While a strong causal conclusion can still not be drawn
from two time points, such an analysis gives us more leverage in understanding changes that
happen within the individual.
i. Preliminary Analysis
As people were interviewed both in 2006 and 2012 it is important to test if there is a
substantial enough percentage of people that have changed their attitude between 2006 and
2012. A Stuart Maxwell test was conducted to see if there was significant change between
two time points (Table 18). The test was highly significant showing that a meaningful shift
occurred between 2006 and 2012. Of the 249 who never visited or invited racial out-group
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members in 2006, only 143 still fell into this category in 2012. While the overall number of
individuals, who had never visited or invited a racial out-group friend, increased from 2006
to 2012, the increase stems from respondents in all 2006 categories.
Table 18. Stuart-Maxwell Test, Out-group bridging
Immigrants take
Jobs away

WAVE 1
Never
Once
2-4 Times
5-9 Times
More than 10 Times
Total
Symmetry
Marginal

WAVE 2
Never

Once

143
40
80
38
44
345

13
7
19
11
2
52
chi2
52.97
46.66

2-4
Times
39
17
55
40
42
193
Df

5-9 Times

23
7
24
37
50
141
Prob>chi2
10
0
4
0

More than
10 Times

Total

31
13
42
53
214
353

249
84
220
179
352
1084

ii. Overall Panel Multinomial Logistic Regression
For the change models, the primary measure of outcome is divided into five distinctive and
similarly sized subgroups: (a) No visits and invites in both years, (b) Sometimes (1-9 times)
in both years, (c) Often (more than 10 times) in both years, (d) Never to sometimes or often,
Sometimes to often and (e) Often to sometimes or never, sometimes to never.
Choosing this outcome was a lengthy process that involved testing several similar models
with different outcomes to explore associations between diversity growth and change in outgroup bridging. The bottom line is that is important to define the optimal number of
categories for the multinomial logistic regression. As a start, I conducted the following
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analysis using a 3-category measure including “no change”, “less out-group bridging” and
“more out-group bridging”. However, this measure had one major flaw: It was not reliable
because of ceiling and floor effects. That is, those who are at either end of the response
scale (never or more than 10 times) in 2006 cannot get more extreme. However, extreme
negatives (never) are quite different from extreme positives (more than ten times) and
should not be merged into “no change”. Furthermore, I tested a 4-category-model that
includes following categories: No visits and invites in both years (0,0), visits to no visits
(1,0), no visits to visits (0,1), and visits to visits (1,1). The results were relatively consistent
with the models below, but the five-category-model described above clearly outperforms it
in terms of variance explained and significance. While the four-category-model relies on
binary outcomes (Yes, No) in 2006 and 2012, the five-category-model draws more subtle
distinctions between the different levels of out-group bridging. First of all, the decrease in
out-group bridging is not just characterized by “visits to no visits”, but by individuals
moving from “often to sometimes or never” and “sometimes to never”. An increase in
interracial home visits is captured through both “never to sometimes or often” and
“sometimes to often”. In addition, visits in both years were broken down into “sometimes in
both years” and “often in both years”. Conflating these two groups would have led to an
oversimplified model.
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Table 19. Change in frequency of out-group visits or invites 2000-2010
NO CHANGE

Freq.

Percent

a) No visits/invites in both years
b) Sometimes in both years (Once
a week, 2-4 Times, 5-9 Times)
c) Often in both years (More than
10 times in past 12 months)
CHANGE

143
217

13.19
20.02

214

19.74

214

19.74

296

27.31

1,084

100

d) Never to sometimes or often,
Sometimes to often
e) Often to sometimes or never,
sometimes to never
Total

As seen in Table 19, 53 percent of the sample did not change their behavior between 2006
and 2012. Roughly 20 percent of the sample “improved” their behavior (moved from never
visiting or inviting in 2006 to visiting or inviting sometimes in 2012, or moved from visiting
or inviting sometimes in 2006 to often in 2012) and 27 percent decreased their out-group
interaction (moved from visiting or inviting often in 2006 to sometimes or never in 2012).
The following tables are multinomial regression analyses capturing the effect of a
percentage change in tract- and CBSA-level diversity on changes in likelihood to visit or
invite an out-group friend between 2006 and 2012. The results of the multinomial logistic
regressions should be interpreted as relative risks of unchanged out-group bridging behavior
in both years (sometimes visited or invited friend in 2006 and sometimes visited or invited
friend in 2012, often visited or invited friend in 2006 and often visited or invited friend in
2012), intensified visiting behavior (never to sometimes and often, sometimes to often), or
decreasing visiting behavior (often or sometimes to never, sometimes to never). All of these
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categories need to be read in reference to being in the base category “No visits and invites in
both years” (did not visit friend in 2006, and did not visit friend in 2012, either).
While I tried several models, I decided to use “No visits and invites in both years” as the
base category, because a) I am mainly interested in the groups that change between 2006
and 2012 and b) this category is easiest to interpret in reference to the others because it is at
one end of the “spectrum”. Rather then choosing the most normal outcome as the base
(Often to sometimes or never, sometimes to never), seeing the change-categories in
reference to “No visits and invites in both years” offers the most interesting contrast.
I begin with a very simple model, which has only diversity change as an independent
variable (Table 20). Against the assumption based of the cross-sectional results that
diversity is positively related to out-group bridging, individuals experiencing diversity
growth are most likely to fall into the category “No visits and invites in both years”.
Table 20. Relative risk ratios, Effect Percentage Change in Simpson Diversity on
Changes in Out-Group Interaction, 2006-2012 (Reference category: No visits or invites
in 2006 and 2012)
Sometimes in Both Years
Often in Both Years
Never to Sometimes/Often
Often to Sometimes/Never

RRR
0.997**
0.999***
0.999*
0.996***

(z)
-2.060
-2.260
-1.855
-2.320

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001,
Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .019, N = 703
* No additional controls.

As seen in Figure 19, this result is confirmed in the full model. The full table (see Appendix,
Table A) indicates that, relative to the base category, respondents are less likely to fall into
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the categories “sometimes in both years”, “often in both years” and “often to
sometimes/never”, even if additional controls are taken into account.
Figure 19. Panel models for tract-level diversity changes (Table A in Appendix)

Rela(ve Risk Ra(os, Eﬀect % Change in Simpson Diversity
on Changes in Out-Group Interac(on, 2006-2012
Reference Category: NO VISITS OR INVITES IN 2006 AND 2012
1.000
0.998
0.996

*

*

*

0.994
0.992
0.990
0.988
0.986
0.984
Some5mes in Both
Years

OFen in Both Years

Never to some5mes/ OFen to some5mes/
oFen
never

Remarks about this and following figures:
* As explained earlier, models in Chapter IV only include people that remained in the same
neighborhood between 2006 and 2012.
* The following models only show major results of interest. In addition, the following
characteristics were controlled for in all of the models: age, gender, race, individual
education, income, general trust in others and towards family and relatives, feeling of safety
in neighborhood, feeling that own race is decreasing in neighborhood, length of residence,
homeownership, tract-level socio-economic status.
* For full models of any of the following figures, please see appendix.
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.
* N= 682, Pseudo-R2= .054
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Figure 20. Adjusted Predictions of Diversity Increase Rates (changerate_Div) by
Category of Dependent Variable: (1) no visits in both years, (2) some visits in both
years, (3) often in both years, (4) never to sometimes/often, (5) often to
sometimes/never
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
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As shown with the adjusted predictions of diversity increase rates (Figure 20), it is
important to note that the model uncertainty is quite large for most of the levels of diversity
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increase. Especially those cases that have larger effect sizes show very broad confidence
intervals, which are signs of an inadequate sample size. Since the spread of the errors is not
constant across the levels of diversity growth, heteroskedasticity is present. However, the
adjusted predictions still evidence that, except for “never to sometimes/often”, all scenarios
are less likely to eventuate when compared to the base category.
A closer look at the full regression model (see appendix, Table A) shows that higher age is
significantly associated with a higher likelihood of having no out-group friends in both
years. Education is particularly important in explaining changes in out-group interaction.
Individuals with a college degree have 1.55 times the odds of visiting or inviting out-group
friends sometimes in both years, while individuals with more than a college degree have
1.633 times the odds and 2.533 times the odds of visiting or inviting out-group friends
sometimes and often in both years, respectively. Higher income is significantly associated
with more out-group bridging in both years (often and sometimes). While trust towards
family and relatives was not meaningfully related to the outcome, general trust towards
others is highly significant and positively related to out-group interaction in both years and
improving interaction between 2006 and 2012.
Similar to the cross-sectional model, the above analysis was broken down into subgroup
models by white and non-white self-identification in the following figure based on the
assumption that non-whites react more positively to changes in diversity as they have a
higher likelihood of living in diverse neighborhoods in the first place. A multinomial
logistic regression with interactions between diversity increase rates and white/non-white
status was implemented (Figure 21).
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Figure 21. Panel Models for tract-level diversity changes (White/ Non-White), (Table B
in Appendix)
By White/Non-White Status: Rela(ve Risk Ra(os, Eﬀect % Change in Simpson
Diversity on Changes in Out-Group Interac(on, 2006-2012
Reference Category: NO VISITS OR INVITES IN 2006 AND 2012
1.010

1.005

1.000
*
0.995

*

Non-White
*

White

0.990

0.985
Some5mes in
Both Years

OFen in Both
Years

Never to
OFen to
Some5mes/OFen Some5mes/Never

* White/Non-White Model (Including Interaction): N= 681, Pseudo-R2= .069

iii. Panel Models by Level of Initial Diversity
While the overall model (Figure 19) suggests that diversity growth affects individuals’
bridging behavior detrimentally, Figure 21 evidences that breaking the panel model down
by white and non-white respondents shows major differences in likelihood to visit an outgroup friend’s home over time. In fact, the negative relationship between diversity growth
and out-group bridging only holds true for non-whites. This comes as quite a surprise
because non-whites were expected to respond more positively to growing diversity as they
are more used to living in diversity in the first place. Furthermore, the cross-sectional model

123

showed a very positive association between higher diversity and more intergroup interaction
among whites. However, the above results evidence the opposite. As I have pointed out
earlier, the panel models show that a positive association for white interaction and diversity
might not actually mean that diversity itself is driving the out-group bridging behavior.
Instead, the cross-sectional results show whites’ propensity to self-select into diversity if
they feel comfortable with ethnoracial outsiders.
In order to understand what is driving the panel results, an analysis was run separately for
tracts with high, medium and low initial levels of diversity (Figure 22). The following figure
shows multinomial logistic regressions with interactions for white/non-white respondents by
initial level of diversity.
As shown in Figure 22 below, a separate analysis by initial level of diversity is crucial in
teasing out differential reactions to growing diversity for both whites and non-whites. As a
reminder, low diversity spans from 0 - 24.3, medium-diversity from 24.4 - 49.04 and high
diversity from 49.05 – 74.5 on the Simpson diversity scale. In line with the above findings,
the negative association between diversity growth and out-group friendship is particularly
meaningful for non-whites at low- and medium-levels of diversity. For non-white
individuals living in low diversity tracts, a one-percent rise in Simpson diversity decreases
the odds of visiting an out-group friend often in both years by a factor of 0.876 (z= -2.390).
For non-whites in low- and medium-level diversity, the odds of increasing out-group visits
(never to sometimes or often) are decreased by factors of 0.889 (z=-3.170) and 0.915 (z=2.460), respectively. It is interesting to see how strong the effect of heterogenization on outgroup bridging for nonwhites is. It seems that the results for low- (and medium-) diversity
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drive the overall negative finding for non-whites. While these results are puzzling, I assume
that non-whites in low-diversity experience heterogenization as a threat and withdraw from
society as competition increases.
This reaction is less dramatic for non-Hispanic whites, but similar: whites who live in lowdiversity neighborhoods react according to the threat hypothesis. Not having been exposed
to diversity before, whites and non-whites in homogenous neighborhoods are more likely to
have no out-group home visits both in 2006 and 2012, and are less likely to see increase in
out-group bonds between 2006 and 2012.
In contrast, for non-whites living in initial high diversity, a one-unit increase in the Simpson
diversity raises the odds of increasing out-group interaction between 2006 and 2012 (versus
not visiting an out-group friend in both years) by a significant factor of 1.132 (z=-2.06). For
whites who initially live in in high diversity, the odds of increasing out-group interaction
also rise by a statistically significant factor of 1.146 (z=2.39).
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Figure 22. Panel Models for tract-level diversity changes broken down by initial level
of diversity and white/non-white status (Table C in Appendix)

By White/Non-White Status: Rela(ve Risk Ra(os, Eﬀect %
Change in Simpson Diversity on Changes in Out-Group
Interac(on, 2006-2012
Reference Category: NO VISITS OR INVITES IN 2006 AND 2012
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Diversity
No Eﬀect

Never to
OFen to
Some5mes/OFen some5mes/never

* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .137
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .108
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 210, Pseudo-R2= .114

To sum up, Figure 22 contradicts the general notion from Figure 21 that diversity growth
generally holds negative effects for non-white stayers. Instead, when the results are broken
down by initial level of diversity, we see that, in the context of diversity growth, both
whites’ and non-whites’ propensity to maintain out-group friendships suffer from low-level
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initial diversity. Furthermore, both whites and non-whites in high-diversity contexts adapt
their out-group friendships to the rising levels of heterogeneity.
What does this tell us? First of all, white and non-white respondents might not be so
different after all. For both groups, the level of diversity experienced a priori is highly
important in determining whether diversity growth is experienced as a threat or an
opportunity for contact. Individuals living in low-diversity contexts may have higher
inhibition thresholds and may be more fearful of contact across racial lines. People living in
high-diversity neighborhoods may be less reserved to meeting and befriending new outgroup members, which then helps to eradicate certain prejudices, encourages them to seek
cultural exchange and cuts down anxieties of coming into contact with peers of the other
culture. Furthermore, they might have self-selected into neighborhoods of rising diversity.
Thus, for both whites and non-whites we find both the contact and threat hypothesis
confirmed. For those respondents with prior experience with diversity, an increase in the
heterogeneity of available out-group friends will lead to higher bridging. For those
respondents with low diversity experience, heterogeneity growth might be perceived as a
neighborhood threat.
While prior analyses were conducted on the neighborhood-level, it is important to
understand if these effects hold true across different geographical levels. As Kaufmann and
Harris (2015) have demonstrated in their meta-analysis of diversity-effects, shifts to
different geographical levels can have very different implications when analyzing
individuals’ behaviors. The CBSA-level analysis in Figure 23 does not show any significant
effects for white and non-white stayers no matter if they had high prior CBSA-level
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exposure to heterogeneity or not. While CBSA-level diversity will prove to be an important
predictor of individual-level attitudes towards out-group members (see Chapter V), the same
cannot be said for out-group interaction. Inter-group bridging is contingent on actual
diversity in communities, while compositional changes in the city do not impact individuals
likelihood to form out-group bridges. The CBSA scale is too large to affect social
interaction patterns. However, it is important to note that none of the bars seem to break the
1-threshold.
Figure 23. Panel Models for CBSA-level diversity changes broken down by initial level
of diversity and white/non-white status
By White/Non-White Status: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect % CBSAChange in Simpson Diversity on Changes in Out-Group Interaction,
2006-2012
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* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .095
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .073
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 210, Pseudo-R2= .107
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Discussion
Workplaces, schools and universities are places where intercultural encounters are very
common. While these kinds of contacts happen within a formal setting and have been shown
to stimulate consequent formation of out-group bridges, neighborhood increases in diversity
might not entail actual interaction across racial lines and have shown rather contrasting
effects. Chapter IV focuses on the effect of diversity on out-group interaction and carefully
dissects the analysis into subgroup studies of racial status, initial level of diversity and level
of geography. Summing the results up in a nutshell, we can say that stayers in high-diversity
contexts increase their out-group interaction when diversity increases, while the opposite
effect was observed for inhabitants of low-diversity tracts.

Four important lessons were drawn from this first part of the present study:
1. On the one hand, the cross-sectional Figure 18 suggests that higher levels of
diversity are associated with more out-group friendships for whites (while there was
no effect for Non-Whites). While cross-sectional associations might seem
meaningful, they do not necessarily depict the effects that diversity growth has
within individuals across time but may reveal more about individual preferences and
choices. What the cross-sectional findings mainly demonstrate is that whites, who
feel comfortable with diversity and live in diverse neighborhoods, tend to befriend
racial out-group members.
2. However, further analysis based on two time points of data reveals that the overall
model (not broken down by initial level of diversity or white/non-white status) did
not prove to be significant for whites: when analyzing changes in bridging behavior
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within the white individual, we find no significant changes. As further analysis
showed this is mainly due to the fact that whites, on average, start at lower levels of
neighborhood diversity (Chapter III) and results strongly differ by initial level of
diversity. For non-whites, the results were rather surprising: contradicting the crosssectional results and the hypothetical assumption that non-whites might embrace
changes in diversity, changing levels of Simpson diversity do not exert an effect on
out-group interaction for whites, while non-whites are more likely to not visit friends
at all. This finding is puzzling and leaves room for further inquiry. In particular,
these partial results show how important it is to break the analysis down by initial
level of diversity.
3. For this part of the study, initial level of diversity was the most important subgroup
measure. For whites and non-whites, it is mainly individuals with substantial
diversity experience in their everyday environments whose frequency of out-group
visits and invites are positively impacted by further diversity growth. Contradicting
the finding from the overall model (stating that heterogenization decreases out-group
bridging), diversity growth raises the odds of both whites and non-whites living in
high-level diversity to spend more time bonding with out-group friends. Prior
experience with heterogeneity, I speculate, removes any threat effects of residing in
an increasingly diverse neighborhood; instead, individuals who remain in
heterogeneous tracts reflect the inter-group contact theory.
Individuals in low-diversity environments were more likely to not visit or invite outgroup friends at all. Among the reasons individuals in low initial diversity do not
experience increases in out-group friendship in view of rising diversity is probably
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that they are less experienced with diversity and might have stronger stereotypes and
worse attitudes, which keep them from establishing new out-group ties. Furthermore,
increasing levels of diversity might not actually mean that people have more
exposure to each other, and this might be particularly true for low levels of diversity.
In fact, various research has demonstrated that exposure to racial and ethnic others
might be hindered through micro-level segregation or the mere fact that actual
conversations and interactions are not taking place even if people of different races
or ethnicities seem to live in close proximity (Wright et al., 2014).
4. While geography plays an important role in Chapter V in understanding diversityeffects on out-group attitudes, there was no effect from changes in city-level
diversity on individual-propensity to visit out-group friends at home. While citylevel diversity negatively impacts perceptions of racial and ethnic outsiders (see
Chapter V) due to perceived threat and competition for jobs and housing (amongst
others), it does not seem to affect the propensity for contact across racial lines. As I
have pointed out before, changes in diversity on the CBSA-level are too far removed
from the everyday environments of individuals to change their behavior towards
racial and ethnic others.
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CHAPTER V

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
IMMIGRATION

Abstract
Chapter V deals with the relationship of changes in diversity to changes in individuals’
attitudes towards immigrants. So far, no conclusion has been reached as to whether diversity
reduces or pushes hostile feelings and stereotypes towards immigrants.
Based on two time points of data (2006-2012) from the Portraits of American Life Survey,
the second part of the present study concerns the effect of ethnic and racial diversity growth
on changes in attitudes towards immigrants in the U.S. by drawing on insights from group
threat and inter-group contact theory. Changes in Simpson Diversity are measured at two
levels of geography: the CBSA- and tract-level. Based on the hypothetical assumption that
the results will differ for movers and stayers, interaction effects by subgroup are included.
Furthermore, the study carefully dissects prior levels of diversity as indicators of later
perception of immigrants.
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Introduction
Given the on-going racial and ethnic diversification of the American society, it is important
to understand how immigrants are viewed in light of these changes. While we can observe
more tolerance towards racial and ethnic others and increasing inter-ethnic engagement
(Alba, 2012; Marsden, 2012), a substantial part of academia argues that increasing diversity
has detrimental effects for immigration-related attitudes (Enos, 2014; Lancee & Schaeffer,
2015a). Numerous studies claim that higher diversity in a neighborhood or city is associated
with negative attitudes towards and higher levels of stereotyping of immigrants. Contrarily,
research relying on the contact hypothesis shows that contact across ethnoracial lines can
foster positive attitudes and reduce between-group stereotypes (Fischer, 2011; Laurence,
2014; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). The majority of studies show that contextual diversity
on the neighborhood level leads to more openness and tolerance between individuals of
different races and ethnicities, while city-level diversity growth can be associated with
feelings of threat and animosity towards out-group members (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015; J.
E. Oliver, 2010).
One popular response to immigrants is rooted in the belief that they will take away jobs that
would have otherwise gone to native-born Americans. Fear of job loss is one of the major
reasons that individuals oppose immigration. As I will show in the following, the
immigrant-threat-to-jobs narrative in the job market strongly correlates with other opinions,
such as tightening immigration policy and the beliefs that immigrants lower wages and
burden the welfare system. In academia there are dissenting opinions as to whether
immigrants are displacing (Borjas, 2016; Camarota & Zeigler, 2013), replacing (Peri &
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Sparber, 2009) or not affecting native workers (Constant, 2014). Some argue that without
immigrant labor, some of the jobs natives currently do not want to do would be upgraded
and appeal to natives. Contrarily, immigrants have also been found to “push” low-skilled
natives into better, less manually-intensive jobs (Foged & Peri, 2013).
This paper attempts to take a step towards a causal explanation by using two time points of
data in order to identify the association between changes in diversity and changes in a key
dimension of immigration attitudes: the belief that immigrants take away “native jobs.”
Keep in mind, that the analysis is constrained by what is available in the data, and only this
item was available in both waves. Using two waves of panel data for individuals in the U.S.,
spanning a period of 6 years, this paper tests the effect of changes in diversity on changes of
feeling immigration threat. With few exceptions (Enos, 2014; Fisher Williamson, Abigail,
2013), most U.S.-based studies examine diversity’s effect on attitudes towards immigration
using cross-sectional data. While there are European studies based on panel data (Kaufmann
& Harris, 2015; Koopmans, Lancee, & Schaeffer, 2014; Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015b;
Laurence & Bentley, 2015), the lack of causality and directionality in U.S. research on this
topic is problematic for the understanding of the role of growing population diversity.
Furthermore, selection bias and reciprocal causality has been shown to be a problem.
Studies that rely solely on cross-sectional research lack certainty in whether differences in
attitudes stem from contextual effects or whether certain individuals self-select into
neighborhoods that best fit their needs and preferences.
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Analytical Approach
The focus of this paper is on respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants in the U.S. captured
through the reaction to following sentence: “Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too
many jobs away from other American citizens.” Respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants
in the U.S. job market were captured both in 2006 and 2012 and serve as a substitute
measure for openness and tolerance to immigration.
While this statement mainly addresses attitudes towards immigrants in the labor market and
could therefore be seen as a rather narrow dependent variable, I use immigration-related
attitudes in the General Social Survey (2014) to demonstrate that these perceptions are
strongly positively correlated with each other. In the following cross-tabulation (Table 21), I
included following three additional GSS statements: (a) America should exclude illegal
immigrants, (b) Immigrants lead to higher crime rates, (c) Number of immigrants to
America nowadays should be decreased.
I test whether or not a statistically significant link exists between attitudes towards the
statement “Immigrants take jobs away” and above named three variables. As we can see
there is a highly significant relationship between the dependent variable and each of these
factors. For instance, of all the respondents agreeing that immigrants take away native jobs,
43.56 percent believe immigrants increase crime, 78.32 percent believe the U.S. should take
stronger measures to exclude undocumented immigrants and 68.32 percent think the number
of immigrants to the U.S. should be reduced.
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Table 21. Percentages of Respondents in each category “Immigrants take jobs away”
by independent variables and Chi2-Test
Immigrants Increase Crime
Immigrants Take
Jobs away

Agree

Disagree

Agree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor
Disagree

43.56
7.39
9.62

30.91
76.65
47.31

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
25.53
15.95
43.08

Pearson chi2(4) = 310.3896
Pr=0.00

Exclude Undocumented
Immigrants
Agree Disagree Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
78.32 11.89
9.79
46.02 37.05
16.93
59.39 13.41
27.2

Reduce Number of Immigrants

Pearson chi2(4) = 146.578
Pr=0.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 132.5769
Pr=0.00

Reduce

Increase

Remain
the same

68.32
25.4
34.13

9.24
24.44
11.98

22.44
50.16
53.89

Table 22. Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable
America should exclude illegal immigrants
Number of immigrants to America nowadays should be
decreased
Immigrants lead to higher crime rates
Immigrants take jobs away

Factor1
0.60

Factor2
-0.22

Factor3
0.15

Uniqueness
0.77

0.65
0.59
0.73

-0.26
0.32
0.17

-0.07
0.10
-0.09

0.62
0.74
0.56

A highly significant factor analysis in Table 22 confirms the strong relationship between
these different attitudes towards immigrants. Factor 1 (with an eigenvalue of more than 1)
shows that only one dimension is necessary to explain a large part of the relationships (77
percent of the variance) among the variables. Furthermore, the main variable of interest in
this study (“Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too many jobs away from other
American citizens”) loads highest.
Answers range from 1 to 5, 1 being “Strongly disagree” and 5 being “Strongly agree”. For
the cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model, the dependent was recoded into
three categories: “Positive attitudes”/“Negative attitudes”/“Indecisive”.
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For the change models, the changes were based on these three cross-sectional outcomes and
recoded as: (a) negative attitudes in 2006 and 2012, (b) neutral attitudes in 2006 and 2012,
(c) positive attitudes in 2006 and 2012, (d) negative attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or
positive attitude in 2012, and (e) positive attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or negative
attitude in 2012 (see Table 23).
Table 23. Attitudes “Immigrants coming into the U.S. are taking too many jobs away
from other American citizens” in Wave 1 and 2

WAVE 1
Indecisive

WAVE 2
Positive
Attitude
113

Positive Attitude
Immigration
Negative Attitude
Immigration
Total
LEGEND

327

Indecisive
81

Negative
Attitude

72

78
107
547
231
Negative in Both
Neutral in Both
Positive in Both
Negative to Neutral/ Positive
Positive to Neutral/Negative

Total
68

262

100

499

234
402

419
1,180

Similar to the construction of the dependent variable in Chapter IV, arriving at this outcome
variable was not smooth sailing. Before implementing the model design below, I tried a
change-score model with three outcomes: (a) improving attitudes, (b) no change and (c)
worsening attitudes. The main problems with this operationalization were the floor and
ceiling effects. For instance, if someone had very strong negative feelings about immigrants
in 2006, the attitude cannot intensify in 2012 as the response is already at a maximum.
Conflating those people at a minimum and maximum with each other would have meant a
loss of information.
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Table 24. Change in Attitude towards Immigrants between 2006 and 2012
Negative Attitudes in Both Years
Neutral Attitudes in Both Years
Positive Attitudes in Both Years
Negative Attitude Changed to Neutral or Positive Attitude
Positive Attitude Changed to Neutral or Negative Attitude
Total

Freq.
234
81
327
298
240
1180

Percent
19.84
6.86
27.77
25.25
20.33
100

As I have explained before, it could be misleading to equate the experience of diversity
growth and decline over time in the same neighborhood with that of moving to a new
neighborhood. When studying these relationships across time 1 (t-1) and time 2 (t),
interaction effects for stayers and movers will be included in the model. Furthermore, it is
important to include interaction effects and introduce separate analysis for individuals in
neighborhoods with different levels of prior exposure to others (origin-effect), as
respondents with prior living experience in diverse neighborhoods may react more
positively to increasing diversity then individuals who have had no prior exposure to racial
and ethnic out-group members and are expected to experience rising local diversity as a
threatening event.
Another issue to be addressed in the analysis concerns geographical level. Since both tractand city-level data are available, separate models for both geographical levels of analysis
will be estimated to see if Kaufmann and Harris’ observation (diversity increases out-group
hostility at the city-level, but decreases it at the neighborhood-level) holds true in the PALS
data.
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All subsequent models are multinomial logistic regressions using 2012 individual-level data
paired with 2010 diversity score (and change in diversity for the panel models) and
immigration percentage. While the focus of this study is on the Simpson diversity index,
attitudes towards immigrants might also be influenced by the local percentage of
immigrants.
In the following, all of the outcomes (attitudes towards immigrants and change in attitude
toward immigrants) are treated as categorical variables under the assumption that there is no
natural ordering of categories within the variables. Instead of listing the logits of the
outcomes, relative risk ratios (RRR) are reported (which are the same as exponentiated
multinomial logit coefficients), because it is more intuitive to interpret them. Relative risk
ratios describe the relative likelihood of belonging to one cluster versus another associated
with a linear increase in the predictor, while holding all other predictors constant. In the
cross-sectional models, RRR’s are interpreted as the effect on the odds of showing negative
or indecisive attitudes relative to positive attitudes. In addition to the overall cross-sectional
model (Table 26), the Table 28 includes an interaction effect for non-Hispanic whites and
non-whites. As discussed earlier, whites and non-whites have different attitudes towards
immigrants in the first place (see table below). As shown in Table 25, almost half of nonwhite respondents have positive attitudes towards immigrants (believe that immigrants do
not take jobs away), while 43 percent of whites share this belief.
Table 25. White and Non-White Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2000 (%)
Indecisive
Positive Attitude Immigration
Negative Attitude Immigration

OVERALL
19.46
46.22
34.31
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WHITE
20.16
43.25
36.59

NON-WHITE
18.72
49.39
31.89

In the panel models, RRR’s are interpreted as the effect on the odds of having
negative/positive attitudes in both years, or having more immigrant-friendly (negative to
neutral or positive) and -hostile (positive to neutral or negative) attitudes relative to “neutral
attitudes in both years”. If the relative risk is smaller than 1, then the odds of outcome m is
expected to fall with respect the reference category 11. After careful consideration, I decided
to use “neutral in both years” as the base category even though it is not the most frequent
event. First of all, I tried using “positive in both years” as the base category because it is the
most frequent group. As the models did not differ much in their main message and my main
interest lies in either positive/ negative attitudes and changing attitudes in comparison to a
neutral “middle ground”, “neutral in both years” seemed like the best base group.
In order to control for the underlying theories of what determines attitudes towards
immigrants on the individual as well as the collective level, the multinomial logistic
regressions control for human capital, feeling of threat, trust and contextual diversity as
major drivers of immigration-related attitudes. Furthermore, an interaction term is included
to capture differences for movers and stayers. As described in Chapter III, 65 percent of the
sample contains stayers, and 35 percent are movers. Based on the discussion in Chapter II,
we know that whites and non-whites have inherently different experiences with diversity
and have been shown to react differently to diversity and diversity growth. Therefore, in line
with the cross-sectional model, separate analysis are also conducted for whites and nonwhites.
11

RRR’s are obtained using the Stata-option rrr for multinomial logistic regressions.
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Findings
a) Cross-sectional Models
Table 26. Relative risk ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect Simpson Diversity (2010) on
attitudes towards immigrants (2012)*

Simpson Diversity (2010)
Age
Male
Human Capital
(No High School)
High school
Some College
Bachelor
Master
Trust
General Trust in Others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Threat
Person felt unsafe (0,1)
Feeling Own Race is
decreasing in Neighborhood
(0,1)
Constant

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive
attitudes towards immigrants as base outcome
versus
Indecisive
Negative Attitude
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z)
1.124
0.25
0.622*
-2.19
0.087
-0.51
1.027
1.44
1.179
1.26
0.988
0.19

2.344**
2.557***
1.859*
1.742*

2.57
2.94
1.98
2.05

1.273
0.873
0.612*
0.388***

1.1
-0.35
-2.32
-3.55

0.966

-0.33

0.911*

-2.08

0.922

-1.05

0.928

-0.97

0.962

-0.25

0.951

-0.40

0.911
0.167

-0.28
-3.91

1.177
0.529

1.05
-1.83

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.
Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .048, N = 952
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years
in the neighborhood, homeownership, race and ethnicity (both measured as
White/Asian/Hispanic/Black and White/Non-White), neighborhood socioeconomic status.
* Foreign-born respondents were excluded (18 percent of the sample).
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Table 27. Relative Risk Ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect tract-percentage immigrants
(2010) on attitudes towards immigrants (2012) *

% Immigrants (2010, logged)
Age
Male
Human Capital
High school
Some College
Bachelor
Master
Trust
General Trust towards Others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Threat
Person felt unsafe (0,1)
Feeling Own Race is
decreasing in Neighborhood
(0,1)
Constant

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive
attitudes towards immigrants as base outcome
versus
Indecisive
Negative Attitude
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z)
0.853**
-2.41
0.699***
-5.87
0.995
-0.42
1.012*
1.89
1.273*
2.41
1.042
0.28

2.431**
2.710**
2.018*
1.826*

2.74
2.89
2.12
1.91

1.354
1.523
0.709*
0.494***

1.46
0.18
-2.11
-3.21

1.12

0.56

0.878*

-1.95

0.895

-0.87

0.921

-0.59

1.132

0.49

0.821

-0.49

1.024

0.12

1.413*

2.14

0.468

-2.96

1.251

0.59

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.
Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .052, N = 998
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years
in the neighborhood, homeownership, race and ethnicity (both measured as
White/Asian/Hispanic/Black and White/Non-White), neighborhood socioeconomic status.
* Foreign-born respondents were excluded (18 percent of the sample).
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Table 28. White and Non-White Relative Risk Ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect
Simpson Diversity (2010) on Attitudes towards Immigrants (2012)*

Simpson Diversity (2010)
Simpson Diversity (2010) *
White (Interaction)
White
Age
Male
Human Capital
High school
Some College
Bachelor
Master
Trust
General Trust towards
Others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Threat
Person felt unsafe (0,1)
Feeling Own Race is
decreasing in
Neighborhood (0,1)
Constant

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive
attitudes towards immigrants as base
outcome versus
Indecisive
Negative Attitude
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z)
1.045
0.06
0.895*
-1.97
0.781
-0.24
0.387*
-2.17
1.263
0.997
1.107

0.52
-0.49
0.56

2.237*
1.006
0.996

2.18
1.12
-0.03

2.666***
2.606***
1.997*
1.725

2.66
2.59
1.84
1.37

1.193
0.821
0.529***
0.314***

0.73
-0.79
-2.46
-3.86

0.922

-0.95

0.801*

-1.95

0.853

-1.77

0.913

-0.59

0.874

-0.72

0.913

-0.49

1.008

0.04

1.214**

2.14

0.205

-0.27

1.251

0.59

Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.
Summary statistics: Pseudo R2 = .058, N = 998
* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years
in the neighborhood, homeownership, neighborhood socioeconomic status.
* Foreign-born respondents were excluded (18 percent of the sample).

As seen in Table 26 and Table 27, higher levels of diversity at the tract level are associated
with more positive attitudes towards immigration in the U.S. job market. The same holds
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true for Table 28, which includes an interaction effect for whites and non-whites. Both
groups are less likely to be indecisive or fear immigrants. In other words, rising diversity
can be linked to significantly lower chances of having negative attitudes towards
immigrants.12 Overall, the results were very similar for effects stemming from growth in
Simpson diversity (Table 26) and neighborhood immigration share (Table 27). In Table 27,
heightened tract-level immigrant percentage also lowered the likelihood of having an
indecisive stance towards immigrants. While this could mean that higher diversity levels
actually lead individuals to have more positive perceptions of immigrants, it could also
reflect selection rather than causality: both whites and non-whites, who live in diverse tracts,
tend to have more liberal views because those without a taste for diversity have migrated
away and others with a taste for mixed neighborhoods have migrated in.
Adjusting for above-listed controls, human capital shapes attitudes towards immigrants. A
person with a bachelor or master’s degree compared to no high school degree is expected to
have better attitudes towards immigrants rather than exhibit antipathy. More specifically, for
bachelor and master degree holders relative to those without a high school degree, the
relative risk for individuals with negative attitudes to positive attitudes would be expected to
decrease by a factor of 0.589 and 0.383 respectively given the other variables in the model
are held constant. This finding is in line with existing studies that have shown a relationship
between an individual’s education/income and attitudes towards immigration (Brenner &
Fertig, 2006; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006).

12

Results of multinomial logistic regressions are always relative risks of having either
indecisive or negative feelings about immigrants rather than being in the base category
(sympathetic attitudes).
144

In addition to collective threat (macro-level diversity) and individual capital theory
(education), individual-level threat theory was included but found to be insignificant:
whether someone felt safe in his or her neighborhood and the feeling that the own race is
decreasing were not significantly linked to the outcome. Furthermore, complete trust
towards neighbors and strangers is also associated with improved perception of immigrants
in the U.S. job market. Trust in members of closer circles like friends and family was not
significantly related to improved attitudes.
In order to test whether these results are robust to a different measure of diversity, the same
analysis (including the interaction effect for whites and non-whites) was conducted using
the 2010 Entropy score. As discussed in the demographic section of this study, the diversity
maps using the Simpson diversity and Entropy score are very similar and the level of
correlation between the two indices indicates high collinearity. As shown in Table 29, white
and non-white individuals living in areas with higher levels of Entropy are more likely to
exhibit positive attitudes towards immigrants.
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Table 29. White and Non-White Relative Risk Ratios (Cross-sectional), Effect
ENTROPY Score (2010) on Attitudes towards Immigrants (2012) *

Entropy Score (2010)
Entropy Score (2010) * White
(Interaction)
White
Age
Male
Human Capital
High school
Some College
Bachelor
Master
Trust

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Positive
attitudes towards immigrants as base outcome
versus
Indecisive
Negative Attitude
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z)
0.998
0.15
0.932*
-2.08
0.467
-0.33
0.425**
-2.21
1.734
0.974
1.131

0.56
-0.57
1.12

2.183*
1.032
0.953

2.25
1.67
-0.49

2.132***
2.534***
1.536*
1.635

2.59
2.34
2.01
1.67

0.946
0.846
0.857**
0.785***

0.88
-1.74
-2.24
-3.11

0.522

-0.64

0.801*

-1.95

0.799

-1.36

0.989

-0.61

0.756

-0.64

0.942

-0.55

Feeling Own Race is
decreasing in
Neighborhood (0,1)

1.012

0.14

1.309**

2.08

Constant

0.274

-0.43

1.194

0.76

General Trust towards
Others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Threat
Person felt unsafe (0,1)

* In addition, the following characteristics were controlled, but were not included in this table: years
in the neighborhood, homeownership, neighborhood socioeconomic status.
* Foreign-born respondents were excluded (18 percent of the sample).

Summing up, we can say that there is a positive association between neighborhood
diversity/ immigrant share and immigrant attitudes, indicating that individuals who live in
heterogeneous neighborhoods are less fearful of immigrants. In contrast, individuals living
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in low diversity are more prone to feel threatened by immigrants, in particular when it
comes to their jobs. Does this mean that diversity decreases out-group hostility? Due to
selection bias, which has been extensively covered in the earlier chapters, such a conclusion
is oversimplified. That is, by self-selecting to live in various levels of contextual diversity,
individuals sort themselves into neighborhoods which may differ on the underlying factors
which initially influenced their decision. For instance, people who prefer heterogeneity
“self-select” into heterogeneous contexts; and this preference for diversity, rather than their
habitation in diversity, actually accounts for their subsequent immigrant-friendly behavior.
Even though randomized control experiments are considered the gold standard research
design, the unavailability of randomized data leads me to study changes within individuals
over time in the following. By doing so, I hope to eliminate the risk of self-selection
stemming from inherent differences in respondents.

b) Panel Model
i. Preliminary Analysis
While Tables 26, 27 and 28 reveal cross-sectional associations, the major contribution of
this chapter lies in trying to understand effects of changes in diversity by capturing
dynamics of opinion formation over two time points. As pointed out in Chapter IV, two time
points of data will not rid the study of self-selection bias and establish causality, but will
provide findings that are oriented towards the understanding of changes within individuals
over time.

147

In order to test if there is significant change between the two time periods, a Stuart Maxwell
Test was conducted testing for significant differences in outcomes between 2006 and 2012
(Table 30). These results indicate that the change is statistically significant. For instance, of
the 299 who strongly disagree in 2006 (299), only 160 still fall into this category in 2012.
Table 30. Stuart-Maxwell Test, Attitude towards immigration
Immigrants take
Jobs away

WAVE 1
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Total

WAVE 2
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
disagree
/agree

Somewhat
agree

Strongly Tota
agree (5) l

160
66
52
27
31
336

41
71
64
41
14
231
chi2
22.97
9.58

43
32
85
55
27
242
df
10
4

26
37
59
87
38
247
Prob>chi2
0.0109
0.048

29
18
22
58
91
218

Symmetry
Marginal

299
224
282
268
201
1274

ii. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Effect of Changes in Diversity on Changes in
Attitudes towards Immigrants

The next set of analyses concerns the role that diversity changes between 2000 and 2010
play in predicting variations in attitude change between 2006 and 2012 panels. In
accordance with the theoretical and methodological discussion, the analysis was dissected
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by mover status, initial level of diversity, geographic level of analysis and white/non-white
status.
In order to obtain measures of change in attitude between 2006 and 2012, the following
multinomial logistic regressions include five categories that describe respondents’ attitudes:
negative attitudes in both years, neutral attitudes in both years, positive attitudes in both
years, negative attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or positive attitude in 2012, positive
attitude in 2006 changed to neutral or negative attitude in 2012. All results need to be seen
in reference to the category “neutral in both 2006 and 2012.” Significant results above one
imply that an individual would be more likely to fall into the selected category than in the
reference category, while significant coefficients below 1 indicate that the individual would
be expected to fall in the category “neutral in both 2006 and 2012.”
Net of all the other factors that might be influencing changes in attitude towards immigrants
(in particular human capital, threat and trust), the higher the overall diversity change rate,
the more likely one is to fall into either "positive in both years" or "negative to
positive/neutral" categories (Figure 24).
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Figure 24. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in
attitudes towards immigrants (Table D in Appendix)

Remarks about following figures:
* The following models only show major results of interest. In addition, the following
characteristics were controlled in all of the models: age, gender, race, individual
education, income, general trust towards others and towards family and relatives,
feeling of safety in neighborhood, feeling that own race is decreasing in neighborhood,
times visited home of friend of other race, length of residence, homeownership, tractlevel socio-economic status.
* For full models of any of the following figures, please see appendix.
* Immigrants were excluded from all the following models.
Notes. Significance levels: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, *** = p <.001.
* N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .058
Figure 25 shows overall effect of percent changes in Simpson diversity on changes in
attitudes towards immigrants, interacted with the mover/stayers status. The figure includes
bars labeled “Overall”, “Stayer” and “Mover”. The “overall” bar was included for
comparison purposes (colored red) but presents the same results as in Figure 24. Bars
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labeled with an asterisk are significant. As indicated in the prior Figure 24 and the red bars
in Figure 25, changes in diversity are significantly associated with being positive in both
years and moving from a negative attitude towards a neutral or positive immigration stance.
While the same observation holds true for stayers (increases in diversity are associated with
persistently positive or increasingly positive attitudes towards immigrants), effects were
insignificant for movers.
The overall change rate is insignificant in the "negative in both years" category, which also
held true for stayers. Only among those who moved do we find that the higher the change
rate, the greater the likelihood of being in the category "negative in both years." This
indicates that movers experiencing diversity growth might be more likely to have negative
attitudes in the first place, while stayers experiencing diversity growth are more likely to
have been positive in both years. An attempt to explain this discrepancy between movers
and stayers will be made at the end of the chapter.

Looking at the full models (see appendix, Table D) we see that individuals with a college
degree or more than a college degree have higher odds of becoming more immigrantfriendly over time than those who did not finish high school. While only college graduates
were more likely to develop better-disposed attitudes, all the educational groups were more
likely to feel good about immigrants in both years when compared to individuals without a
high school diploma. General trust towards others is highly significant and positively related
to improving attitudes towards immigration: respondents, who trust non-familial others
(strangers, neighbors and friends) in 2006 are less likely to exhibit worsening attitudes,
while trust limited to family members tends to be related to a higher likelihood of either not
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changing or worsening attitudes. This is in line with prior research showing that individuals
who mainly trust family and close friends tend to form fewer relationships with outsiders,
while those that actually bridge socioeconomic, racial or ethnic divides through trusting
those they do not know end up forming more out-group bonds (Geys & Murdoch, 2010).
The model only partially supports the individual-level threat hypothesis: while
respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants are not influenced by how safe or unsafe they
feel in their neighborhood, the demographic anxiety that the own racial group might be
decreasing in relative size in their neighborhood spurs anti-immigrant sentiment. As various
scholars have demonstrated (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993), this is a common reaction for
individuals who base much of their self-worth on belonging to a racial group with clear
spatial and social boundaries and have strong racial and ethnic identities. Individuals who
are perceived as outsiders automatically threaten these racial and ethnic identities once
spatial boundaries are crossed and neighborhoods change.
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Figure 25. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in
attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers and stayers (Table E in
Appendix)

* Overall Model: N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .058
* Mover /Stayer Model: N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .061

The same model was conducted with change rates derived from shifts in immigrant
percentage (Figure 26). As pointed out before, attitudes towards immigrants are likely
influenced by the percentage of immigrants as well. While this study focuses on Simpson
diversity as a more comprehensive measure of heterogeneity, changes in local immigrant
presence will be analyzed, too.
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Figure 26. Multinomial logistic regression: Percentage change in immigrant population
and changes in attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers and stayers
(Table F in Appendix)

* Overall Model: N= 972, Pseudo-R2= .058
* Mover /Stayer Model: N= 972, Pseudo-R2= .063

First of all, it is important to notice that, without the mover/stayer distinction, neighborhood
changes in immigrant presence are not significantly related to changes in attitudes. This is a
contrast to the Simpson diversity changes, which entailed overall positive results. However,
once the mover/stayer distinction is introduced, higher levels of immigrant percentage
increased the propensity of movers to feel negatively about immigration both in 2006 and
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2012, while stayers were significantly less likely to fall into this category. Stayers had
higher odds of developing complaisant attitudes between 2006 and 2012, while movers were
more likely to develop feelings of threat between the two time points.
Summing up the results from Figure 25 and 26, Simpson diversity growth is associated with
more positive overall and stayer attitudes towards immigrants, while increases in
neighborhood percentage of immigrants show more positive attitudes for stayers and more
negative attitudes for movers.
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iii. Panel Models by Level of Initial Diversity
Figure 27. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in
attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers/stayers and initial level of
diversity (Table G in Appendix)

* Overall Model:
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 362, Pseudo-R2= .042
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 329, Pseudo-R2= .099
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 280, Pseudo-R2= .091
* Mover/Stayer Model:
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 362, Pseudo-R2= .058
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 329, Pseudo-R2= .143
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 280, Pseudo-R2= .094
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As Lancee and Schaeffer (2015) demonstrate, the level of initial diversity matters for the
effect of changes in neighborhood diversity on attitudes towards immigrants.
Six separate models were conducted in Table 27: overall effect percentage change in
Simpson diversity on changes in attitudes towards immigrants for (1) low-initial diversity,
(2) medium-initial diversity and (3) high-initial diversity; effect percentage change in
Simpson diversity on changes in attitudes towards immigrants for (4) stayers and movers in
low-initial diversity, for (5) stayers and movers in medium-initial diversity and for (6)
stayers and movers in high-initial diversity. Lighter bars visualize low initial diversity,
while darker bars exemplify higher levels of initial diversity. As a reminder, the continuous
variable measuring initial diversity scores in 2000 was separated into three equally sized
subgroups. Consistent with the analysis in Chapter IV, the first group has diversity scores
ranging from 0 - 24.3 (low origin-diversity), the second from 24.4 - 49.04 (medium origindiversity) and the final group ranges from 49.05 – 74.5 (high origin-diversity).
Centering on the overall model (depicted by the red bars), which does not include a
mover/stayer distinction, we can see that an increase in Simpson diversity is only positively
associated with improved attitudes in high-diversity neighborhoods. Briefly put, diversity
only seems to have a positive effect on tracts with high initial diversity in 2000. This
confirms the hypothesis that individuals with prior exposure to heterogeneous
neighborhoods will react positively to further diversity growth.
The interaction term with the mover/stayer variable is significant showing the slopes for the
outcome on diversity growth are significantly different for movers and stayers. Interestingly,
movers from low- and medium-diversity neighborhoods that experience rising diversity
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through their relocation show worsening attitudes towards immigrants in the job market,
while those individuals who moved from high diversity contexts to higher diversity
improved their attitudes. Thus, it is mainly those movers that had relatively little prior
exposure to diversity that responded negatively to changes in diversity.
For stayers, the picture looks slightly different as their attitudes do not become more prone
to threat over the course of time. Largely reflecting the overall model (red bar), it is
particularly those individuals living in high-diversity neighborhoods who respond positively
to changes in diversity surrounding them, while there is no significant effect for respondents
in low- to medium-diversity neighborhoods.

iiii. Panel Models for CBSA-level diversity changes
As Kaufmann and Harris (2015) show, it is crucial to distinguish whether diversity growth
effects are measured for higher-level contexts such as cities or counties, or for more finegrained neighborhoods. As pointed out before, most studies find higher levels of diversity to
be associated with threat at higher geographic levels, while lower level diversity often seems
to evoke friendlier attitudes and spurs inter-racial and inter-ethnic contact.
In Figure 28, any positive effects of increasing diversity at the tract-level are reversed when
measured at the city level: As diversity increases at the city-level, individuals with low and
medium initial diversity levels get significantly more concerned about immigration. In fact,
individuals experiencing heterogenization in low- and medium-level diversity cities between
2006 and 2012 have about 1.06 and 1.07 times the odds of developing a threat-based
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reaction to diversity growth over time. Part of the explanation for this difference in
geographic level of diversity is that neighborhoods might offer more opportunity for
contact. In this study, local diversity growth seems to reduce hostile feelings towards
immigrants if respondents already live in diverse places. Higher geographic levels of
analysis, however, might not capture actual contact, but rather reflect competition for jobs,
housing and other resources (E. Oliver, 2010).

Figure 28. Multinomial logistic regression: CBSA-level diversity growth rate and
changes in attitudes towards immigrants, broken down initial level of CBSA-diversity

* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 362, Pseudo-R2= .058
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 329, Pseudo-R2= .123
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 280, Pseudo-R2= .078

159

Overall, we can conclude that tract-level changes in diversity elicit different reactions
among respondents as they positively influence both movers’ and stayers’ attitudes in
contexts of high initial diversity but negatively impact movers relocating from lowdiversity. In comparison, a negative relationship was observed between city level diversity
and attitudinal changes at low- and medium- levels of initial diversity.

iiiii. Panel Models by White/Non-White dichotomy
In the following section I will test whether whites and non-whites differ in their reactions to
rising levels of diversity and how these findings intersect with the mover/stayer distinction.
Therefore, the earlier models will be replicated but broken down by white and non-white
subgroups. As I have pointed out before, a dissection into movers and stayers will not be
carried out for CBSA-level diversity.
This model partially confirms the earlier observation that tract heterogenization leads to
more complaisant attitudes towards immigrants. As shown in Figure 29 below, it is mainly
non-white stayers that show significantly higher odds (1.072) of moving from negative to
positive attitudes between 2006 and 2012. There was a marginally significant effect
showing that respondents experiencing growing diversity between 2000 and 2010 are more
likely to become more immigrant-friendly over time and less likely to be negative in both
years. Based on the knowledge gained from prior models, the positive effect of increased
heterogeneity might be due to fact that the non-white population lives in higher initial
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diversity than whites. As a reminder, in 2000 whites lived in neighborhoods where the
likelihood of randomly selecting two people with different racial or ethnic background was
29 percent, while non-whites likelihood was 43 percent.
While the mover/stayer model (Figure 25) evidenced that movers were more prone to move
from positive/neutral attitudes to less immigrant-friendly attitudes as diversity grows, this
observation only seems to hold true for white movers. This is consistent with other findings,
since white respondents tend to live in lower-diversity contexts, and as we have seen in
Figure 27, it is mainly those respondents in low- to medium- diversity neighborhoods that
respond negatively to heterogenization.

161

Figure 29. Multinomial logistic regression: diversity growth rate and changes in
attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by movers/stayers and white/non-white
Eﬀect % Change in Simpson Diversity on Changes in AQtudes towards
Immigrants, 2006-2012, by White/Non-White Status and Mover/Stayer
Census Tract
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* Non-White Model: N= 398, Pseudo-R2= .079

In line with prior results, both whites and non-whites were more likely to show negative
changes in attitude over time as diversity rises on the CBSA-level (Figure 30), broadly
confirming the earlier results. Thereby, the effect is stronger for stronger for whites, who
exhibit 1.087 times the odds of developing threat-based attitudes over time. In line with the
theory of ethnic competition, both whites and non-whites seem to feel as though they were
in a competition for scarce resources such as jobs, housing, economic benefits and social
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transfers. On the CBSA-level, these resentments versus immigration are therefore
considered a defensive response to a perceived competition for scarce goods between
different groups.
Figure 30. Multinomial logistic regression: CBSA-level diversity growth rate and
changes in attitudes towards immigrants, broken down by white/non-white
Eﬀect % Change in Simpson Diversity on Changes in AQtudes
towards Immigrants, 2006-2012, by White/Non-White Status
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* White Model: N= 590, Pseudo-R2= .129
* Non-White Model: N= 398, Pseudo-R2= .112
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Making Sense of the Differential Findings for Movers and Stayers
This Chapter stresses how attitudes towards racial and ethnic outsiders are affected by
increases in diversity. However, Chapter III and V along with prior research on this topic
(Koopmans et al., 2014; Laurence, 2011, 2014; Laurence & Bentley, 2015) have stressed the
importance of dividing respondents into movers and stayers in order to capture dynamic
processes underlying the reaction to residential neighborhoods. As demonstrated in Chapter
III, diversity growth is different for movers and stayers –both in terms in quantity and
quality- hence, leading to different reactions to outsiders in local communities.
In order to understand why movers’ and stayers’ attitudes are so differently affected by
diversity growth, it is important to study if movers’ relocations and stayers’ continued
residence are in fact voluntary or whether these decision were driven by financial
constraints. I hypothesize that is mainly movers with high-income backgrounds that selfselect into the neighborhoods they want to live in, because they have the financial means to
do so.
Residential mobility can be framed as an opportunity for social upward mobility. Contrary
to the mixed results from studies surrounding the Moving to Opportunity experiment
(Briggs, Popkin, & Goering, 2010; Clark, 2008; Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001), recent
research, that followed up on children involved in the MTO experiment, has found that
improving living contexts for children have positive effects on their later success in life
(Chetty & Hendren, 2016). The considerable attention to whether improved living contexts
for poor families and individuals generate gains in overall well-being, health and
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educational attainment stems from the belief that relocations into neighborhoods with more
resources and better overall living standards can affect individuals’ life trajectories.
However, the demographic analysis in Chapter III points out that not all moves are
voluntary. Individuals do not necessarily pick neighborhoods to live in consciously, but
might decide where to move in a reactive way (Sharkey, 2012) under substantial pressure.
Decisions that lead individuals and their households to relocate might be largely
overshadowed by income constraints. In fact, prior research has shown that poor families
often relocate to neighborhoods with similar socio-economic characteristics as their current
living context (Rosenblatt & DeLuca, 2012). Scholars have demonstrated that that it is
mainly whites who move consciously and voluntarily based on their preferences and needs
(McAllister, Kaiser, & Butler, 1971). Minority families, in contrast, have been shown to
move based on involuntary shocks like displacement, foreclosure, unbearable contextual and
living conditions and domestic violence, among other reasons (Newman & Owen, 1982).
Furthermore, vulnerable families are more likely to experience downward mobility by
relocating into less resourceful neighborhoods.
Given the assumption that low-income individuals have less room for maneuver in their
decision where to move, it is necessary to understand these scopes of action through a
financial lens. Movers might find themselves unable to move to lower-diversity living
contexts. While movers face constraints in form of income and cost, stayers might face
similar problems: Faced with increasing diversity, stayers, who are not content with their
current living situation, can find themselves unable to move due to moving-related costs:
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while some stayers might like their neighborhoods and therefore remain between 2006 and
2012, others might find themselves unable to move due to financial or familiar restraints.
Hence, it is worthwhile to analyze the role of constraints for my stayer and mover findings.
While PALS respondents are not randomly assigned to new neighborhoods (movers) and do
not randomly live in certain neighborhoods over time (stayers), I hope that studying the
reactions towards diversity growth of involuntary movers and stayers reduces self-selection
bias. I believe that most moves are voluntary and for positive reasons. However, since the
study period includes the housing bubble and great recession, there may be more
involuntary moves. For those parts of the population that did not have choice of where to
relocate selection bias might play a lesser role. Unfortunately, there is no information of
how voluntary a move was and how much agency individual’s had in choosing a new
neighborhood. As evidenced by prior analyses, moves to new neighborhoods resulted in
more diverse living contexts (in fact, Chapter III shows that diversity for movers increased
by 57 percent between 2000 and 2010), and neighborhood socioeconomic status (as
measured by the share of people above the age of 25 who did not attend college) did not
increase much (45 in 2000 to 46 percent in 2010). As a proxy, income is used as a
determinant of how flexible someone is in moving or staying. I hypothesize that low-income
movers are more likely to show deteriorating attitudes towards outsiders, as diversity growth
might not happen on account of a voluntary decision to relocate, but might result from the
inability to move to a “better” neighborhood. High-income movers, in theory, have more
flexibility in choosing a neighborhood of their liking. The same kind of subgroup analysis
will be conducted for stayers with similar hypothesis: Low-income stayers are expected to
show negative attitudes towards diversity growth, because they might face higher obstacles
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keeping them from moving away once diversity rises. High-income stayers, in contrast, are
expected to show positive or no reaction, as they “chose” to remain. I am fully aware that
this is an oversimplified statement, but it is an attempt to address the ambiguity in the
mover-stayer findings through constraints.
Income groups range from under 5000 Dollar per year by household up to 200,000 Dollars
and more (Figure 31). The sample was divided into three non-overlapping groups of
relatively equal size for movers and stayers:
a. Low-Income Household ((< $5,000) - ($30,000-$35,000)), N=410
b. Medium-Income Household (($35,000-$39,999) - ($60,000-$69,999)), N= 339
c. High-Income Household (($70,000-$79,999) – ($200,000 or more)), N=357

Figure 31. Total household income (Percent)
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
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In the following models, we see two-way interaction models (diversity growth interacted
with mover/stayer distinction).
As demonstrated in following figures, it is primarily low-income movers that feel either
negatively about immigrants in both years or develop negative attitudes throughout the
course of the six years. While prior models have demonstrated that income is positively
associated with better attitudes, the below analysis by subgroup aids us in understanding
how members of different income categories react to changes in local diversity.
As shown in Figures 33 and 34, movers with medium- or high-income backgrounds react
less harshly when confronted with diversity growth in their new neighborhood. In fact,
movers with medium-high incomes are only marginally more likely to change their attitudes
for the worse when they move to a more heterogeneous neighborhood. There is no
significant effect for high-income movers. These results confirm the initial hypothesis that
movers from low-income backgrounds might not move voluntarily, but actually find
themselves forced to move to a diverse community. While there was no significant effect for
high-income stayers, medium-income stayers are more likely to be positive both in 2006 and
2012. However, results for stayers did not confirm my initial hypothesis.
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Figure 32. LOW-INCOME: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect Percentage Change in
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012, by Movers and
Stayers *
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Figure 33. MEDIUM-INCOME: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect Percentage Change in
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012, by Movers and
Stayers
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Figure 34. HIGH-INCOME: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect Percentage Change in
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012, by Movers and
Stayers
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Discussion
Based on two time points of data (2006-2012) from the Portraits of American Life Survey
the present paper analyzes the effect of changing levels of ethnic and racial diversity on
attitudes towards immigrants in the U.S. by drawing on conceptual frameworks from the
group threat and inter-group contact theory. In other words, this study estimates the
association between diversity in 2000 and its change scores (2000-2010) and variations in
attitudinal change towards immigration between 2006 and 2012 panels.
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By relying on two time points of data, the present study was able to include residential
mobility and neighborhood sorting as mechanism underlying attitudes towards ethnic
outsiders. In addition, this study can address selection bias by separating movers from
stayers and taking into account prior levels of diversity. This chapter investigates the role of
income in influencing movers’ and stayers’ attitudes towards immigrants, arguing that selfselection bias will be more inherent to richer people than to those with limited financial
means, who might be able to choose which neighborhood to move into or to stay in.
Measures of human capital, threat and trust were included into all of the models as key
indicators of immigrant-related attitudes.
While models based on two time-points need to be interpreted carefully and do not
necessarily demonstrate causal processes under way, certain directionalities in shaping
individual behavior are identified. First and foremost, the results point to the need to
differentiate between movers and stayers in their reaction to changing diversity patterns in
their neighborhood. Similar to Laurence and Bentley (2015) and Lancee and Schaeffer
(2015a), who investigate similar questions in the European context, this study highlights that
diversity growth has different effects for movers and stayers. Thus, an individual’s reaction
to rising diversity interacts with the conditions under which they experience diversity
changes.
Overall, increases in diversity are associated with improved attitudes over time. However,
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate that movers and stayers inherently experience different
conditions influencing their reaction to rising heterogeneity. There is a significant
interaction between whether someone relocated or not and the extent of diversity change.
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Results from the multinomial logistic regression show that an increase in Simpson diversity
is positively associated with attitudes towards immigrants for stayers, while indicating no
relationship for movers. More generally, if stayers were to experience increasing diversity,
they would be expected to improve attitudes towards immigrants. When diversity is
measured through changes in immigrant percentage, increases in neighborhood percentage
of immigrants show improving attitudes for stayers and worsening attitudes for movers.
Furthermore, these results need to be analyzed in the light of different initial levels of
diversity. The role of initial diversity is particularly interesting for the mover/stayer
distinction. It was hypothetically argued that movers who relocated from homogeneous to
more diverse neighborhoods or stayers who experienced diversification in low-diversity
tracts would get more concerned about immigration, while those that were already living in
diverse neighborhoods and were therefore more acquainted with out-group members, would
not change their views or even improve them. These hypotheses were confirmed in the
findings. The results indicate that respondents that have little to medium-level of initial
exposure to diversity mainly drive the worsening in attitudes for movers. As diversity grows
between 2000 and 2010, movers from relatively homogenous neighborhoods seem to
experience immigrants as a threat to their jobs, while those that already live in high diversity
neighborhoods respond positively, results that support both the contact and threat
hypothesis. Positive attitudes among stayers seem to be largely driven by those individuals
who already live in highly diverse neighborhoods (medium-level neighborhoods were
marginally significant), while results were insignificant for low-diversity neighborhoods.
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The white/non-white subgroup model that included interaction effects for movers and
stayers corroborated and refined these results: Higher odds becoming more immigrantfriendly over time were mainly observed for non-white stayers, who are more familiar with
heterogeneity and therefore find diversification less threatening. White movers, who tend to
live in lower-diversity neighborhoods, respond negatively to heterogenization.
What is surprising about these findings is that one might expect that respondents who move
to higher-diversity contexts might be in search for more racial and ethnic heterogeneity and
therefore less likely to perceive immigrants as a threat to the American worker. However,
the results suggest that movers from medium- and low-diversity neighborhoods might be
less trusting in general or could exhibit other underlying characteristics that influence their
attitudes. In particular, movers to higher diversity could be constrained in the ability to
move to a neighborhood of their choice. In order to address self-selection bias, I conducted
separate analyses for three different income tertials, whereby it became apparent that it is
mainly low-income movers who show fearful reactions towards diversity growth. Thus, it is
not moving as such that elicits this feeling of threat; instead, the circumstances under which
people move and how voluntarily they decide where to move shapes latter attitudes.
Furthermore, this study finds that it is crucial to draw distinctions between different levels
of geography. While most of the results reported above pertain to tract-level changes in
diversity, bigger-scale diversity (in this case measured through micro- and metropolitan
areas) evokes different reactions among respondents. Across low-and medium levels of
initial community heterogeneity, concerns towards immigrants seem to rise with higher
CBSA-level diversity. Given that the threat hypothesis is partially explained through
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competition for resources like housing, employment and political power, it is likely that the
threat hypothesis holds true when diversity outcomes are observed at the city level. At the
tract level, the results reflect the contact hypothesis for stayers, with the threat hypothesis
applying to individuals in lower diversity neighborhoods that have low interaction with outgroup members on a daily bases.
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CHAPTER VI

OVERALL CONCLUSION

The growing antipathy towards strangers in general has become evident in the election of
Donald Trump as the new president and the panic surrounding the entrance of immigrants
and refugees from Muslim countries, in particular. Also outside the U.S., recent political
shifts have stressed the western divide in reactions to diversity growth: On the one hand we
see that right-wing conservatism has risen, and on the other, the influx of immigrants and
refugees has encouraged citizens’ commitment to welcome ‘strangers’. This study
investigates the reactions of people faced with rising levels of diversity. Deliberately
focusing on diversity growth rates instead of percentage point increases, this study attempts
to understand how relative diversification affects individuals’ feelings about immigrants and
their out-group bridging behavior. As the demographic analysis in Chapter III evidences,
diversification is no longer an urban phenomenon: instead, diversity growth mainly takes
place in low-immigration and low-diversity tracts and cities. While patterns of immigration
and diversity are by no means congruent in their spatial distribution, a large chunk of
diversity growth is driven by immigrants’ relocation into non-traditional areas of
immigration.
As diversity continues to grow, especially in parts of the country that are relatively
unacquainted with diverse populations, it is important to understand how various groups of
people react to the demographic changes. These distinctive reactions are reflected in the
academic literature, which is marked by conflicting portrayals of diversity-effects on
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interethnic attitudes, and interethnic and interracial behavior. On the one hand, the contact
hypothesis argues that diversity growth leads to improved attitudes and higher chances of
interaction with racial and ethnic others at schools, at the work place or in the neighborhood.
On the other, there are threat-based explanations such as inter-group competition, defended
neighborhoods and disorganizations theories. Succinctly, more cultural diversity equals less
social capital, less trust and cohesion and most importantly for this study, worse attitudes
and less interaction with racial and ethnic outsiders –this is the central statement formulated
by Robert Putnam ( 2001).
The forms and motives surrounding individuals’ behavior towards racial and ethnic others
deserve stronger attention because they have short-term and long-term consequences for the
social cohesion and trust in an increasingly diverse society. As a possible outlook for the
years to come, Alba and Tsao argue that the perception of immigrants as a threat and an
alien element might actually decrease in the future as the United States face labor shortages
due to the aging of the population; consequently, the years to come offer “extraordinary
opportunity for minority mobility” (Alba & Tsao, 2010, p. 5). According to Alba and Tsao,
the U.S. is entering what he refers to as a period of “non-zero-sum mobility”, where the
upward mobility of racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants might not impact the
majority population due to vacant job opportunities and a growing age structure. While the
diversification of the U.S. gives reason for hope, a major concern remains the growing
unrest and disunity regarding heightened levels of diversity (Lichter, 2013c). As children
grow up in a diversifying country, they face challenges of inclusion, racism and xenophobia
that will essentially influence their chances of becoming productive and integrated members
of society. It is therefore essential to further our understanding of how changes in
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heterogeneity impact societal perception of and interaction with out-group members.
The present study focuses on two major features of social cohesion and bridging behavior to
ethnoracial minority members: the changes in willingness to spend time with racial outgroup friends, and the changes in attitudes towards immigrants. This study addresses the
impact of changes in dynamic neighborhoods on changes in attitudes and propensity to
interact with racial and ethnic out-group friends over time rather than solely capturing crosssectional associations. While impressive efforts have been made outside the U.S. to capture
such changes (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015; Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015a; Laurence & Bentley,
2015), most U.S. studies rely on national-level repeated cross-sections. They offer
interesting insights into tendencies and associations, but their methodology impedes
conclusions on changes in attitudes towards immigration and interaction with out-group
members.
In fact, the cross-sectional part of this study corroborates the positive association between
diversity and attitudes and interactions: the higher local diversity is, the more likely an
individual is to have a complaisant attitude towards immigrants, and the higher the
propensity of a white individual to visit a racial out-group friend at home. However, these
results are not causally interpretable. In fact, these results mainly show that higher
heterogeneity attracts (white) individuals who feel comfortable living in diverse
neighborhoods and cities. These results also imply that those (white) individuals who do not
approve of diversity, and diversity growth in particular, could have out-migrated, leaving
behind a seemingly diversity-friendly population. As we have seen in Chapter III, whites
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who faced increases in diversity had a higher propensity to move between 2006 and 2012
even though these relocations do not end in lower-diversity neighborhoods.
To my knowledge, this is one of the first U.S. studies using survey data to look at how tractand city-level diversity growth is related to changes in attitudes towards immigrants over
time by relying on two time points. Repeated observations taken on the same subject prove
to be beneficial in understanding the effects of rising diversity by uncovering causally
directed diversity effects. Furthermore, the step-by-step approach chosen in the analytical
section of Chapter II (overall models ! broken down by movers and stayers ! broken
down by whites and non-whites ! broken down by initial level of diversity) helps us
understand how these different aspects build on each other, are interrelated and, in some
cases, create different realities.
As a reminder, the analysis was broken down into movers and stayers only for Chapter V
(changes in attitudes), while Chapter IV (changes in cross-racial friendship) only focuses on
stayers. Summing up the findings from Chapter IV and V, it is helpful to look at Table 31
providing an overview of the main findings:
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Table 31. Summary of Main Findings (Chapter IV and V)

CHAPTER IV
“Out-Group Bridging”

CHAPTER V
“Attitudes towards Immigrants”

A) Cross-sectional Models
•
•
•

Positive association between Simpson diversity
and out-group bridging frequency
Out-group friendships depend strongly on
contextual diversity for whites.
No association of diversity and bridging for nonwhites.

•

•

Positive association between Simpson
diversity/immigration percentage on
attitudes towards immigrants
Significant association between
diversity and positive attitudes for
whites and non-whites

B) Panel Models
Overall

•

Mover/Stayer

As diversity rises, individuals •
most likely to “never visit or
invite in both years”
----•
•
•

White/
Non-White

As diversity rises, individuals more
likely to feel better about immigrants
over time
As diversity rises…
Stayers: “positive in both years”,
“negative to positive”
Movers: “negative in both years”
Low-income movers feel either
threatened by immigrants in both
years or develop negative attitudes
over time
Non-white stayers react positively to
diversity growth
White movers feel threatened by
diversity

•
•

No effect for whites
•
“No visits in both years” for nonwhites
•

Initial Level •
of Diversity

Both whites’ and non-whites’ •
friendships suffer from low-initial
diversity
•
Negative effect also for nonwhites in medium-level diversity
Non-whites and whites in high
diversity spend more time with
out-group bonds as diversity
increases

Movers in low initial diversity develop
feeling of threat when diversity grows
Movers and stayers in high initial
diversity improve attitudes

No significant effects at all levels •
of initial diversity

Individuals in low- and medium initial
diversity respond to immigration as
threat

•
•

CBSA

•
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I find evidence that neighborhood- and city-level diversity is determinant in shaping
individual’s out-group attitudes and interaction, which is in line with prior research on this
topic. The main results using PALS panel data at the tract-level suggest that
A) Growing Simpson diversity leads to higher odds of visiting or inviting out-group
friends for non-whites and whites already living in high initial diversity (a
neighborhood with a more than 50 percent chance of randomly selecting two racially
or ethnically different people). However, low-diversity residential contexts affect
out-group bonds detrimentally for whites and non-whites, but it takes a larger toll on
non-whites.
B) In general, diversity growth is associated with attitude improvement between 2006
and 2012. However, the study including interaction effects also shows that this
positive relationship only holds true for stayers (in particular stayers experienced
with diversity). More specifically, movers living in low- and medium-heterogeneity
contexts and those movers with limited financial means actually show worsening
attitudes over time, while movers that have initial experience with high-diversity
show attitude improvement.

It is important to point out that diversity growth has both beneficial and detrimental effects
on attitudes depending on the circumstances. Both out-group bridging and attitudes are
highly sensitive to outside influences, and both can be advantageously and
disadvantageously influenced and fluctuate strongly between 2006 and 2012. In the
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following section, factors influencing out-group bridging and attitudes are discussed in more
detail.
The assessment of this study should begin with an optimistic outlook: Contrary to Putnam's
interpretation that diversity leads to a general decline in trust and withdrawal into private
life, the study demonstrates that parts of the U.S. feel increasingly more comfortable with
the diversification of the American population. However, the findings show that unfavorable
changes in attitudes and out-group interaction are not inevitable. Instead, the study
concludes that careful distinctions by movers and stayers, initial level of diversity,
geographic level of diversity measurement and racial background need to be taken into
account in order to fully understand what fosters and what hinders interracial connections
and immigrant-friendly attitudes.
The panel data proved to be useful in addressing initial levels of diversity by modeling
different outcomes for respondents from low-diversity neighborhoods and how they react to
diversity relative to individuals from medium- or high-level diversity. Individuals who had
high levels of diversity in their neighborhood in 2000 and experience further diversity
growth over time are more used to heterogeneity and react positively to heterogeneity
growth. Thus, diversification seems less threatening and might actually be understood as an
opportunity for other inter-group contact.
On the other hand, individuals from low-diversity (and in some cases medium-level)
backgrounds did not show positive reactions to diversification in terms of out-group
bridging, and in the case of out-group attitudes, low-diversity movers showed deteriorating
attitudes. Thus, once the models for out-group friendships and attitudes towards immigrants,
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were dissected by above-mentioned covariates, it became apparent Putnam’s general
“hunkering down” is not an exaggeration, especially if respondents initially live in lowdiversity neighborhoods. This study finds that increasing diversity is threatening for those
movers who previously lived in homogeneity and move to higher-level diversity, because
little inter-group contact was made in homogenous areas.
It remains unclear why stayers react differently to diversity than movers. It can be argued
that the loss of neighborhood ties and friendships has detrimental effects on out-group
attitudes and interaction in general, which in turn leads to a worsening of attitudes between
2006 and 2012. Several studies have demonstrated that while movers might, in some cases,
voluntarily relocate to areas that fit their needs and expectations, movers themselves exhibit
fewer social ties (Fauth, Leventhal, & Brooks-Gunn, 2008). It could be that the relative lack
of bridging and bridging ties made movers more prone to relocate in the first place when
compared to people with more social connections, who are more hesitant to move (Coulton,
Theodos, & Turner, 2012). In fact, the logistic regression in Chapter V demonstrates that
individuals that decide to relocate between 2006 and 2012 show lower levels of trust
towards family members and relatives, but also towards their social network (friends,
neighbors and strangers). All in all, moving to a new city or neighborhood might interrupt
community ties in general. I also pointed out that movers might experience anticipation
effects when relocating to a new neighborhood with higher levels of diversity.
For this study, I focused on individual-level income to tease out if involuntary relocations
(due to evictions, foreclosures or the inability to afford a “better” neighborhood) might lead
movers to feel either threatened by immigrants in both years or develop negative attitudes
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over time. Movers tend to have lower incomes when compared to stayers and might feel
more unsafe in their 2006 neighborhood, which might serve as a incentive to move. I argue
that not all movers who end up in more heterogeneous neighborhoods relocate voluntarily.
In fact, this hypothesis was confirmed showing that it might not be moving as such that
drives down immigrant-friendly attitudes but instead low-income movers that drive the
overall negative findings for movers. Breaking the analysis down into subgroup models
proved very useful in understanding discrepancies in outcomes for movers and stayers:
Findings show that movers’ changes in attitudes towards immigrants are susceptible to
income restraints. Negative attitudes among movers are mainly driven by low-income
respondents who might not be free in deciding where to move, but instead relocate in a
reactionary manner.
As the demographic discussion in Chapter III showed, diversity experiences vary
dramatically for whites and non-whites and were therefore broken down along this line. At
first, it seems that the main narratives in the white/non-white interaction models are very
different for Chapter IV and V: in Chapter IV, increased diversity did not have any effect on
whites but it did on non-whites. Strangely, as diversity increases non-whites are more likely
to fall into the category “No visits in both years”. It could be argued that non-whites are
more inclined to see their neighborhood as a sanctuary from the “white world,” and thus
value same-race neighborhood interactions more. This contradicted my initial hypothesis as
I expected non-whites to show increased out-group bridging as non-whites have been shown
to live in higher levels of diversity and would therefore be expected to be more accustomed
to heterogeneity. While these results are puzzling they are a result of the overall model not
broken down by initial level of diversity.
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In Chapter V, initial diversity was found to play an important role for whites and non-whites
alike. It was shown that white movers in low initial diversity develop feelings of threat over
time when neighborhoods diversify. In contrast, white movers in high initial diversity
showed improving attitudes between 2006 and 2012. The positive effect of heterogenization
only held true for non-white stayers in high initial diversity.
Summing up we can say that non-whites and whites who were accustomed to high-diversity
neighborhoods showed heightened out-group bridging. The negative non-white relationship
between diversity growth and out-group friendship found in the overall models seems to
stem from low- and medium initial diversity.
Since prior research has argued that varying geographical levels might also influence the
outcomes, separate analysis were conducted for neighborhoods (measured through Census
tracts) and Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA), which approximate cities. I conclude that
it is crucial to distinguish between different levels of geography. While the CBSA-level
analysis did not prove to be meaningful for predicting out-group bridging it was a
significant in predicting attitudes. There is no certainty in how to interpret this finding. I
suspect that growing city-level heterogeneity is too removed and distant to have actual
effects on individual’s propensity to form or intensify out-group friendships, while attitudes
are more easily impacted. Diversity growth on the CBSA-level diversity exerts strong
negative effects on individuals’ perceptions of out-group member supporting one of today's
most influential perspectives on immigrants: Immigration is believed to put a risk to social
standards, social resources and jobs, because immigrants are willing to work for dumping
wages and evict domestic workers from the labor market. In comparison, the results from
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the tract-level analysis are not as negative and one-sided and point to the need to separate by
initial level of diversity, by mover and stayer and by white and non-white dichotomy.

Limitations
As common to most quantitative studies, there are limitations to the research and
interpretation of the results.
Most pressingly, the interpretation of the findings is limited due to the reliance on only twotime points. First of all, it is important to keep in mind that two time points offer only a
limited statement on the course of the change in behavior since intermittent events are not
recorded. Furthermore, due to the lack of an experimental design with randomized control
groups, the present analysis does not constitute a true longitudinal study that can be causally
interpreted. It is important to make note that results in this study only reflects how changes
in contextual features are related to changes in behavior and attitude, but do not depict a
causal relationship.
Strictly speaking, in a correlative relationship between two features A (diversity growth)
and B (change in behavior or attitude), four interpretations are possible with regard to the
causal interpretation:
1. A causes causal B.
2. B causes causal A.
3. A third variable C causes causally both A and B in the same way, while between A
and B there is no causal relationship.
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4. A and B are mutually interrelated in a circular process.

Based on the theoretical assumption, the results show how changes in diversity (A) affect
changes in individual behavior and attitude (B). It is highly unlikely that changes in
behavior or attitudes cause diversity growth. However, it is not possible to rule out the
effects of "third variables" within the scope of the panel analyses or a certain circular
interchange between A and B. Thus, a study that is not limited to two time points but
includes several different time points would be preferable for future research.
A true causal effect cannot be observed for just two time points because the selection into
certain neighborhoods does not take place randomly. Ideally, it would have constituted a
true causal approach if random people had experienced increases in diversity versus a group
that underwent decreases and no changes. What I do, instead, is to compare the observed
reactions and behavior of the treated (individuals in diversifying tracts and cities) to the
reaction and behavior of the untreated.
Secondly, six years (2006 to 2012) might cover too short a time span to observe changes in
individuals’ behaviors and attitudes. It would be interesting to see what happens when more
time passes. Do people experience a “shock” to their attitudes and interactional behavior
when diversity increases, which then levels off? Or do improvements or impairments to
attitudes take more time to manifest?
Due to the limited availability of variables measuring out-group attitudes and inter-group
bridging in 2006 and 2012, I was bound to two outcome variables that might seem too
specific in terms of content. Ideally, I would have created a more nuanced measure by
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combining several indicators of attitudes (belief that immigration should be limited,
immigrants increase crime rates etc.) through factor analysis. The number of times a person
visited a racial out-group friend is one way of studying out-group bridging. Had there been
more panel variables, I could have used a more generic outcome measuring whether an
individual had out-group friends, how the composition of friends changes over time and so
on. However, I still believe that these variables are acceptable proxies for overall attitudes
towards immigrants and the willingness to interact with racial out-group members. As I
demonstrated using the General Social Survey, the feeling of threat on the job market is
highly correlated with other indicators of a threat-based perception of immigration.
Furthermore, a larger sample size might have enabled greater confidence in the results. The
sample was on the verge of being too small. As pointed out earlier, the sample could not be
subdivided into subgroups of more than one or two parameters. In other words, different
subgroup models had to be implemented measuring the effect of diversity changes on
behavior through a white/non-white lens, for instance, followed by a separate subgroup
analysis broken down movers and stayers by level of initial diversity.
I decided to focus on the Simpson’s Diversity Index instead of the percentage of minorities,
because the Simpson diversity measure is that it incorporates five different racial groups
(white, black, Asian, Hispanic, other) into one score, which reduces the number of
parameters that would have needed to be considered. Rather than singling out a specific
racial or ethnic group, the Simpson diversity index offers a leveled ground for the
comparison across geographic entities. However, while it takes into account both richness
and evenness, the Simpson’s index is weighted towards the richness of the largest racial or
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ethnic group in a sample rather than presenting a measure of overall evenness. Critics have
argued that ethnic and racial groups with smaller numbers of group members (other, Asians)
only affect the overall diversity score marginally (Magurran, 2003).
I still believe that is the best measure to use, because it conveys a general sense of how
many races and ethnicities are prominent. In prior research scholars have suggested to use
alternative measures of diversity in the same study as a sensitivity analysis even though
different indices where found to be practically indistinguishable from each other (Schaeffer,
2013). I have cross-validated the maps and results using the Entropy score, which is highly
correlated with the Simpson diversity index. As expected, there is great overlap in the
findings suggesting that the Simpson diversity measure is indeed an adequate way of
quantifying heterogeneity.
Both parts of this dissertation focus on contextual effects shaping individual level racial and
ethnic out-group attitudes and friendships without considering local policy and local policy
changes that might influence these outcomes (Bart Meuleman, 2009; Koopmans &
Schaeffer, 2015). Future research should analyze the influence that different instruments of
policy and different local politics (government culture of welcoming immigrants, for
instance) have on individuals with different racial and ethnic backgrounds living together
and working in heterogeneous contexts. For example, should it be true that living in
diversifying context leads to a deterioration in attitudes for those in low-diversity
neighborhoods, the following questions arise: Are there local integration policies in cities
that successfully counteract this tendency to retreat into private life in heterogeneous
contexts?
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Another concern or information to keep in mind is that measuring diversity (and percentage
of immigrants) at the tract- and city level helps us understand how individual perceptions
are shaped by the environment, but can deviate fundamentally from the ratios measured by
statistical indices. Since one of the central questions is whether there is an influence of
regional and local diversity on out-group interaction and attitudes, there is a focus on the
contextual characteristics that give us information on the ethnic composition of the
population in the regions under study. However, statistical ratios do not exactly reflect the
socio-spatial living worlds of respondents. For instance, an individual might live on a highly
segregated block within a diverse neighborhood, but does not actually interact with racial or
ethnic out-group members. While this study includes an attempt to take into account various
levels of geography, future research should explore the micro-level individual experiences
of respondents as well. Even though the present study includes both CBSA- and Censustract-level analysis, which provides an advantage over other studies, we need to keep in
mind that these administratively drawn boundaries represent only approximations of actual
neighborhoods and living contexts. In fact, individuals’ attitudes might be influenced
beyond or within these boundaries, or patterns of inter-group contact could be affected
outside of these geographic zones. As pointed out before, respondents’ attitudes are not only
shaped by where they live, but whom they interact with at work, at their children’s schools,
and so on. In some cases, individuals travel outside of their tracts and even metropolitan
areas to reach these destinations. Thus, this paper only addresses a limited context of
residential exposure to diversity changes.
While I would have liked to analyze subgroups for Whites, Blacks, Asians and Hispanic,
small numbers of interviewees in each of these categories prohibited such an analysis. While
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Whites constitute the biggest group (N=630), Blacks (N=250), Asians (N=94) and Hispanics
(N=196) are somewhat underrepresented. I therefore had to refrain to a broader
categorization of White and Non-White, which offered meaningful implications. For future
research, a more fine-grained subgroup analysis should be implemented to tease out
differences in attitudes and interactions between different racial and ethnic groups.

DISCUSSION

Prejudice and stereotyping are common to most societies. So is the proverbial tendency for
birds of a feather to flock together. However, the problem of xenophobic and racist attitudes
becomes highly problematic when it develops into discriminatory behavior. In this context,
ethnic and racial diversification is a widely used method in policy-making to ensure the
equal distribution of resources and to stimulate and support inter-group contact and the
decrease of xenophobia and racism. There are a variety of programs within organizations
and institutions that try to foster interethnic and interracial communication. In addition to
civic associations, many public institutions (ranging from kindergartens to colleges, and
from police facilities to clinics) and companies (catchword "diversity management”) have
implemented strategies that focus on diversity and try to encourage not only diverse
demographics but also actual cohesion and interaction. Since racial and ethnic diversity is
not only a demographic fact but also a social value added in terms of education (Gurin, Dey,
Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002), innovation (O. Richard, McMillan, Chadwick, & Dwyer, 2003)
and economic advantages (O. C. Richard, 2000) amongst other benefits, the formation of
shared identities and goals has been increasingly encouraged. While the merits of such
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diversification among students and in the workplace have been established (despite
considerable resistance to workplace and educational diversity policies that supposedly give
some groups unfair advantages), it still remains unclear whether diversity growth in
communities and cities across the U.S. fosters out-group understanding and bridging.
One of the major questions I intended to answer was whether representational diversity
measured through the Simpson Diversity score actually leads to changes in out-group
perception and interaction. While group-threat and inter-group-contact theories offer
alternative scenarios of what happens when diversity grows, local diversification need not
necessarily lead to more interaction at all. Daily lives in diversifying neighborhoods might
not mean actual exposure to each other; instead, daily routines and activity spaces can be
marked by microsegregation along lines of socioeconomic background, race and ethnicity
(Browning, Calder, Krivo, Smith, & Boettner, 2017; Tach, 2014). Furthermore, researchers
have recently shown that the proclaimed decrease in black-white does not hold true on
micro-levels of segregation (Lichter et al., 2015).
The main conclusion from this study is that diversity growth actually does influence
attitudes and inter-group contact for stayers positively if they initially live in high-diversity
neighborhoods. Whether attitudes are actually improved through diversified daily routines
and communication is not certain, but clearly the presence of an increasingly heterogeneous
population is associated with improving attitudes towards immigrants and racial out-group
bridging. In contrast, individuals who reside in low-diversity neighborhoods and experience
gradual diversification through relocation or in their neighborhood, show obverse or no
effects. Again, it remains uncertain whether it is actual integration in diverse neighborhoods
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that leads to the development of detrimental attitudes towards outsiders, or whether the mere
presence suffices to trigger feelings of xenophobia. While this study uncovers interesting
relationships between diversification and changes in out-group attitudes and bridging, future
research should take a closer look at what diversity increases actually mean for individual
residents on a day-to-day basis.
While rising neighborhood diversity is associated with more out-group bridging and
improved out-group attitudes in neighborhoods with established diverse populations,
neighborhood diversity itself should not be considered as adequate in driving down
xenophobic stereotyping and hesitant out-group bridging. As this study shows, it is mainly
residents in areas that were already diverse to begin with that drive positive results. Actual
encounters and actual contact between locals, racial out-group members and immigrants
should be the core element of an open and tolerant society, particularly with regards to those
people who have not been exposed to much diversity initially. The results from this study
are troubling in that they show how white and non-white movers and stayers in low (and
medium) diversity show immigrant-unfriendly reactions and a partial decrease in out-group
bonds over time.
How can the study’s findings be interpreted, and more importantly, which policy changes
and neighborhood programs should be implemented in low-diversity areas to encourage
improved out-group attitudes and bridging through heightened levels of interaction? How
can a warmer inclusionary culture towards immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities be
fostered if not through merely diversifying tracts and cities?
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Rather than focusing on the educational or economic benefits of a diversifying population,
the contact and participation in common day-to-day activities of people with different racial
or ethnic backgrounds is of central importance for the success of peaceful coexistence under
conditions of increasing cultural, religious and ethnic diversity in low-diversity
neighborhoods and cities. An exchange between the different groups in early stages of
people’s lives, for instance in institutional places like kindergartens and schools, could be
crucial in reducing xenophobia and intolerance in later life. On top of interracial and
interethnic contact in institutional and public settings, prejudices against members of other
groups are reduced when the following optimal "contact conditions" are found: (1) the same
status in the contact situation, (2) assistance by recognized authorities, (3) a joint superior
goal, and (4) cooperation (Allport, 1979a). These optimal contact conditions, which are also
referred to as "friendship potential" of an environment, are conducive to the formation of
successful intercultural friendships.
In addition to the common goals, similar status, support from authorities and cooperation,
effective information programs are relevant to obliterate xenophobia and out-group fear,
because they can take account of the perception process and counter prejudices by
falsifying, expanding or differentiating existing racial and ethnic categories. Although in
practice, information programs are quite common nowadays (e.g., media campaigns
regarding the 'political correct' representation of foreigners, anti-racist and anti-fascist
groups, presentations in school teaching), they are often linked to contact programs. The
link between contact/interaction and information is essential, because every intercultural
contact is an exchange of information. However, given the polarized discourse worlds of
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Americans today, I wonder if education in matters of immigration, race and diversity will
have a large effect.
On the policy level, the idea of managing, controlling and regulating migratory movements
has been a clear priority. The current U.S. administration emphasizes the detriments of
diversity and immigration rather than focusing on the advancement of inter-group ties and
cooperation. The current practice of promotion of public cohesion mainly pertains to
bonding social capital (the promotion of internal relations in a group) rather than bridging
social capital (the relationship that a group takes to other social entities). Instead, structural
bridging or incentives for bridging implemented by city governments and state level policies
could help to promote friendships between different races and ethnicities by further steering
the cultural and ethnic composition of schools, colleges and work places and encouraging
interethnic group work.
While I believe the government could take a more active role in stimulating interethnic and
interracial interaction and improved attitudes towards each other, researchers at the WZB
(Berlin Social Science Center) rightly point out that out-group attitudes and friendships
cannot and should not be organized by the state or by social workers (Koopmans, Dunkel,
Schaeffer, & Veit, 2011). Instead, the authors claim that the focus should lie on the
promotion of the neighborhood, whose purpose should not be targeted directly as
"intercultural encounter", but where spontaneous encounters can occur that then lead to
intercultural understanding and respect. It is important to stress that diverse neighborhood
infrastructure does not equal mere diversity growth. Instead, diversity growth in
neighborhoods and cities should be met by the creation of infrastructure to increase cross-

194

cultural communication. An excellent example of a place where such interethnic and
interracial bonding can take place is community gardens, which have been shown to
encourage such ties (Parry, Shinew, & Glover, 2004). In addition, the focus should be on
parks, playgrounds and the promotion of a broad range of medium-sized businesses. While I
agree that a harmonization through contact and interaction should happen in people’s natural
living contexts, the powerful microsegregation in America’s communities and
neighborhoods might prohibit such encounters (Lichter et al., 2015). While exposure to
others might not create inter-group cohesion, it is certainly a prerequisite for the formation
of out-group bridges and bonds.
Finally, I believe that concerns and fears caused by economic and social changes at the local
level have not been adequately addressed in the realm of politics, which has reinforced the
fears of marginalized groups to be ignored and forgotten. As this study shows, it is
oftentimes the low-income population in low-diversity communities that fears diversity
growths. Furthermore, there is a longstanding bitterness of poor and working-class whites
toward so-called “limousine liberals,” who try to impose integration but often live in very
segregated environments. This anger and fear needs to be taken seriously. As we could
observe in the past years, the feeling of being dismissed has led to the rejection of more
established political parties and the values they represent, and given rise to populist, rightwing parties. It is not enough to explain to people who are afraid of diversity growth that we
need immigrants and diversification for demographic reasons in order to compensate for the
decline in births and the professional deficit. Government, experts, employers and trade
unions have done this in Switzerland and Germany for years, with minor success. Not taking
the reasons and concerns behind xenophobia and racism seriously is a mistake, as the recent
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entry of the far-right nationalist movement AFD into the German parliament, developments
around the UK's decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the election of Donald
Trump have shown. Concerns regarding personal living environments, high migrant rates in
schools or increasing criminality - whether justified or not - can easily turn into open
rejection or worse. Without a structural understanding of racism and xenophobic attitudes,
any legal instrument, including a punishment for racist action, will only have marginal
impact. It is only when the institutions and the legal state take the problem seriously that it
can be combated. Instead of relying on the government’s role in welcoming immigrants and
decreasing inter-racial tension, U.S. cities and municipalities need to take more initiative.
Cities and communities need to create affordable housing, for the new citizens as well as for
the locals, so that there is no repression contest. They must create more integration
opportunities in schools and beyond. And they should do more to prevent migrants from
being exploited as cheap labor and be perceived as competition by local workers. This
impression encourages xenophobia. A particularly successful example of how such policy
and community intervention could look like is “Welcoming America”, which has
established a network of "welcoming cities" in the USA and is also working with the
approach of strategically networking the various stakeholder groups in order to successfully
implement migration and integration13.

13

https://www.welcomingamerica.org/
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Table A. Relative Risk Ratios (Longitudinal), Effect Percentage Change in Diversity
on Changes in Out-Group Interaction, 2006-2012 (Figure 18)
Reference Category: NO VISITS OR INVITES IN 2006 AND 2012

SOMETIMES IN
BOTH YEARS
RRR
0.996

Change Rate
Diversity 20002010
Age
0.890
Male
1.215
Parents born in
1.244
U.S.
High School
1.568
College
1.552
More than
1.591
College
Income
1.352
General Trust
1.438
towards others
Trust towards
0.882
Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in
1.097
NH
Feeling that
0.553
own race is
decreasing
Neighborhood
1.251
SES
Constant
5.986
N= 682, Pseudo-R2= .054

(z)
-2.520

NEVER TO
OFTEN/SOMETI
SOMETIMES/
MES TO NEVER
OFTEN
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z)
0.996 -2.090
0.995 -0.870
0.997 -2.260

-4.240
0.830
0.780

0.954 -6.670
1.801 1.950
1.508 0.980

0.967 -5.520
1.324 0.820
1.276 0.680

0.962
1.683
1.392

-4.540
1.950
1.210

0.690
0.720
2.230

2.311
3.193
2.523

1.480
1.890
2.610

0.978 -0.130
1.011 0.020
1.210 0.290

1.119
1.297
0.979

0.540
0.570
-0.150

-4.100
2.990

2.577
1.529

1.680
2.580

0.802
1.527

0.730
2.690

0.698
1.512

1.420
0.810

-0.890

1.098

0.510

1.035

0.250

0.913

-1.170

0.858 -0.720

1.121

0.310

0.945

-0.190

1.369

0.773 -0.850

0.888

-0.610

1.387

0.270

1.014

-2.850

15.635

4.630

9.668

3.520

0.410
-0.960
0.830
2.730

OFTEN IN
BOTH YEARS

0.980

0.915 -2.750
15.647
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Table B. By White/Non-White Status: Relative Risk Ratios, Effect % Change in
Simpson Diversity on Changes in Out-Group Interaction, 2006-2012 (Figure 20)

Reference Category: NO VISITS OR INVITES IN 2006 AND 2012

Percentage Change Diversity
White (0,1)
Percentage Change
Diversity- WHITE
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High School
College
More than College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is
decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant

SOMETIMES OFTEN IN
NEVER TO OFTEN/SO
IN BOTH
BOTH
SOMETIME METIMES
YEARS
YEARS
S/OFTEN
TO NEVER
RRR
(z)
RRR
(z) RRR
(z) RRR
(z)
0.995 -1.38
0.993 -2.20 0.996 -1.93 0.994 -2.11
0.375 -2.75
0.212 -4.07 0.164 -4.99 0.304 -3.53
1.003
0.966
1.269
1.690
2.002
2.073
2.327
0.958
1.698

0.74
-3.63
0.81
1.59
1.45
1.41
1.77
-2.84
3.14

1.006
0.928
1.835
2.310
3.468
4.906
4.443
3.235
1.851

1.58
-6.99
1.99
2.33
2.11
2.60
2.56
2.19
3.47

1.003 0.97
0.958 -4.34
1.301 0.89
2.354 2.55
1.526 0.91
1.600 0.93
2.058 1.58
1.635 0.84
1.813 3.46

1.004 1.19
0.967 -3.75
1.702 1.93
2.016 2.23
1.738 1.28
1.823 1.28
1.517 0.96
0.888 1.48
1.697 3.25

0.895
1.109

-0.71
0.36

1.137
0.818

0.74
-0.66

1.104
1.100

0.60
0.33

0.892 -0.77
0.967 -0.12

0.850
1.394
5.049

-0.48
0.86
2.31

1.768
0.946
12.153

1.66
-2.65
3.25

1.053
1.946
9.977

0.15
0.42
3.35

1.003 0.01
1.028 -2.28
7.541 3.09

* White/Non-White Model (Including Interaction): N= 681, Pseudo-R2= .069
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Table C. By Initial Level of Diversity (Subgroup) and White/Non-White Status
(Interaction): Relative Risk Ratios, Effect % Change in Simpson Diversity on Changes in
Out-Group Interaction, 2006-2012 (Figure 21)
Reference Category: NO VISITS OR INVITES IN 2006 AND 2012

LOW INITIAL
DIVERSITY
(1) SOMETIMES IN BOTH
YEARS
Percentage Change Diversity-NonWHITE
White (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityWHITE
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
More than College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
(2) OFTEN IN BOTH YEARS
Percentage Change Diversity-NonWHITE
White (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityWHITE
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
More than College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and

RRR

(z)

MEDIUM
INITIAL
DIVERSITY
RRR
(z)

HIGH INITIAL
DIVERSITY
RRR

(z)

0.989

-1.720

1.027

1.770

0.975

-0.620

0.212
0.999

-1.900
-0.140

0.491
0.986

-1.090
-0.760

0.475
0.975

-0.890
-0.460

0.970
0.409
6.021
3.210
5.010
4.780
0.856
1.372
0.913

-1.840
-1.800
2.840
1.800
1.580
1.710
-1.970
1.360
-0.380

0.966
2.532
0.404
2.524
4.380
1.656
0.998
5.633
0.956

-1.950
1.650
-1.310
1.090
1.600
0.600
-2.550
3.690
-0.150

0.964
2.900
1.228
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.926
1.819
0.698

-1.620
1.500
0.300
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-3.160
1.240
-0.890

0.492
1.511
1.111
3.425

-1.400
0.620
1.320
0.960

1.648
0.209
1.779
11.767

0.920
-2.430
2.470
1.740

1.156
0.719
1.343
141.000

0.230
-0.440
0.840
0.020

0.876

-2.390

1.027

1.810

1.020

-1.790

0.086
1.001

-2.720
0.220

0.404
0.977

-1.350
-1.190

0.631
1.020

-0.570
0.350

0.931
0.676
16.198
0.000
0.000
0.000
3.187
1.720
0.979

-3.580
-0.710
3.080
0.020
0.020
0.020
2.190
2.070
-0.070

0.938
2.642
0.397
2.645
4.418
2.159
3.187
6.263
1.346

-3.440
1.700
-1.300
1.040
1.500
0.860
2.190
3.840
0.890

0.921
5.325
2.182
0.000
0.000
0.000
3.187
1.809
0.955

-3.460
2.390
1.140
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
2.190
1.230
-0.110
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Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
(3) NEVER TO SOMETIMES OR
OFTEN
Percentage Change Diversity-NonWHITE
White (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityWHITE
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
More than College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
(4) OFTEN TO
SOMETIMES/NEVER
Percentage Change Diversity-NonWHITE
White (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityWHITE
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
More than College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is decreasing

0.748
5.293
2.987
0.000

-0.510
2.520
1.680
-0.020

1.185
0.238
1.321
49.624

0.310
-2.190
-1.180
2.690

0.430
0.901
0.956
370.000

-1.320
-0.140
-2.440
0.030

0.889

-3.170

0.915

-2.460

1.332

-2.060

0.038
0.966

-3.940
2.110

0.400
0.988

-1.540
-0.670

0.214
1.146

-1.730
2.390

0.965
1.443
7.883
0.934
2.345
2.615
1.372
1.779
1.329

-2.000
0.730
2.980
-0.070
0.840
1.090
0.886
2.470
1.040

0.957
1.123
0.381
2.528
3.669
2.287
1.190
4.212
1.112

-2.680
0.220
-1.500
1.190
1.500
1.090
0.540
3.100
0.360

0.964
2.879
2.483
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.004
2.440
0.963

-1.540
1.450
1.290
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
0.480
1.840
-0.090

0.729
3.087
2.359
5.493

-0.600
1.770
1.890
1.340

1.053
0.331
1.735
47.162

0.100
-1.900
0.390
2.890

1.139
0.401
1.389
173.000

0.200
-1.150
0.310
0.030

0.970

-1.990

0.957

2.020

1.020

-0.710

0.209
1.006

-2.030
0.850

0.281
0.985

-2.160
-0.820

0.613
1.016

-0.630
0.290

0.965
0.899
0.968
1.684
3.342
1.331
0.854
1.404
0.974

-2.270
-0.240
2.890
0.700
1.420
0.370
2.310
1.540
-0.120

0.965
2.418
0.516
2.252
2.695
1.460
0.977
5.290
0.950

-2.180
1.700
-1.030
1.090
1.180
0.510
1.430
3.640
-0.180

0.977
3.583
1.597
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.989
2.130
0.703

-1.040
1.880
0.720
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
1.660
1.620
-0.900

0.903
1.882

-0.230
1.090

0.773
0.474

-0.500
-1.330

1.009
0.299

0.020
-1.650
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Neighborhood SES
0.746
-2.200
0.335
Constant
5.726
1.500
33.439
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .137
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .108
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 210, Pseudo-R2= .114

-1.870
2.620

1.010
127.000

-1.880
0.020

Table D. Relative Risk Ratios (Panel), Effect Percentage Change in Diversity on
Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012 (Figure 23)
Reference Category: NEUTRAL BOTH IN 2006 AND 2012

NEGATIVE IN
BOTH YEARS

POSITIVE IN
BOTH YEARS

RRR
1.001

(z)
1.360

RRR
1.008

2.740
0.690
1.080
-0.020
-0.750
-1.280
-1.990
-1.980

Increase Rate
Diversity (20002010)
Age
1.015
Male
1.169
Parents born in U.S.
1.427
High school
0.993
College
0.767
More than College
0.632
Income
0.802
General Trust
0.807
towards others
Trust towards Family 1.023
and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
1.208
Feeling that own race 1.435
is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
0.857
Constant
0.948
N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .058

(z)
2.290

NEGATIVE
TO POSITIVE
OR
NEUTRAL
RRR (z)
1.014 2.350

POSITIVE TO
NEGATIVE
OR
NEUTRAL
RRR (z)
1.001
0.890

1.001
0.989
1.197
4.243
3.696
5.769
2.213
0.989

0.110
-0.030
0.490
2.100
1.920
2.210
2.750
-0.080

0.992
1.453
1.354
0.823
1.121
2.787
1.013
1.009

-1.110
2.670
0.590
-0.470
0.280
2.640
1.970
0.090

1.021
1.810
1.237
0.984
0.803
1.376
0.833
0.905

2.270
0.390
0.680
-0.040
-0.510
0.780
-0.610
-0.850

0.210

0.989

-0.070

1.210

2.650

0.943

-0.490

0.840
1.420

1.075
1.661

0.220
2.470

0.789
1.225

2.200
0.780

1.054
1.069

0.200
0.230

-2.370
-0.100

1.453
0.075

2.240
-2.670

1.766
1.147

-2.640
0.250

0.975
0.552

-0.520
-1.000
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Table E. BY MOVER/STAYER: Relative Risk Ratios (Panel), Effect Percentage Change in
Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012 (Figure 24)
Reference Category: NEUTRAL BOTH IN 2006 AND 2012

NEGATIVE IN
BOTH YEARS

Percentage Change
Diversity-STAYER
Percentage Change
Diversity- MOVER
Mover (0,1)
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
More than College
Income
General Trust towards
others
Trust towards Family
and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race
is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant

RRR
1.001

(z)
0.900

POSITIVE IN NEGATIVE
BOTH
TO
YEARS
POSITIVE
OR
NEUTRAL
RRR (z)
RRR (z)
1.009 1.960 1.023 2.600

1.014

2.340

0.999 -0.420 0.999 -0.530 1.000 0.250

0.857
1.015
0.810
1.377
1.256
0.698
0.231
0.899
0.802

0.670
2.100
-2.020
1.090
0.600
-2.960
-4.120
-1.870
-1.990

0.538
1.011
0.686
1.253
5.425
3.385
2.132
2.213
0.981

0.847

-2.470 0.815 -0.330 1.826 2.650

0.933
1.170

-0.330 0.830 -0.600 0.767 -2.150 0.818 -0.830
2.680 1.353 1.940 0.815 -0.790 0.875 -0.500

0.799
0.692

-2.350 1.550 1.780 1.691 -2.370 0.989 -0.490
-0.670 0.054 -2.910 0.756 -0.470 0.390 -1.510

N= 985, Pseudo-R2= .061
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-1.410
1.070
-1.250
0.530
2.070
2.490
2.950
1.760
-0.140

0.942
1.009
0.693
1.233
1.261
0.910
1.366
1.075
0.991

-0.180
1.210
-2.640
0.680
0.550
-0.230
-2.580
0.220
-0.090

POSITIVE
TO
NEGATIVE
OR
NEUTRAL
RRR (z)
1.001 0.310

0.932
1.013
1.252
1.175
1.249
0.733
0.502
0.803
0.802

-0.150
1.970
0.980
0.510
0.500
-0.700
-1.680
-0.590
-1.930

0.783 -2.030

Table F. BY MOVER/STAYER and WHITE/NON-WHITE: Relative Risk Ratios (Panel),
Effect Percentage Change in Diversity on Changes in Attitudes towards Immigrants,
2006-2012 (Figure 25)
Reference Category: NEUTRAL BOTH IN 2006 AND 2012

NEGATIVE IN BOTH YEARS
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
Mover (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
POSITIVE IN BOTH YEARS
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
Mover (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH

(z)

NONWHITE
RRR

(z)

1.000
0.716

0.010
-0.770

0.966
1.876

-2.360
1.070

1.000
1.284
0.855
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.657
0.790
0.981
0.957
1.146
0.869
0.987

0.040
2.330
-2.420
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-4.560
-1.310
-0.090
-0.120
0.350
-2.210
0.020

1.011
1.062
2.458
0.481
0.273
0.083
0.571
0.845
1.276
1.472
0.478
0.971
0.774

1.250
2.680
1.490
-0.790
-1.390
-2.540
-3.780
-0.560
1.020
0.690
-1.120
-1.950
-0.200

0.999
0.548

-0.290
-1.370

0.979
1.362

-2.430
0.540

0.998
0.972
1.058
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.337
1.085
1.372
0.955

-0.560
-2.290
0.150
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
2.560
0.490
1.470
-0.120

1.020
1.043
3.012
0.522
0.906
1.773
1.331
1.044
1.430
1.534

2.270
1.870
2.100
-0.680
-0.100
3.370
2.780
0.150
1.500
0.780

WHITE
RRR
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Feeling that own race is decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant

0.918
1.278
0.896

NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE OR NEUTRAL
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
0.999
Mover (0,1)
0.939
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
1.000
Age
0.989
Male
0.978
Parents born in U.S.
0.000
High school
0.000
College
0.000
Income
1.118
General Trust towards others
1.037
Trust towards Family and Relatives
1.037
Felt Unsafe in NH
0.908
Feeling that own race is decreasing
0.834
Neighborhood SES
1.342
Constant
0.789
POSITIVE TO NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
0.999
Mover (0,1)
0.912
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
1.057
Age
0.990
Male
1.763
Parents born in U.S.
0.000
High school
0.000
College
0.000
Income
0.857
General Trust towards others
0.987
Trust towards Family and Relatives
0.974
Felt Unsafe in NH
0.758
Feeling that own race is decreasing
0.909
Neighborhood SES
0.779
Constant
0.673
WHITE: N= 526, Pseudo-R2= .0682
NON-WHITE: N= 354, Pseudo-R2= .0803
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-0.220
1.920
0.020

0.665
1.110
0.892

-0.640
2.110
-0.090

-0.320
-0.140

1.072
1.086

2.580
0.140

0.010
-0.860
-0.060
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
2.310
0.210
0.170
-0.240
-0.440
1.980
0.020

0.999
1.035
1.183
0.503
0.560
0.255
1.897
0.955
1.123
0.950
0.266
1.015
2.472

-0.170
1.490
0.270
-0.720
-0.610
-0.410
3.890
-0.160
0.490
-0.090
-2.850
2.335
0.690

-0.420
-0.190

0.996
1.237

-0.550
0.350

2.220
-0.730
1.400
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-3.220
-0.070
-0.120
-0.640
-0.220
-2.540
0.020

1.004
1.047
2.388
0.728
0.578
0.377
0.873
0.875
1.146
1.418
0.388
0.775
0.684

0.580
2.000
1.440
-0.330
-2.560
-2.000
-4.950
-0.450
0.560
2.620
-1.370
-1.950
-0.280

Table G. BY MOVER/STAYER and INITIAL LEVEL OF DIVERSITY: Relative
Risk Ratios (Panel), Effect Percentage Change in Diversity on Changes in
Attitudes towards Immigrants, 2006-2012 (Figure 26)
LOW
DIVER
SITY
RRR
(NEGATIVE IN BOTH
YEARS)
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
Mover (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is
decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
(POSITIVE IN BOTH YEARS)
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
Mover (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
Income
General Trust towards others

(z)

MEDIUM
DIVERSI
TY RRR

(z)

HIGH
DIVER
SITY
RRR

(z)

1.001
1.097

-0.070
0.160

0.991
0.368

-0.260
-1.530

0.992
2.066

-1.030
0.850

0.999
0.991
0.892
0.850
0.260
0.208
0.886
0.753

0.040
-0.570
-0.240
-0.140
-1.170
-2.390
-3.460
-1.220

1.003
0.991
3.607
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.839
1.115

0.480
-0.460
1.800
-0.040
-0.030
-0.040
-2.770
0.370

0.993
1.026
0.540
0.649
0.492
0.143
0.767
0.765

0.610
1.070
-1.000
-0.350
-0.560
-2.590
-2.220
-0.840

0.960
0.781

-0.160
-0.500

1.106
2.611

0.390
1.640

0.898
0.748

-0.350
-0.450

0.962
0.789
17.917

-0.070
-2.340
2.000

0.796
0.779
36.483

-0.350
-2.470
0.040

0.904
0.943
3.089

-0.160
-1.940
0.760

1.002
1.071

-0.410
0.110

0.955
0.316

-0.640
-1.740

1.025
2.222

-1.160
0.970

0.997
0.995
0.691
0.490
0.277
1.144
1.224
1.039

0.000
-0.280
-0.790
-0.580
-1.100
2.030
3.540
0.180

0.977
0.973
8.135
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.664
1.247

1.100
-1.400
2.930
-0.040
-0.030
-0.030
3.780
0.730

0.974
0.988
0.862
0.703
0.914
1.586
1.250
0.849

1.530
-0.500
-0.250
-0.280
-0.070
2.370
3.570
-0.570

208

Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is
decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
(NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE OR
NEUTRAL)
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
Mover (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
Income
General Trust towards others
Trust towards Family and
Relatives
Felt Unsafe in NH
Feeling that own race is
decreasing
Neighborhood SES
Constant
(POSITIVE TO NEGATIVE OR
NEUTRAL)
Percentage Change DiversitySTAYER
Mover (0,1)
Percentage Change DiversityMOVER
Age
Male
Parents born in U.S.
High school
College
Income
General Trust towards others

1.083
0.751

0.310
-0.580

2.069
2.582

2.170
1.570

0.918
1.053

-0.280
0.080

1.089
1.123
14.100

0.160
3.720
1.810

0.863
2.779
18.743

-0.220
1.970
0.040

0.476
1.440
7.250

-2.170
2.840
1.320

1.000
1.027

-0.460
0.040

0.987
0.330

0.410
-1.630

1.093
2.900

2.320
1.250

0.995
0.992
0.843
0.932
0.336
0.299
1.118
0.795

0.120
-0.430
-0.340
-0.060
-0.890
-1.010
2.320
-0.930

1.013
0.993
4.364
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.112
1.591

0.200
-0.360
2.020
-0.040
-0.030
-0.040
3.470
1.640

1.030
0.986
0.384
1.485
1.463
1.617
1.323
0.785

0.660
-0.580
-1.510
0.310
2.290
2.380
-1.940
-0.750

1.108
0.252

0.360
-2.330

1.005
0.578

0.020
1.570

0.783
1.152

-0.790
0.220

0.189
1.177
15.003

-2.170
1.580
1.750

0.555
1.449
27.464

-0.860
2.270
0.040

1.076
1.743
4.279

0.110
0.840
0.950

0.988
1.523

0.710
0.660

0.956
0.332

-2.010
-1.580

0.991
3.571

-1.030
1.470

1.044
0.994
1.080
0.942
0.226
0.465
0.987
1.000

-2.220
-0.320
0.150
-0.050
-2.200
-2.640
-4.560
0.000

1.022
0.990
10.189
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.761
1.098

2.650
-0.500
3.170
-0.030
-0.030
-0.030
-3.550
0.300

1.017
1.012
0.646
0.580
0.573
0.437
0.974
0.779

1.410
2.460
-0.670
-2.420
-2.420
-0.660
-2.340
-0.770
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Trust towards Family and
Relatives
0.879 -0.480
1.153
Felt Unsafe in NH
1.120 2.370
1.734
Feeling that own race is
decreasing
0.491 -1.140
0.725
Neighborhood SES
0.673 -2.950
0.789
Constant
5.007 1.040
19.454
* Low Initial Diversity Model: N= 234, Pseudo-R2= .058
* Medium Initial Diversity Model: N= 229, Pseudo-R2= .142
* High Initial Diversity Model: N= 210, Pseudo-R2= .097
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0.490
0.870

0.748
0.896

-0.920
-0.160

-0.460
-1.980
0.040

0.737
0.856
2.326

-0.440
-1.988
0.530
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